ACC 335 Topic 6 user access rights review example

Accounting Information Systems Grand Canyon University Free custom sample in 24 to 48h

This ACC 335 Topic 6 sample paper is a user access rights review that works from a distributor's system export of users and roles, not its organization chart. It belongs to GCU ACC 335, Accounting Information Systems, the course listed as ACC-335 in the Grand Canyon University BS in Accounting. Each account's permissions are compared with the duties its holder performs. Three findings follow: a payroll clerk who can add employees, approve timesheets and edit direct deposit; an active account for a supervisor who left in March; and one administrator login shared by two people. Each finding states the risk, whether the log would reveal misuse and the smallest permission change that closes it, with a priority order.

CourseACC 335 Accounting Information Systems
TopicTopic 6
Paper typeUser access rights review
LengthAbout 980 words, 2 pages
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolGrand Canyon University (GCU)
ProgramBS in Accounting
UpdatedSeptember 2026

Free sample paper for ACC 335 Topic 6

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What the System Allows Versus What People Do: A User Access Rights Review of Cedar Basin Plumbing Supply's Accounting System

[Author Name]

Colangelo College of Business, Grand Canyon University

ACC-335: Accounting Information Systems

Topic 6 Assignment

[Instructor Name]

[Date]

The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.

What this page is doingThe title names the comparison that produces every finding, permissions set against actual duties. Cedar Basin Plumbing Supply and its users are composites; the standards cited are real.
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What the System Allows Versus What People Do: A User Access Rights Review of Cedar Basin Plumbing Supply's Accounting System

Method

This review of Cedar Basin Plumbing Supply's accounting system works from the system's own export of user accounts and assigned roles, pulled on the last day of the quarter, not from the organization chart. An organization chart shows what people are supposed to do; the export shows what the system will let them do, and fraud or error uses the second. Each account was compared with the duties its holder actually performs, confirmed by a short interview and by the activity log for the quarter. Wherever permissions exceed duties, or an account has no current holder, that difference is a finding.

Two principles frame the review. Least privilege holds that each user should have only the access needed for their duties. Separation of duties holds that no user should have enough access to complete and conceal a harmful transaction alone (Joint Task Force, 2020).

Accounts Reviewed

Table 1 lists the accounts with access to financial functions. Warehouse and sales counter accounts with view-only access were checked and are omitted.

Table 1

Financial System Users, Roles and Duties

User accountRoles assigned in the systemDuties actually performedGap
tmarsh, payroll clerkPayroll entry; timesheet approval; employee master editEnters hours, runs payrollCan add employees, approve their time and change bank details
rbell, warehouse supervisorInventory adjustments; receivingNone: left the company in MarchActive account for a departed employee
admin, sharedSystem administratorUsed by the controller and the IT contractorNo individual accountability
kwong, payables clerkVendor invoices; payment runsEnters invoices, prepares payment runsNone found in this review
jparks, controllerApprovals; general ledger; reportsApproves payments and journal entriesNone found in this review

The Three Findings

Table 2 states each finding with its risk, whether the system log would reveal misuse and the smallest permission change that would close it.

Table 2

Access Findings

FindingRiskWould the log reveal misuse?Smallest change that closes it
Payroll clerk holds three payroll powersA fictitious employee could be created, paid and routed to the clerk's own accountPartly: the log records master file changes, but no one reviews itRemove employee master edit and timesheet approval from the clerk; give master edits to the office manager and approvals to supervisors
Departed supervisor's account activeSomeone who knows the password could adjust inventory to hide theftYes, under the supervisor's name, which would mislead any investigationDisable the account today; add account removal to the exit checklist
Shared administrator loginAny change made under it cannot be traced to a personNo: the log shows only adminIssue named administrator accounts to each user and retire the shared one

Finding 1: The Payroll Clerk

The payroll clerk's role combines three powers that belong apart: adding an employee to the master file, approving timesheets and editing direct deposit details. Together they allow a complete payroll fraud. The clerk could add a fictitious employee, approve hours for that person each pay period and route the pay to a bank account the clerk controls. No one else would need to act. Payroll schemes of this kind are a recognized category of occupational fraud (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2024).

The system log does record changes to the employee master file, so misuse would leave evidence, but no one reviews the log, so the evidence would sit unread. The clerk needs only to enter hours and run payroll. Removing master file editing and timesheet approval from the role, and giving them to the office manager and department supervisors respectively, closes the gap without changing the clerk's daily work.

Finding 2: The Departed Supervisor

The warehouse supervisor left in March, but the account remains active with inventory adjustment rights. The log shows no activity since the supervisor's last day, so there is no sign of misuse. The risk is that anyone who knew or guessed the password could post inventory adjustments to conceal missing stock, and the log would record them under the departed supervisor's name, pointing any investigation in the wrong direction. The cause is procedural: the exit checklist covers keys and equipment but not system accounts.

Finding 3: The Shared Administrator Login

The controller and the outside IT contractor share one administrator login. Administrator rights allow changing any role, including the ones reviewed here. Because both people use the same account, the log shows only that admin made a change, never who. Individual accountability, the ability to trace every action to one person, is a basic purpose of access controls (Romney et al., 2021). Named administrator accounts for each person, with the shared account disabled, restore it at no cost.

Why the Organization Chart Would Have Missed All Three

Reviewed against the organization chart, each account would have looked appropriate. The chart shows a payroll clerk in payroll, a warehouse supervisor in the warehouse and an administrator in the office. None of the three findings is visible at that level. The payroll clerk's extra powers came from a role template set up years ago, when one person did all of payroll alone, and never narrowed when the office manager was hired. The departed supervisor still appears in last year's chart. And the shared login is invisible in any chart, because it belongs to no position. The export, compared line by line with what people actually do, is the only source that shows what the system will permit. That is why access reviews in most control frameworks begin from the system's own list of users rather than from a staffing document.

Priority

Finding 2 should be fixed today, because disabling an account takes minutes. Finding 3 should follow within the week. Finding 1 needs the office manager and supervisors trained on their new tasks and should be completed before the next payroll cycle. Access should then be reviewed quarterly from a fresh export.

References

Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. (2024). Occupational fraud 2024: A report to the nations. https://legacy.acfe.com/report-to-the-nations/2024/

Joint Task Force. (2020). Security and privacy controls for information systems and organizations (NIST Special Publication 800-53, Rev. 5). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Romney, M. B., Steinbart, P. J., Summers, S. L., & Wood, D. A. (2021). Accounting information systems (15th ed.). Pearson.

ACC 335 Topic 6 instructions, in plain terms

The Topic 6 instructions in ACC-335 ask students to evaluate user access controls in an accounting system. Weak submissions review access against job titles. The assignment rewards reviews that start from the system's own list of users and roles, compare each account's permissions with the duties actually performed and treat every difference as a finding. Students should apply least privilege and separation of duties, write each finding with its risk, state whether the system log would reveal misuse, propose the smallest change that closes the gap and set priorities and a review cycle.

How this ACC 335 Topic 6 example is built

The finished review works from the system's own export of users and roles, not from the organization chart. Each account is listed with its assigned permissions and the duties the person actually performs, and wherever the two disagree, that difference is the finding. Three gaps are written up. The payroll clerk can add a new employee, approve timesheets and edit direct deposit details, which together allow a fictitious employee to be created, paid and routed to an account the clerk controls. An account belonging to a warehouse supervisor who left the company months ago is still active. Two people share a single administrator login, so nothing done under it can be attributed to either. Each finding names the risk, whether the system log would reveal misuse, and the smallest change in permissions that would close it.

ACC 335 Topic 6 rubric: what Excellent looks like

Faculty grading the access review reward findings drawn from the system export. Excellent reviews show a combination of payroll powers that allows a ghost employee from creation to payment. Credit goes to catching accounts of departed staff and shared logins that destroy accountability. The rubric values stating whether logs would reveal misuse and proposing the smallest fix. The highest level explains why an organization chart would have missed each finding and sets a quarterly review. Reviews built from job descriptions rather than system permissions usually lose marks.

ACC 335 Topic 6 help before you submit

The weakest reviews describe access in principle and never open the permissions report. Discussing least privilege with no account, role or right named could describe any system, and it finds nothing. Reviews built from job titles repeat what the organization intended and miss the right a role quietly carries. Excess permissions listed without the transaction they permit leave the reader unsure whether a gap is trivial or serious, and a payroll clerk able to create and pay an employee is plainly the latter. Terminated users and shared logins are frequently missed because they are not segregation problems, yet they defeat attribution, which every other control depends on. Recommending that all excess rights be removed, without checking whether a small team needs some of them for coverage, proposes a change the business will reverse within a month.

Get an ACC-335 Topic 6 example written to your instructions

Send the ACC-335 Topic 6 instructions, the rubric your classroom posts and any permissions list or case the assignment includes. You receive a custom example written to those criteria, with access taken from the system rather than the chart, excess rights traced to transactions, logging tested and a reviewer assigned, within 24 to 48 hours. The first one comes free.

More ACC 335 papers and BS in Accounting samples

ACC 335 Topic 6 questions, answered

Why not rely on the organization chart?

Because the chart records intended responsibility, while the system decides what each login can actually do. Permissions accumulate as people cover for colleagues, change jobs or receive temporary access that nobody removes. The gap between intended and actual access is exactly what the review exists to find, and starting from the chart assumes the answer before looking.

What is least privilege?

The principle that each account should hold only the permissions its user's job requires, and no more. It limits both deliberate misuse and honest mistakes, since a person who cannot post a journal entry cannot post a wrong one. In a small organization it has to be balanced against coverage, and the honest version of the review says where that balance was struck.

How often should access be reviewed?

Often enough that a departed employee's account or a leftover permission does not survive long. Many organizations review on a quarterly cycle, and immediately whenever someone leaves or changes roles. The frequency in the example should follow from the risk it describes, and the review should be performed by somebody who cannot change the permissions being reviewed.

Where can I find a free ACC 335 Topic 6 sample paper?

Everything is above: the method, accounts reviewed, the three findings, the payroll clerk, the departed supervisor, the shared administrator login, why the org chart missed them and priority. Send your user list for a free worked review.

Why is the payroll clerk a finding in ACC 335 Topic 6?

The clerk can add an employee, approve that person's hours and change bank details, so one person could create, pay and redirect pay for a fictitious employee.