| Course | ACC 335 Accounting Information Systems |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 6 |
| Paper type | User access rights review |
| Length | About 980 words, 2 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | BS in Accounting |
| Updated | September 2026 |
Free sample paper for ACC 335 Topic 6
What the System Allows Versus What People Do: A User Access Rights Review of Cedar Basin Plumbing Supply's Accounting System
[Author Name]
Colangelo College of Business, Grand Canyon University
ACC-335: Accounting Information Systems
Topic 6 Assignment
[Instructor Name]
[Date]
The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.
What the System Allows Versus What People Do: A User Access Rights Review of Cedar Basin Plumbing Supply's Accounting System
Method
This review of Cedar Basin Plumbing Supply's accounting system works from the system's own export of user accounts and assigned roles, pulled on the last day of the quarter, not from the organization chart. An organization chart shows what people are supposed to do; the export shows what the system will let them do, and fraud or error uses the second. Each account was compared with the duties its holder actually performs, confirmed by a short interview and by the activity log for the quarter. Wherever permissions exceed duties, or an account has no current holder, that difference is a finding.
Two principles frame the review. Least privilege holds that each user should have only the access needed for their duties. Separation of duties holds that no user should have enough access to complete and conceal a harmful transaction alone (Joint Task Force, 2020).
Accounts Reviewed
Table 1 lists the accounts with access to financial functions. Warehouse and sales counter accounts with view-only access were checked and are omitted.
Table 1
Financial System Users, Roles and Duties
| User account | Roles assigned in the system | Duties actually performed | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| tmarsh, payroll clerk | Payroll entry; timesheet approval; employee master edit | Enters hours, runs payroll | Can add employees, approve their time and change bank details |
| rbell, warehouse supervisor | Inventory adjustments; receiving | None: left the company in March | Active account for a departed employee |
| admin, shared | System administrator | Used by the controller and the IT contractor | No individual accountability |
| kwong, payables clerk | Vendor invoices; payment runs | Enters invoices, prepares payment runs | None found in this review |
| jparks, controller | Approvals; general ledger; reports | Approves payments and journal entries | None found in this review |
The Three Findings
Table 2 states each finding with its risk, whether the system log would reveal misuse and the smallest permission change that would close it.
Table 2
Access Findings
| Finding | Risk | Would the log reveal misuse? | Smallest change that closes it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Payroll clerk holds three payroll powers | A fictitious employee could be created, paid and routed to the clerk's own account | Partly: the log records master file changes, but no one reviews it | Remove employee master edit and timesheet approval from the clerk; give master edits to the office manager and approvals to supervisors |
| Departed supervisor's account active | Someone who knows the password could adjust inventory to hide theft | Yes, under the supervisor's name, which would mislead any investigation | Disable the account today; add account removal to the exit checklist |
| Shared administrator login | Any change made under it cannot be traced to a person | No: the log shows only admin | Issue named administrator accounts to each user and retire the shared one |
Finding 1: The Payroll Clerk
The payroll clerk's role combines three powers that belong apart: adding an employee to the master file, approving timesheets and editing direct deposit details. Together they allow a complete payroll fraud. The clerk could add a fictitious employee, approve hours for that person each pay period and route the pay to a bank account the clerk controls. No one else would need to act. Payroll schemes of this kind are a recognized category of occupational fraud (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2024).
The system log does record changes to the employee master file, so misuse would leave evidence, but no one reviews the log, so the evidence would sit unread. The clerk needs only to enter hours and run payroll. Removing master file editing and timesheet approval from the role, and giving them to the office manager and department supervisors respectively, closes the gap without changing the clerk's daily work.
Finding 2: The Departed Supervisor
The warehouse supervisor left in March, but the account remains active with inventory adjustment rights. The log shows no activity since the supervisor's last day, so there is no sign of misuse. The risk is that anyone who knew or guessed the password could post inventory adjustments to conceal missing stock, and the log would record them under the departed supervisor's name, pointing any investigation in the wrong direction. The cause is procedural: the exit checklist covers keys and equipment but not system accounts.
Finding 3: The Shared Administrator Login
The controller and the outside IT contractor share one administrator login. Administrator rights allow changing any role, including the ones reviewed here. Because both people use the same account, the log shows only that admin made a change, never who. Individual accountability, the ability to trace every action to one person, is a basic purpose of access controls (Romney et al., 2021). Named administrator accounts for each person, with the shared account disabled, restore it at no cost.
Why the Organization Chart Would Have Missed All Three
Reviewed against the organization chart, each account would have looked appropriate. The chart shows a payroll clerk in payroll, a warehouse supervisor in the warehouse and an administrator in the office. None of the three findings is visible at that level. The payroll clerk's extra powers came from a role template set up years ago, when one person did all of payroll alone, and never narrowed when the office manager was hired. The departed supervisor still appears in last year's chart. And the shared login is invisible in any chart, because it belongs to no position. The export, compared line by line with what people actually do, is the only source that shows what the system will permit. That is why access reviews in most control frameworks begin from the system's own list of users rather than from a staffing document.
Priority
Finding 2 should be fixed today, because disabling an account takes minutes. Finding 3 should follow within the week. Finding 1 needs the office manager and supervisors trained on their new tasks and should be completed before the next payroll cycle. Access should then be reviewed quarterly from a fresh export.
References
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. (2024). Occupational fraud 2024: A report to the nations. https://legacy.acfe.com/report-to-the-nations/2024/
Joint Task Force. (2020). Security and privacy controls for information systems and organizations (NIST Special Publication 800-53, Rev. 5). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5
Romney, M. B., Steinbart, P. J., Summers, S. L., & Wood, D. A. (2021). Accounting information systems (15th ed.). Pearson.
ACC 335 Topic 6 instructions, in plain terms
The Topic 6 instructions in ACC-335 ask students to evaluate user access controls in an accounting system. Weak submissions review access against job titles. The assignment rewards reviews that start from the system's own list of users and roles, compare each account's permissions with the duties actually performed and treat every difference as a finding. Students should apply least privilege and separation of duties, write each finding with its risk, state whether the system log would reveal misuse, propose the smallest change that closes the gap and set priorities and a review cycle.
How this ACC 335 Topic 6 example is built
The finished review works from the system's own export of users and roles, not from the organization chart. Each account is listed with its assigned permissions and the duties the person actually performs, and wherever the two disagree, that difference is the finding. Three gaps are written up. The payroll clerk can add a new employee, approve timesheets and edit direct deposit details, which together allow a fictitious employee to be created, paid and routed to an account the clerk controls. An account belonging to a warehouse supervisor who left the company months ago is still active. Two people share a single administrator login, so nothing done under it can be attributed to either. Each finding names the risk, whether the system log would reveal misuse, and the smallest change in permissions that would close it.
ACC 335 Topic 6 rubric: what Excellent looks like
Faculty grading the access review reward findings drawn from the system export. Excellent reviews show a combination of payroll powers that allows a ghost employee from creation to payment. Credit goes to catching accounts of departed staff and shared logins that destroy accountability. The rubric values stating whether logs would reveal misuse and proposing the smallest fix. The highest level explains why an organization chart would have missed each finding and sets a quarterly review. Reviews built from job descriptions rather than system permissions usually lose marks.
ACC 335 Topic 6 help before you submit
The weakest reviews describe access in principle and never open the permissions report. Discussing least privilege with no account, role or right named could describe any system, and it finds nothing. Reviews built from job titles repeat what the organization intended and miss the right a role quietly carries. Excess permissions listed without the transaction they permit leave the reader unsure whether a gap is trivial or serious, and a payroll clerk able to create and pay an employee is plainly the latter. Terminated users and shared logins are frequently missed because they are not segregation problems, yet they defeat attribution, which every other control depends on. Recommending that all excess rights be removed, without checking whether a small team needs some of them for coverage, proposes a change the business will reverse within a month.
Get an ACC-335 Topic 6 example written to your instructions
Send the ACC-335 Topic 6 instructions, the rubric your classroom posts and any permissions list or case the assignment includes. You receive a custom example written to those criteria, with access taken from the system rather than the chart, excess rights traced to transactions, logging tested and a reviewer assigned, within 24 to 48 hours. The first one comes free.
More ACC 335 papers and BS in Accounting samples
- ACC 335 Topic 1: Cycle Responsibility Map
- ACC 335 Topic 2: Expenditure Cycle Flowchart
- ACC 335 Topic 3: Design Versus Operation Memo
- ACC 335 Topic 4: Incompatible Duties Matrix
- ACC 335 Topic 5: Control Cost Discussion Post
- ACC 335 Topic 7: Control Weakness Finding
- ACC 335 Topic 8: Compensating Control Plan
- ACC 260 Topic 6: Linked Budget Schedules
- ACC 250 Topic 6: Useful Life Comparison Memo
- ACC 240 Topic 6: Merchandising Entry Set
ACC 335 Topic 6 questions, answered
Why not rely on the organization chart?
Because the chart records intended responsibility, while the system decides what each login can actually do. Permissions accumulate as people cover for colleagues, change jobs or receive temporary access that nobody removes. The gap between intended and actual access is exactly what the review exists to find, and starting from the chart assumes the answer before looking.
What is least privilege?
The principle that each account should hold only the permissions its user's job requires, and no more. It limits both deliberate misuse and honest mistakes, since a person who cannot post a journal entry cannot post a wrong one. In a small organization it has to be balanced against coverage, and the honest version of the review says where that balance was struck.
How often should access be reviewed?
Often enough that a departed employee's account or a leftover permission does not survive long. Many organizations review on a quarterly cycle, and immediately whenever someone leaves or changes roles. The frequency in the example should follow from the risk it describes, and the review should be performed by somebody who cannot change the permissions being reviewed.
Where can I find a free ACC 335 Topic 6 sample paper?
Everything is above: the method, accounts reviewed, the three findings, the payroll clerk, the departed supervisor, the shared administrator login, why the org chart missed them and priority. Send your user list for a free worked review.
Why is the payroll clerk a finding in ACC 335 Topic 6?
The clerk can add an employee, approve that person's hours and change bank details, so one person could create, pay and redirect pay for a fictitious employee.