| Course | ACC 361 Intermediate Managerial Accounting |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 8 |
| Paper type | Control system incentive review |
| Length | About 840 words, 1 pages |
| Format | Memo with APA 7 references |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | BS in Accounting |
| Updated | September 2026 |
Free sample paper for ACC 361 Topic 8
Memorandum
To: Chief financial officer, Tri-State Building Supply
From: [Author Name], financial planning and analysis
Date: [Date]
Re: How the regional bonus plan shapes managers' decisions, and two redesigns
Summary
The regional managers' bonus plan rewards four behaviors that cost the company money: building slack into budgets, delaying sales once a bonus is capped, taking large write-offs in bad years and deferring maintenance past year end. This review sets out the evidence for each, estimates what the behaviors cost and compares two redesigns with keeping the plan. It recommends a linear bonus with no cap or floor, measured against targets set from trend rather than negotiated. All figures are illustrative.
The Plan as It Works Today
Each regional manager negotiates an annual operating profit budget with the vice president of operations. The bonus is zero below 90% of budget, rises in a straight line from 90% to 120% and stops rising at 120%. Profit is measured for the calendar year.
Budget Slack
Table 1 compares three years of negotiated budgets with results for the six regions combined.
Table 1
Budgets Against Results, Three Years
| Six regions combined, operating profit | Year 1 | Year 2 | Year 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Negotiated budget | $8.2 million | $8.5 million | $8.7 million |
| Actual | $8.9 million | $9.3 million | $9.7 million |
| Actual above budget | 8.5% | 9.4% | 11.5% |
| Regions paid at or above 100% of target | 5 of 6 | 5 of 6 | 6 of 6 |
Reading the Slack
Beating the budget by 8% to 12% every year, with nearly every region paid at or above target, is more consistent with targets set low than with repeated outperformance. A plan that pays managers for exceeding targets they help set gives them a reason to understate what they can achieve, and the budget then stops being useful for planning (Jensen, 2003).
The Cap, the Floor and the Calendar
Table 2 lists each design feature, the behavior it rewards and the evidence found in the records.
Table 2
Plan Features and the Behaviors They Reward
| Plan feature | Behavior it rewards | Evidence in the records |
|---|---|---|
| Negotiated budget | Building slack into targets | Actual beat budget by 8.5% to 11.5% three years running |
| 120% cap | Delaying sales into January once the cap is reached | Two regions over the cap by November shipped 31% less in December than in the prior year and 44% more in January |
| 90% floor | Taking every write-off in a year already lost | The North region, at 78% of target, wrote down $180,000 of slow inventory in one December |
| Annual measurement | Deferring maintenance past year end | Fourth-quarter repair spending averaged $38,000; first-quarter averaged $104,000 |
What the Evidence Shows
A manager already at the 120% cap earns nothing more for extra sales this year, but those sales would raise next year's result. Holding orders until January is rational under the plan and costly to the company, since some customers will not wait. A manager far below the 90% floor earns nothing this year whatever happens, so taking every available write-off now clears the way for a better result next year. Healy (1985) found evidence consistent with exactly this pattern: managers' accounting choices tended to reduce reported income when earnings were below the bonus floor or above the cap, and to increase it in between.
Deferred maintenance follows from annual measurement. Repairs postponed from December cost the same or more in January, but they fall in a year when the manager has not yet started to worry about the bonus.
Options, Costed
Table 3 compares keeping the plan with two redesigns.
Table 3
Keeping the Plan Versus Two Redesigns
| Option | What changes | Estimated cost | Main risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| Keep the plan | Nothing | About $210,000 a year of profit shifted, deferred or understated, by the estimates above | Continues all four behaviors |
| Linear bonus, no cap or floor, targets set from trend | Payout rises or falls with every dollar of profit; budget no longer negotiated | About $45,000 a year more in bonuses in strong years | Targets set from trend may feel imposed |
| Pay relative to peer regions | Bonus depends on rank against the other five regions | About $20,000 a year to administer; payout unchanged on average | Regions differ in markets, so rank reflects luck as well as skill |
Recommendation
Adopt a linear bonus with no cap or floor, measured against targets set centrally from each region's three-year trend adjusted for market growth. Removing the cap removes the reason to delay sales; removing the floor removes the reason to take write-offs in a bad year; and setting targets from trend removes the reason to negotiate slack. The additional payout in strong years, about $45,000, is well below the roughly $210,000 of profit the current plan's behaviors are estimated to cost. Add a maintenance measure, repair spending as a share of equipment value averaged over two years, so that deferral no longer helps.
Relative performance pay was considered and not recommended. It would remove the negotiation over targets, but Tri-State's regions face very different local construction markets, so a manager's rank would reflect the market as much as the manager. Control systems work best when the measures capture what managers can influence and reward the decisions the company wants (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2017). The linear plan comes closer to that for Tri-State.
References
Healy, P. M. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), 85-107. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(85)90029-1
Jensen, M. C. (2003). Paying people to lie: The truth about the budgeting process. European Financial Management, 9(3), 379-406. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-036X.00226
Merchant, K. A., & Van der Stede, W. A. (2017). Management control systems: Performance measurement, evaluation and incentives (4th ed.). Pearson.
The ACC-361 Topic 8 assignment instructions
The Topic 8 instructions in ACC-361 ask students to evaluate a management control or incentive system. Weak submissions describe the plan without evidence of its effects. The assignment rewards reviews that take each design feature in turn, name the behavior it rewards and find evidence of that behavior in the records, such as budgets consistently beaten or sales shifted across year end. Students should connect the patterns to research on budgeting and bonus plans, estimate what the behaviors cost, compare at least two redesigns with keeping the plan and recommend one with its risks.
Inside the ACC 361 Topic 8 example
Written to the chief financial officer, the review treats the control system as a set of rewards with observable effects. Each design feature is taken in turn. The negotiated budget invites slack, and the review estimates it by comparing three years of budgets with results. The 120 percent cap gives a manager already over target a reason to delay orders into January, and the 90 percent floor gives one far below target a reason to take every write-off in the same bad year. Deferred maintenance near year end shows up as a spike in first-quarter repairs. Figures throughout are illustrative. Two redesigns are then costed against keeping the plan: a linear bonus with no cap or floor, and pay tied to results relative to peer regions. One is recommended, and the rejected option keeps its price on the page.
Reading the ACC 361 Topic 8 rubric
Faculty grading the incentive review reward features linked to observed behavior. Excellent reviews estimate budget slack from several years of results and find sales delayed by a cap and write-offs taken at a floor. Credit goes to research on how bonus bounds shape accounting choices. The rubric values costing each redesign against the estimated cost of current behavior. The highest level recommends a design, adds a measure for deferred maintenance and explains why the alternative was rejected. Reviews that criticize incentives in general without evidence usually land in a middle band.
Common ACC 361 Topic 8 mistakes, and how to avoid them
At the close of the course, a review earns credit by showing the system producing behavior, and describing the system well earns very little. A paper summarizing the bonus plan and calling it well intentioned has assessed the design's purpose and nothing about its effects. Claims that managers pad budgets or shift sales, offered without any pattern from the records, read as speculation and draw that comment. Redesigns proposed without the new behavior they might invite repeat the original mistake one level up. Recommending a change with no cost set against keeping the plan, or against the redesign turned down, leaves the chief financial officer with a preference instead of a comparison. A system reviewed with no manager named for any measure has not been reviewed as a control system at all.
Get an ACC-361 Topic 8 example written to your instructions
Send the ACC-361 Topic 8 instructions, your rubric and the control system or bonus plan your assignment describes. We write a custom example to them, with each design feature traced to the behavior it rewards, the evidence stated, two redesigns costed against the current plan and an owner named for every measure, back in 24 to 48 hours. The first one is free.
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ACC 361 Topic 8 questions, answered
What is budget slack, and why does a negotiated budget invite it?
Slack is the cushion a manager builds into a budget by understating revenue or overstating costs, so the target becomes easier to meet. When the same person helps set the target and is paid for beating it, the incentive to build a cushion is obvious. Comparing several years of budgets with actual results is the usual way a review estimates how much slack exists.
Why does a bonus cap cause timing problems?
Because income above the cap earns nothing this year and could earn something next year. A manager who has already reached the ceiling has a reason to delay shipments, hold back orders or pull expenses into the current period. The mirror problem sits at the floor, where a manager with no chance of reaching it may move every possible cost into the bad year.
Is there a control system with no side effects?
Probably not, which is why the review costs both options rather than presenting the redesign as a cure. Every measure can be improved by something other than the behavior it was meant to encourage. The realistic aim is a design whose side effects are smaller and easier to detect than the current ones, and the example says what evidence would show that.
Where can I find a free ACC 361 Topic 8 sample paper?
Read the full review above, from the summary and the plan as it works through budget slack, the cap and floor, the evidence, costed options and the recommendation. Share your company's plan for a free worked review.
Why remove the cap in ACC 361 Topic 8?
A manager already at 120 percent earns nothing more this year, so holding orders until January is rational under the plan and costs the company sales.