| Course | ACC 653 Advanced Managerial Cost Accounting |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 7 |
| Paper type | Transfer pricing policy memo |
| Length | About 770 words, 1 pages |
| Format | Memo with APA 7 references |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | MS in Accounting |
| Updated | September 2026 |
Free sample paper for ACC 653 Topic 7
Memorandum
To: Chief financial officer
From: [Author Name], corporate controller's office
Date: [Date]
Re: Replacing the market-price rule for internal circuit board transfers
What the Current Policy Cost
Last year the assembly division bought 30,000 control boards from an outside discount supplier at $76 each, while our own controls division had 30,000 boards of idle capacity and could have made them for $45 of variable cost. The company paid $31 a board more than it needed to, about $930,000 in total. Both division managers acted sensibly under the current policy, which sets the internal price at the $80 market price: at $80, the assembly manager saved $4 a board by buying outside, and at $80, the controls manager had no reason to cut the price. The policy, not the managers, produced the loss. Figures are illustrative.
The Facts
The controls division can make 100,000 boards a year and has outside orders for 70,000 at $80. Each board costs $45 in variable production cost, and outside sales carry $5 of selling and shipping cost that internal transfers do not. The assembly division needs 30,000 boards a year, and its best outside offer is $76.
The Minimum Transfer Price
The lowest price the controls division should accept is its variable cost plus the contribution it gives up by selling internally instead of outside (Datar & Rajan, 2021). Table 1 applies that rule in the two situations the division can face.
Table 1
Minimum Transfer Price
| Controls division situation | Minimum transfer price | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Idle capacity: 30,000 boards unused | $45 | Only variable cost is given up; no outside sale is lost |
| Full capacity: every board could be sold outside | $75 | Variable cost of $45 plus lost contribution of $30: the $80 price less $45 variable and $5 avoidable selling cost |
Reading the Rule
When the controls division has idle capacity, as it did last year, supplying the assembly division gives up no outside sale, so the minimum is $45. Any internal price between $45 and the assembly division's $76 outside option leaves both divisions better off than an outside purchase, and the company saves $31 a board. When the controls division is at full capacity, each board sold internally displaces an outside sale that would have contributed $30 after selling costs, so the minimum is $75. At that point, buying outside at $76 costs the company only $1 a board more than an internal transfer, and either choice is reasonable.
Policy Options
Table 2
Transfer Pricing Policy Options
| Policy | How it works | Strength | Weakness |
|---|---|---|---|
| Market price, current policy | Internal price equals the $80 outside price | Simple; divisions judged as if independent | Ignores idle capacity and selling costs saved; drove the $930,000 loss |
| Market price less avoidable costs, variable cost when idle | $75 at capacity, $45 when idle | Matches the company's actual opportunity cost | Seller earns nothing on internal sales when idle, which it will resist |
| Negotiated within the range | Divisions agree a price between the minimum and the buyer's $76 alternative | Divisions share the gain; managers keep autonomy | Negotiation takes time and may need arbitration |
| Dual pricing | Seller credited at $75, buyer charged $45 | Both divisions see the right incentive | Divisional profits sum to more than company profit |
Recommendation
Replace the market-price rule with negotiated pricing within the range set by the minimum transfer price and the buying division's best outside offer, with two safeguards. First, the controls division must quote internally before the assembly division may buy outside, and the corporate controller's office will publish the minimum transfer price each quarter based on the controls division's capacity. Second, if the divisions cannot agree within two weeks, the controller's office sets a price at the midpoint of the range. In last year's situation, the midpoint would have been about $60, giving each division a share of the $31 saving.
Negotiated pricing preserves the divisions' autonomy, which the company values in evaluating division managers as profit center heads, while ensuring that the company's opportunity cost sets the boundaries. Research on transfer pricing in practice has found that no single method suits every situation, and that the choice should follow from how the company is organized and what it wants managers to decide (Eccles, 1985). Dual pricing was considered and rejected: it gives the right incentives, but because divisional profits would sum to more than company profit, it weakens the credibility of divisional performance reports (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2017).
Next Steps
If you approve, the controller's office will draft the policy for the division presidents, calculate this quarter's minimum price, currently $45 with the controls division below capacity, and brief both division managers so that next quarter's board requirements are sourced internally.
References
Datar, S. M., & Rajan, M. V. (2021). Horngren's cost accounting: A managerial emphasis (17th ed.). Pearson.
Eccles, R. G. (1985). The transfer pricing problem: A theory for practice. Lexington Books.
Merchant, K. A., & Van der Stede, W. A. (2017). Management control systems: Performance measurement, evaluation and incentives (4th ed.). Pearson.
ACC 653 Topic 7 instructions, in plain terms
ACC-653 Topic 7 asks students to evaluate and recommend a transfer pricing policy. Many memos describe the methods without showing their consequences. The assignment rewards memos that quantify what the current policy costs the company, compute the minimum transfer price as variable cost plus opportunity cost under different capacity conditions, and identify the buying division's maximum price. Students should compare policies such as market price, cost-based, negotiated and dual pricing on incentives and autonomy, recommend one with safeguards and describe implementation steps.
How this ACC 653 Topic 7 example is built
Written for the finance chief, the memo puts the loss ahead of the policy. All figures are illustrative. The controls division has capacity for 100,000 boards and outside orders for 70,000; each costs $45 in variable production cost, plus $5 of selling cost when sold outside at $80. Policy sets the internal price at $80, so the assembly division buys its 30,000 boards from a discount supplier at $76, and the company pays $31 a board more than its own idle capacity would have cost. The memo then works the minimum transfer price, variable cost plus opportunity cost: $45 with idle capacity, $75 at full capacity, against the buyer's ceiling of $76. A price of market less the avoided selling cost, $75, keeps the purchase inside in both states.
Reading the ACC 653 Topic 7 rubric
Faculty grading the transfer pricing memo reward the loss quantified and the range computed. Excellent memos show how a market-price rule with idle capacity leads to outside purchases above variable cost. Credit goes to computing minimum transfer prices for idle and full capacity, including avoidable selling costs. The rubric values comparing policies on goal congruence and divisional autonomy. The highest level recommends a policy with a quoting rule and arbitration and explains why dual pricing was rejected. Memos that endorse market price without considering capacity usually land in a middle band.
ACC 653 Topic 7 help: mistakes that cost marks
Credit on this memo turns on whether the writer sees that a correct price can still produce the wrong purchase. Papers that defend market-based transfer pricing as objective, without asking whether the seller has idle capacity, recommend the rule that created the loss. Computing the minimum transfer price for one capacity state only leaves the policy untested in the other, and the case is usually built so the answer changes. A recommendation of variable cost transfer, adopted because it makes the company-wide decision correct, ignores that the seller then earns nothing on internal sales and will favor outside customers whenever it can. Dual pricing proposed without stating the profit it leaves unreconciled hides its cost from the reader. Memos that never show each division's result under the proposed price have not checked whether either manager will accept it.
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Send your ACC-653 Topic 7 instructions, the rubric and the divisional cost, capacity and price data your section supplied. We write a custom example to them, with the minimum transfer price derived for each capacity state, candidate policies tested against it, divisional results shown and the recommendation defended against its strongest rival, back in 24 to 48 hours. Your first is free.
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ACC 653 Topic 7 questions, answered
What is the general rule for a minimum transfer price?
The selling division's floor is its variable cost of the transfer plus the contribution it gives up by supplying inside rather than selling outside. With idle capacity it gives up nothing, so the floor is variable cost alone. At full capacity it gives up the outside contribution. The buying division's ceiling is what it would pay an outside supplier, and any price between the two leaves the company no worse off.
Why not simply let head office decide every internal purchase?
Because decentralization exists to let division managers decide with local knowledge and be judged on the results. Head office can override a sourcing choice, but doing so routinely removes the autonomy the divisional structure was built for and weakens the profit measure used to evaluate the managers. A well-designed transfer price aims to make the choice each manager prefers the choice the company prefers.
Do taxes change the analysis?
Across national borders, often a great deal, since transfer prices shift taxable income between jurisdictions and tax authorities expect them to meet an arm's-length standard. The case in this example involves two domestic divisions, so the memo sets tax aside and says so. Where your case spans countries, many sections expect the tax constraint discussed alongside the incentive question, and the example would add that part.
Where can I find a free ACC 653 Topic 7 sample paper?
This page holds the complete memo: what the current policy cost, the facts, the minimum transfer price and how to read it, policy options, the recommendation and next steps. Tell us your divisions for a free worked memo.
What is the minimum transfer price with idle capacity in ACC 653 Topic 7?
$45, the variable cost, because selling internally gives up no outside sale, so any price up to the buyer's $76 alternative benefits the company.