| Course | BUS 655 Sports Business Analytics |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 3 |
| Paper type | Price elasticity estimate |
| Length | About 1,080 words, 4 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | MBA |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for BUS 655 Topic 3
Why Higher Prices Seemed to Sell More Tickets: Estimating Price Elasticity by Zone at a Composite Soccer Club From a Mid-Season Price Change
[Author Name]
Colangelo College of Business, Grand Canyon University
BUS-655: Sports Business Analytics
Topic 3 Assignment
[Instructor Name]
[Date]
The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.
Why Higher Prices Seemed to Sell More Tickets: Estimating Price Elasticity by Zone at a Composite Soccer Club From a Mid-Season Price Change
The Question and the Trap
Riverbend FC's general manager sets next season's prices for four seating zones by December 1 and wants to know how much single-game sales in each zone would fall if prices rose. That is a question about price elasticity: the percentage change in tickets sold for a one percent change in price. All figures below are illustrative composites.
The obvious approach fails. When the club's three seasons of match-level data are plotted, matches with higher average prices also sold more tickets. Taken at face value, that would mean raising prices increases sales. It does not. The club already charged more for matches people wanted to see, such as rivalry games and Saturday evenings, so high prices and high sales both reflect strong demand. Price is responding to demand, not the other way around. Any estimate built on that raw relationship would mislead the general manager badly (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).
Finding Price Changes That Demand Did Not Cause
What is needed is price variation that did not come from demand. Last season offered one. After the ninth home match, the club raised single-game prices in two zones for operational reasons unrelated to demand: Zone B, the sideline corners, went from $30 to $34 when new seats were installed, and Zone D, the standing supporters' end, went from $20 to $23 to cover the cost of added stewards required by the league. Zones A, center sideline at $38, and C, the family end at $24, did not change.
That creates a comparison. If sales in Zones B and D fell after match nine relative to their own earlier level, part of the fall might be due to price and part to something else that changed for every zone at once, such as summer heat or a poor run of results. Zones A and C show what that something else did. Subtracting their change from the change in B and D isolates the effect of price. This difference-in-differences design rests on one assumption: that without the price change, sales in B and D would have moved in step with A and C. The first half of the season supports that, since the four zones' sales tracked each other closely through the first nine matches.
Measuring Sales
Sales are measured as single-game tickets sold per match in each zone, excluding season members, whose prices did not change. To account for different opponents and kickoff times, each match's sales are expressed relative to the attendance model's forecast for that match, so a rivalry game is not mistaken for a price effect. Sales are also split by when the ticket was bought: more than 21 days before the match, 4 to 21 days before, and in the final three days.
Results by Zone
Table 1
Estimated Price Elasticity of Single-Game Sales by Zone, Illustrative
| Zone | Price change | Sales change relative to control zones | Elasticity | Range |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| B: sideline corners | +13.3% ($30 to $34) | -9.1% | -0.68 | -0.35 to -1.01 |
| D: supporters' standing end | +15.0% ($20 to $23) | -21.0% | -1.40 | -0.92 to -1.88 |
Table 1 shows the estimates. Eight matches after the change make a small sample, so every elasticity is shown with a band two standard errors wide on each side.
Zone B buyers are not very sensitive to price: sales fell by less than the price rose, so revenue in the zone increased. Zone D buyers are sensitive: sales fell by more than the price rose, so revenue fell. That fits who buys each zone. Sideline corner buyers are often adults buying a good seat for a particular match; supporters' end buyers are younger, buy more often and have a smaller budget per match.
Results by Timing
Table 2
Estimated Elasticity by Purchase Timing, Zones B and D Combined
| When bought | Share of single-game sales | Elasticity | Range |
|---|---|---|---|
| More than 21 days before | 28% | -0.52 | -0.10 to -0.94 |
| 4 to 21 days before | 41% | -0.95 | -0.60 to -1.30 |
| Final three days | 31% | -1.62 | -1.05 to -2.19 |
Elasticity also differs by when people buy, as Table 2 shows for both changed zones combined.
Early buyers have usually decided to attend a particular match and are less concerned about a few dollars. Late buyers are deciding whether to come at all and are much more sensitive. Secondary market research on dynamic pricing in baseball found a similar pattern, with prices for weaker games falling as kickoff approached because late demand was soft (Shapiro & Drayer, 2012).
What a Small Price Move Would Do
Table 3
Revenue Effect of a 5 Percent Price Increase by Zone
| Zone | Current price | 5% increase | Expected sales change | Expected revenue change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| B | $34 | $35.70 | -3.4% | +1.4%, about +$5,900 a season |
| D | $23 | $24.15 | -7.0% | -2.4%, about -$4,200 a season |
Table 3 turns the zone estimates into the revenue effect of a 5 percent price increase next season, using last season's single-game sales.
Even in Zone B the gain is small, and Zone D would lose money. A lost ticket also costs the club concession and merchandise spending, which these figures leave out. Clubs often price tickets where demand appears inelastic partly because each fan in the building spends money elsewhere, which makes fans worth more than the ticket alone (Krautmann & Berri, 2007). Including concessions would make the case for raising Zone D even weaker.
Limits
The estimates cover only the price ranges observed, $30 to $34 in Zone B and $20 to $23 in Zone D. A larger move would take the club outside the data, and elasticity may not stay the same there. The estimates come from eight matches after the change, so the ranges are wide; Zone B's true elasticity could be close to zero or close to minus one. Zones A and C had no price change, so the analysis says nothing direct about them.
Most importantly, the estimate cannot answer the renewal question. Season members did not face a price change, so the data show nothing about how members would respond to higher membership prices. That question needs a different design, such as testing renewal offers at different prices on randomly chosen members.
Recommendation
The general manager should consider a modest increase in Zone B, of no more than the 13 percent already tested, and should hold Zone D's price or offer late-purchase discounts there only through bundles that include food, which protect the published price. Any change should again be applied to some zones and not others so the club keeps learning, and the analysis should be repeated after next season with the larger sample.
References
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2009). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist's companion. Princeton University Press.
Krautmann, A. C., & Berri, D. J. (2007). Can we find it at the concessions? Understanding price elasticity in professional sports. Journal of Sports Economics, 8(2), 183-191. https://doi.org/10.1177/1527002505275093
Shapiro, S. L., & Drayer, J. (2012). A new age of demand-based pricing: An examination of dynamic ticket pricing and secondary market prices in Major League Baseball. Journal of Sport Management, 26(6), 532-546. https://doi.org/10.1123/jsm.26.6.532
BUS 655 Topic 3 instructions, in plain terms
BUS-655 Topic 3 asks students to estimate price elasticity of demand for tickets. The trap is a regression of sales on price using all matches, which picks up the club's own pricing of strong games. The assignment rewards analysis that explains that problem, finds price variation demand did not cause and compares changed and unchanged groups. Students should report elasticities by zone and by purchase timing with ranges, convert them into the revenue effect of a small price change, note what concessions spending implies and state the price range the estimate covers and the questions it cannot answer.
How this BUS 655 Topic 3 example is built
The estimate opens with the general manager's question and the misleading raw pattern. A section describes the mid-season price change in Zones B and D and explains the difference-in-differences comparison with Zones A and C. Sales are measured against the attendance forecast so opponents and kickoff times do not distort the result. Table 1 reports elasticity by zone and Table 2 by purchase timing, each with ranges. Table 3 converts the estimates into the revenue effect of a 5 percent increase. Limits cover the price range, the small sample and the renewal question, and a recommendation closes it.
Where the marks sit in the BUS 655 Topic 3 rubric
Instructors grading the elasticity estimate reward a paper that shows the trap before avoiding it. Top work finds a source of price variation that demand did not cause and states the assumption the comparison rests on, with evidence that it holds. Credit goes to elasticities reported with ranges and split by zone and timing, since buyers differ. The rubric values turning each estimate into revenue and recognizing that each lost fan also takes concession spending away. The highest band states the price range covered and admits what the estimate cannot answer, such as how members would respond. Papers that report one elasticity for the whole stadium tend to score lower.
Common BUS 655 Topic 3 mistakes, and how to avoid them
Most deductions on this estimate come from reading the raw slope as a demand curve. An elasticity that comes out positive, implying buyers want more tickets as prices rise, is the signature of prices set in response to expected demand, and papers reporting it without comment have measured the franchise's pricing habits, not its buyers. A single elasticity for the whole building costs marks too, because it averages people who respond very differently. Estimates with no range present a guess as a finding. Recommending price moves well outside anything the franchise has charged stretches the model past its data. Graders also expect the paper to state its own boundary: dynamic pricing backed by single-game data alone says nothing about members who committed before the season, and a paper silent on that gap has left the most expensive risk unexamined.
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BUS 655 Topic 3 questions, answered
Why does the raw data suggest higher prices sell more tickets?
Because the organization already set prices by expected demand. Rivalry games and marquee opponents carried higher prices and also drew bigger crowds, so price and sales rise together even though no buyer prefers paying more. Separating the two requires price changes made for some other reason, such as a scheduled tier adjustment, and the example argues that one qualifies because its timing followed the budget calendar.
What elasticity values are typical for tickets?
No single figure transfers between organizations, and the example does not borrow one. Sensitivity depends on the seat, the opponent, how close the game is and who is buying, which is why it is estimated from the sales history of the organization itself. Published studies can frame the discussion, but a number carried in from another market or sport is the error the course warns against.
Does this topic cover the fairness side of dynamic pricing?
Where the prompt asks, briefly, and as a constraint on the recommendation. The analytic question here is how buyers respond to price in the data. What repricing does to committed buyers and to perceptions of fairness usually gets separate treatment, often tied to renewal, and the example flags it as a limit rather than folding it into the estimate.
Where can I find a free BUS 655 Topic 3 sample paper?
The complete soccer pricing estimate is on this page, from the raw-data trap and the comparison design to the zone and timing tables, the revenue effects, the limits and the recommendation. Share the price changes your property has made and we can prepare a free estimate around them.
Why does the raw data mislead in BUS 655 Topic 3?
The club already charged more for matches people wanted to see, so high prices and high sales both reflect strong demand. Plotted together, they wrongly suggest that raising prices sells more tickets.