| Course | BUS 676 Advanced Conscious Capitalism: Free Market Perspectives |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 8 |
| Paper type | Objection defense paper |
| Length | About 980 words, 4 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | MS in Leadership |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for BUS 676 Topic 8
Either Redundant or Illegitimate? Defending Conscious Capitalism Against Its Strongest Objection Through a Coffee Roaster's Grower Contracts, and the Claim the Defense Must Give Up
[Author Name]
Colangelo College of Business, Grand Canyon University
BUS-676: Advanced Conscious Capitalism: Free Market Perspectives
Topic 8 Assignment
[Instructor Name]
[Date]
The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.
Either Redundant or Illegitimate? Defending Conscious Capitalism Against Its Strongest Objection Through a Coffee Roaster's Grower Contracts, and the Claim the Defense Must Give Up
The Objection
The strongest objection to conscious capitalism takes the form of a dilemma. Either a firm's stakeholder commitments increase long-run value, or they do not.
If they do, the doctrine is redundant. A firm following Jensen's enlightened value maximization would make the same commitments for profit-seeking reasons, since that approach already requires managers to attend to every group whose cooperation affects long-run value (Jensen, 2001). Purpose adds a vocabulary but no different decisions.
If they do not, the doctrine is illegitimate. Managers who honor commitments that reduce value are spending the owners' money on ends the owners did not choose, and Friedman likened that to taxation by an official nobody elected (Friedman, 1970).
Either way, the objection concludes, conscious capitalism has nothing distinctive and defensible to offer. This paper defends the doctrine against both horns, using one composite case, and then concedes the claim the defense cannot keep.
The Case
Altamira Coffee, a composite family-controlled roaster with about $90 million in annual sales, buys roughly six million pounds of green coffee a year. For a decade it has bought most of it under five-year contracts with grower cooperatives in Peru and Honduras that guarantee a minimum price of $2.40 a pound, plus a quality premium, whatever the world market does. The family's shareholder agreement, adopted when the contracts began, states that the company will honor its grower commitments "in bad years as in good."
Last year world prices collapsed. Equivalent coffee could be bought on the open market for about $1.45 a pound including quality differentials. Honoring the contracts cost Altamira an illustrative $5.7 million more than buying on the market, roughly its entire net profit for the year. Its competitors bought at market prices and reported strong margins.
Against the First Horn: It Is Not Redundant
The first horn says a calculating firm would make the same commitments if they paid. In Altamira's case they do pay, over time: cooperatives that trust the company invest in quality, give it first choice of their best lots in tight years and share information about crop problems early. Those benefits are real and show up in value.
But the benefits depend on the cooperatives believing that Altamira will keep its word when keeping it is expensive. A purely calculating firm faces a problem here. When honoring a contract costs a year of profit, a firm that commits only because commitment pays has a strong reason to find a way out, and growers know it. Relationships that rely on promises no court fully enforces work only when each side believes the other values the relationship enough to keep them in bad times (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012). A firm whose commitment is part of its purpose, written into its owners' agreement, is more credible than one whose commitment is a calculation the next bad year might reverse.
So the doctrine is not redundant. The very fact that Altamira does not reconsider its contracts each time prices fall is what earns the trust a calculating competitor cannot easily reproduce. Purpose here is not a description of a profit-seeking choice; it is what makes a profitable relationship possible.
Against the Second Horn: It Is Not Illegitimate
The second horn says that honoring a value-reducing commitment spends other people's money. In Altamira's case, the people whose money was spent are the owners who adopted the commitment. The family wrote the grower clause into its shareholder agreement, and any new investor buys into a company whose commitments are public. No one's money was spent on an end they did not choose.
Friedman's objection was aimed at managers using their position to pursue social goals the owners had not authorized. It does not apply when the owners themselves have chosen the goal and disclosed it. His own argument allows owners to spend their money as they wish; he objected to executives doing it for them.
What the Defense Must Concede
The defense works, but it costs the doctrine one of its central claims. Advocates often say that stakeholder interests do not truly conflict and that serving all of them sacrifices nothing in the long run. Altamira's case shows the opposite. Last year the owners gave up $5.7 million so that growers would not bear the price collapse. That was a real trade-off, and the owners chose it.
If the defense against the second horn depends on owners choosing a commitment that may cost them, then the doctrine cannot also claim that the commitment costs nothing. The no-trade-off claim has to go. What remains is a narrower and stronger position: some commitments that cost money in bad years build trust that pays over time, and owners who adopt such commitments openly are acting legitimately even in the years when they lose.
Limits of the Defense
Two limits should be stated. First, the defense depends on owners who chose the commitment. A widely held public company whose managers adopt a similar commitment without a shareholder vote would face Friedman's objection with full force. Second, the credibility argument applies to relationships where trust matters and contracts are incomplete, such as long-term supply, specialized employment and community ties. It does not show that every stakeholder commitment creates value, and a firm that made commitments in areas where trust adds nothing would be back on the first horn.
Conclusion
Conscious capitalism survives its strongest objection in a narrower form than its advocates usually state. It is not redundant, because commitments rooted in purpose are more credible than commitments rooted in calculation, and credibility has value. It is not illegitimate when owners adopt it openly and bear its costs. But it can survive only by admitting that its commitments sometimes cost money, which means giving up the claim that stakeholder interests never truly conflict.
References
Friedman, M. (1970, September 13). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. The New York Times Magazine, 32-33, 122-126.
Gibbons, R., & Henderson, R. (2012). Relational contracts and organizational capabilities. Organization Science, 23(5), 1350-1364. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1110.0715
Jensen, M. C. (2001). Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective function. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 14(3), 8-21. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2001.tb00434.x
BUS 676 Topic 8 instructions, in plain terms
The Topic 8 instructions for BUS-676 ask students to defend their position against its strongest objection. A defense that answers a weak version of the criticism will not earn much. The assignment rewards a paper that states the objection fully and fairly before replying, uses a concrete case to test both the objection and the reply and draws on sources from both sides. Students should identify what their defense depends on, state its limits and concede any claim the defense cannot keep. Showing what survives in a narrower form demonstrates graduate judgment. The case should be concrete enough that both horns of the objection can be tested on it.
Inside the BUS 676 Topic 8 example
The paper opens with the objection as a dilemma, citing Jensen for the first horn and Friedman for the second. The roaster's contracts and the price collapse are set out with figures. The reply to the first horn uses research on relational contracts to argue that purpose makes commitments credible. The reply to the second horn points to the owners' shareholder agreement. A section concedes that stakeholder interests sometimes conflict, so the no-trade-off claim must go. Limits cover widely held firms and relationships where trust adds nothing, and the conclusion states the narrower doctrine that survives. Figures in the case are computed from stated prices and volumes.
Reading the BUS 676 Topic 8 rubric
Instructors grading the defense reward an objection stated more strongly than a critic might state it. Strong papers test both the objection and the reply on one detailed case. Credit goes to a mechanism, such as credibility in relationships, rather than general praise of purpose. The rubric values an honest concession when the defense requires giving up a claim, and limits stated plainly. The highest band ends with a narrower, defensible version of the doctrine. Defenses that refute a weak version of the objection, or that never concede anything, usually lose points. A composite case with labeled figures keeps the test honest.
Common BUS 676 Topic 8 mistakes, and how to avoid them
An objection chosen because it can be beaten is the costliest mistake here. Answering the complaint that conscious capitalism is merely marketing, when the dilemma is available, signals the paper picked its opponent for convenience. Papers that state the dilemma but garble its sources, presenting Friedman as rejecting all attention to stakeholders or Jensen as dismissing them, weaken the defense before it begins. A case where purpose happened to pay cannot test the doctrine, since both horns sit comfortably with it. Refusing to concede anything, and keeping the claim that trade-offs vanish in the long run, turns the defense into a brief for one side. Conclusions broader than the argument cost marks too: a reply that works for an owner-controlled firm with disclosed commitments says little about a widely held company whose managers adopt purpose on their own authority.
Get a BUS-676 Topic 8 example written to your instructions
Send the BUS-676 Topic 8 instructions and the rubric your section posts, with the objection or case you were asked to address. A custom example is written to those criteria, with the strongest objection stated first, a case where purpose costs something, each horn answered, a real concession made and the narrowed position defended, in 24 to 48 hours. The first one is free.
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BUS 676 Topic 8 questions, answered
Which objection to conscious capitalism is hardest to answer?
Many sections point to accountability, and this example uses a related dilemma: if purpose pays, the doctrine adds nothing to long-run value maximization, and if it does not, it lets managers spend owners' money on goals the owners never chose. Your prompt may name a different objection. Whichever it is, the defense should answer it in the form its most careful proponents would use.
Can a defense concede part of the objection?
It usually has to. The doctrine's popular claim that stakeholder interests never truly conflict is hard to defend against a case where they plainly did. Conceding it and defending a narrower version, purpose adopted openly by owners and kept when it costs something, produces a position the objection does not simply defeat. Graders tend to read a well-placed concession as strength.
Why use an owner-controlled firm for the case?
Because it makes the second horn of the dilemma answerable: when the owners themselves adopt a costly commitment, nobody's money is being spent without consent. The example admits that this limits the defense. A widely held firm whose managers adopt purpose without a shareholder mandate faces the objection in its full force, and the paper says its reply does not reach that case.
Where can I find a free BUS 676 Topic 8 sample paper?
The whole defense is above: the dilemma, the roaster case, the replies to both horns, the concession, the limits and the conclusion. Send the objection you need to answer, and we can prepare a free defense for it.
What does the defense concede in BUS 676 Topic 8?
The claim that stakeholder interests never truly conflict. Honoring the grower contracts cost the owners about $5.7 million in one year, a real trade-off they chose, so the doctrine cannot also say its commitments cost nothing.