DBA 805 Topic 6 theory transfer test example

Management Theory in a Global Economy Grand Canyon University Free custom sample in 24 to 48h

This DBA 805 Topic 6 sample paper tests whether agency theory transfers to a composite family business group in an emerging economy by stating its assumptions before examining the case. It belongs to GCU DBA 805, Management Theory in a Global Economy, listed as DBA-805 in Grand Canyon University's Doctor of Business Administration. From Berle and Means and Jensen and Meckling come separated ownership, self-interested managers and aligning remedies. The family holds 52 percent of votes but 31 percent of cash flows, and related-party purchases priced 12 to 15 percent above market reveal tunneling. The theory transfers only when respecified as a principal-principal conflict.

CourseDBA 805 Management Theory in a Global Economy
TopicTopic 6
Paper typeTheory transfer test
LengthAbout 990 words, 2 pages
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolGrand Canyon University (GCU)
ProgramDBA
UpdatedOctober 2026

Free sample paper for DBA 805 Topic 6

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Whose Agent Is the Family Chief Executive? Testing Agency Theory's Assumptions Against a Family Business Group Before Applying It

[Author Name]

College of Doctoral Studies, Grand Canyon University

DBA-805: Management Theory in a Global Economy

Topic 6 Theory Transfer Test

[Instructor Name]

[Date]

The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.

What this page is doingThe title states the question the transfer test turns on. The business group and its figures are a composite; the sources are real.
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Whose Agent Is the Family Chief Executive? Testing Agency Theory's Assumptions Against a Family Business Group Before Applying It

Assumptions Before the Case

A theory developed in one setting can be applied in another only if its working assumptions hold there. To prevent the theory from being fitted to facts already in view, this test states agency theory's assumptions first, from its founding sources, and only then examines the case. Berle and Means (1932) described the large American corporation in which ownership was dispersed among many small shareholders while control passed to professional managers. Jensen and Meckling (1976) built on that separation to model the relationship between owners, as principals, and managers, as agents, who will pursue their own interests at the owners' expense unless monitored and bonded. Three working assumptions follow. First, ownership is separated from control, so the central conflict is between owners and managers. Second, managers are self-interested and may divert value through perquisites, empire building or shirking. Third, the remedies, independent boards, performance-based pay and the threat of takeover, can align managers with owners.

The Case

The case is a composite family business group in a large emerging economy, with listed firms in cement, textiles and logistics and several unlisted firms owned directly by the family. The founding family controls 52 percent of the voting rights in the listed cement company through a pyramid of holding companies, while holding only about 31 percent of its cash-flow rights. The chief executive is a second-generation family member, and another family member chairs the board. Of nine directors, four are classified as independent, but three of those have served for more than a decade and one is the family's long-time tax adviser. In the most recent year, the cement company bought about 60 million dollars of transport services and packaging from two unlisted firms wholly owned by the family, at prices the company's own procurement staff estimated at 12 to 15 percent above comparable market rates.

Table 1

Agency Theory's Assumptions Tested Against the Case

AssumptionHolds in the case?Evidence
Ownership separated from controlNoFamily controls 52 percent of votes and runs the company
Managers self-interested against ownersNot as framedThe chief executive is a controlling owner
Boards, pay and takeovers align managers with ownersPartlyIndependent directors tied to family; takeover blocked by control
Implied conflict: owners versus managersReplacedConflict between controlling and minority owners

Testing Each Assumption

The first assumption fails outright. Ownership and control are not separated; they are concentrated in one family, which both owns and manages. The second assumption fails as framed. The chief executive is not an agent working against owners, since the chief executive represents the largest owner; the classic problem of managers spending owners' money on themselves is muted when the manager is the owner. The third assumption partly fails. The board's independent directors depend on the family's goodwill for their seats, performance-based pay matters little to an executive whose wealth lies in the family's shares, and no hostile takeover is possible while the family holds a majority of votes.

The Conflict That Replaces It

A different conflict appears in its place: between the controlling family and the minority shareholders who own the other 69 percent of the cash flows. The related-party purchases show it. If the family firms charged 12 to 15 percent above market on 60 million dollars of services, about 7 to 9 million dollars a year moved from the listed company, where the family owns about 31 percent of the cash flows, to firms it owns entirely. The family gains on the transfer even though its share of the listed company's profits falls. Johnson et al. (2000) called this tunneling: the transfer of resources out of a firm to its controlling shareholders. Young et al. (2008) described such conflicts between controlling and minority owners as the principal-principal problem characteristic of firms in emerging economies with concentrated ownership and weak legal protection for minority investors.

What the Respecified Theory Predicts

Respecified, the theory makes predictions that could be checked against this group and others like it. It predicts that the gap between the family's voting rights and its cash-flow rights, here 52 against 31 percent, should be associated with more related-party transactions on unfavorable terms, since a wider gap means the family captures more of each diverted dollar than it loses. It predicts that firms in the group whose minority shareholders include active institutional investors should show fewer such transactions. And it predicts that rule changes requiring minority approval of related-party transactions should reduce their volume or improve their terms. Each prediction can fail, which keeps the respecified theory a theory rather than a description of the case.

Verdict

Agency theory does not transfer to this case as originally specified. Its core logic, that whoever controls a firm may use that control to take value at others' expense, does transfer, but only after the theory is respecified: the agent is the controlling family, the principals are the minority shareholders, and the remedies that matter are minority protections such as approval of related-party transactions by disinterested directors or shareholders, disclosure rules and the ability to sue, rather than executive pay or takeover threats. Applying the original theory without this test would have led an analyst to recommend tying the chief executive's pay to share price, a remedy that addresses a problem the company does not have and leaves the related-party transfers untouched.

Conclusion

Stated first and tested against the case, agency theory's assumption of separated ownership and control fails, its picture of the self-interested manager fails as framed and its remedies only partly apply. The case, examined only after the assumptions were stated, reveals a conflict between controlling and minority owners, visible in related-party purchases that likely moved several million dollars a year out of the listed company. The theory's core logic survives the transfer only when respecified around that conflict, and the respecified version makes predictions that a doctoral study could test across business groups.

References

Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. Macmillan.

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X

Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2000). Tunneling. American Economic Review, 90(2), 22-27. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.2.22

Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal-principal perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45(1), 196-220. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00752.x

Reading the GCU DBA 805 Topic 6 instructions

The Topic 6 assignment in DBA-805 asks doctoral students to test whether a theory transfers to a new setting. Strong tests state the theory's working assumptions from its founding sources before presenting the case, so the theory cannot be fitted to facts already in view. Students should present the case with its ownership, board and transactions, test each assumption against it, identify the conflict that replaces the original one, reach a verdict on transfer and state what the respecified theory predicts. The respecified theory should make predictions that could fail, so it remains a theory rather than a redescription of the case.

How this DBA 805 Topic 6 example is built

Three assumptions are pulled out of agency theory before the case is opened: ownership dispersed enough that no shareholder controls the firm, professional managers whose interests diverge from owners', and remedies such as equity pay and independent boards that bring the two back together. Each is then checked against the composite group. The founding family holds a majority of the flagship company's voting shares, directly and through a pyramid of holding companies, and a family member runs it. The owner-manager conflict barely exists. What does exist is the conflict Young, Peng and colleagues call principal-principal, visible in related-party sales from the flagship to a family-owned distributor at prices minority shareholders cannot see. Equity pay for this chief executive would reward the controlling owner twice. The test concludes that agency theory travels only with its boundary conditions attached.

Where the marks sit in the DBA 805 Topic 6 rubric

Faculty reward assumptions stated before the case. An Excellent paper derives three working assumptions from Berle and Means and from Jensen and Meckling. Credit goes to a table testing each against the family group's ownership, board and related-party purchases. The rubric values naming tunneling, from Johnson and colleagues, and the principal-principal conflict described by Young and colleagues. Strong papers show which remedies the original theory would have recommended wrongly. Top marks go to testable predictions for the respecified theory.

DBA 805 Topic 6 help: mistakes that cost marks

This topic punishes transfer by assumption most, the paper that applies agency theory's prescriptions abroad without first asking whether owners and managers are separate people there. Labeling the family's behavior as agency costs, when the family is both principal and agent, uses the theory as vocabulary and tests nothing. A frequent shortcut explains every difference through Hofstede's dimensions, handing a national average the work a firm-level governance analysis should do, and readers of this literature will look for McSweeney's critique wherever the scores appear. Papers that reject agency theory entirely overcorrect, since its logic survives in adapted form once the conflicting principals are identified. Ignoring the related-party transactions leaves the minority-shareholder problem asserted rather than shown. Recommendations copied from the theory's home economy, equity pay above all, reveal that no assumption was checked.

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DBA 805 Topic 6 questions, answered

What is the principal-principal problem?

A term from Michael Young, Mike Peng and colleagues for the agency conflict that dominates where ownership is concentrated and minority protection is weak. Instead of dispersed owners struggling to control hired managers, a controlling shareholder can extract value at the expense of minority shareholders, for example through related-party transactions. The example reads it as agency theory adapted to a setting whose assumptions differ, rather than as a separate theory.

Why not explain the difference with Hofstede's dimensions?

Geert Hofstede's dimensions are a framework for comparing national averages, originally drawn from surveys of one multinational's employees. Brendan McSweeney's critique argues that they assume a uniform national culture and cannot bear the causal weight often placed on them. A governance arrangement inside one business group is better explained by ownership and law. The example mentions the scores only to show why it does not rely on them.

Does agency theory fail outside its home economy?

Not entirely, which is the example's point. Its core logic, that a party acting for others will pursue its own interests unless monitored or aligned, travels well. What fails to travel are the assumptions about who the parties are and the remedies built on them. Stating those assumptions as boundary conditions, in Whetten's sense, lets the theory be applied where they hold and adapted where they do not.

Where can I find a free DBA 805 Topic 6 sample paper?

The transfer test is printed here in full: assumptions first, the case, testing each assumption, the conflict that replaces it, what the respecified theory predicts, the verdict and the conclusion. Name the theory and setting your seminar assigns and a transfer test follows at no cost.

Why does the separation assumption fail in DBA 805 Topic 6?

The family both owns and runs the company, holding 52 percent of the votes, so ownership and control are concentrated, not separated.