DBA 815 Topic 4 local pricing power analysis example

Economics for Business Decisions Grand Canyon University Free custom sample in 24 to 48h

This DBA 815 Topic 4 sample paper defines a composite fitness chain's markets from member addresses and measures pricing power club by club. It was prepared for GCU DBA 815, Economics for Business Decisions, catalog code DBA-815, required coursework in the DBA offered by Grand Canyon University. Members live within about twelve minutes of their clubs, sorting fourteen clubs into five near the regional rival, three near a 15 dollar entrant and six uncontested. After a rise from 45 to 49 dollars they lost about 9, 5 and 3 percent of members, and 46, 22 and 11 percent of joiners named a rival. One price cannot suit all three.

CourseDBA 815 Economics for Business Decisions
TopicTopic 4
Paper typeLocal pricing power analysis
LengthAbout 990 words, 2 pages
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolGrand Canyon University (GCU)
ProgramDBA
UpdatedOctober 2026

Free sample paper for DBA 815 Topic 4

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Fourteen Clubs, Three Markets: Measuring Local Pricing Power for a Fitness Chain From Member Addresses and Its Last Price Increase

[Author Name]

College of Doctoral Studies, Grand Canyon University

DBA-815: Economics for Business Decisions

Topic 4 Local Pricing Power Analysis

[Instructor Name]

[Date]

The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.

What this page is doingThe title states the finding that one price cannot fit every club. The chain and every figure are a composite, labeled illustrative; the sources are real.
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Fourteen Clubs, Three Markets: Measuring Local Pricing Power for a Fitness Chain From Member Addresses and Its Last Price Increase

Defining the Markets

A fitness chain's market is not its metropolitan area. Member addresses show that most members of the composite fourteen-club chain live within about twelve minutes' drive of the club they use, and few travel past a closer club to reach one. Each club therefore competes inside its own radius, against whichever rivals sit within it. Spatial competition of this kind, in which customers' distance from sellers shapes how much market power each seller holds, has a long history in economics (Hotelling, 1929), and studies of local retail markets such as movie theaters show that nearby rivals constrain prices far more than distant ones (Davis, 2006). Figures in this analysis are illustrative.

Three Competitive Settings

Mapping rivals into each club's twelve-minute radius sorts the fourteen clubs into three settings. Five clubs share their radius with clubs of the regional rival, a close substitute offering similar facilities, classes and prices. Three sit near the new 15 dollar entrant, a different product that attracts price-sensitive joiners rather than members who want classes and staffed floors. Six face neither within their radius. Labels alone do not establish pricing power, so the analysis measures it with evidence the chain already holds.

Measuring Pricing Power

Two sources of evidence measure how strongly each setting constrains the chain's price. The first is the chain's last price increase, from 45 to 49 dollars, about 8.5 percent measured at the midpoint. Within a quarter, the rival-overlap clubs lost about 9 percent of members, the entrant-nearby clubs about 5 percent and the uncontested clubs about 3 percent. The second is the chain's join survey, which asks new members which other gyms they considered: 46 percent of new members at rival-overlap clubs named a rival, 22 percent at entrant-nearby clubs and 11 percent at uncontested clubs.

Table 1

Pricing Power by Competitive Setting, Illustrative

SettingClubsMembers lost after 45 to 49 dollar increaseImplied short-run elasticityNew members naming a rival
Regional rival overlap5About 9 percentAbout -1.146 percent
Near the 15 dollar entrant3About 5 percentAbout -0.622 percent
Uncontested6About 3 percentAbout -0.411 percent

Reading the Evidence

Both measures rank the settings the same way. Members at rival-overlap clubs left at three times the rate of uncontested clubs after the increase, and new members there were four times as likely to have considered a rival. The implied short-run elasticities, about minus 1.1, minus 0.6 and minus 0.4, should be read with care: they measure how many existing members quit within one quarter, which understates the longer-run response, since some members wait for a contract to end or a move to change gyms, and since price also affects how many new members join. The pattern across settings is more reliable than any single figure. The entrant-nearby clubs sit in between, because the entrant's product differs enough that only the most price-sensitive members switch.

What Pricing Power Implies

A firm with more pricing power can charge more relative to its costs without losing as many customers (Tirole, 1988). The evidence suggests the chain's uncontested clubs have the most room to raise price and its rival-overlap clubs the least; at the latter, the last increase may already have cost more contribution than it added. One price across all fourteen clubs, the chain's current practice, cannot be right in all three settings: it is probably too low where the chain faces no nearby rival and too high where it faces the regional rival.

Why Distance Alone Is Not Enough

A simpler approach would rank clubs by distance to the nearest rival club of any kind. The evidence shows why that would mislead. The entrant-nearby clubs have rivals as close as the rival-overlap clubs do, yet they lost members at about half the rate after the increase, because the entrant offers a different product that appeals mainly to joiners who were never likely to pay 49 dollars. What constrains the chain's price is the presence of a close substitute, not the presence of any gym. Defining competitive settings by substitutability rather than distance alone is what makes the three groups behave differently.

What Local Pricing Would Require

Charging different prices at different clubs has practical demands. Members who use more than one club would need a rule, such as paying the rate of their home club. Advertising would need to stop quoting a single chain-wide price. Staff at contested clubs would need guidance on answering members who learn that another club charges less. And the chain would need to watch for members switching their home club to a cheaper one nearby, which the twelve-minute radius suggests would be rare but not absent.

Limits

The measures have limits. The last increase applied to all clubs at once, in January, so season and advertising affected all settings alike; differences between settings are informative, but the level of each elasticity is uncertain. Survey answers depend on what members remember considering. And twelve minutes is an average; some members travel farther, especially to clubs near workplaces.

Recommendation

The chain should stop treating its fourteen clubs as one market. Before changing any price, it should run a controlled test that measures new-member response to a higher price separately in each setting, starting with the uncontested clubs, where the evidence suggests the most room. Prices at rival-overlap clubs should not rise further until the regional rival's likely response has been analyzed.

Conclusion

Defined by where members live and which close substitutes sit nearby, the chain's fourteen clubs fall into three markets with measurably different pricing power. Member losses after the last increase and new members' consideration of rivals rank the settings the same way, from rival-overlap clubs with little room to uncontested clubs with the most. A single chain-wide price cannot suit all three, and the next step is a test that measures response in each.

References

Davis, P. (2006). Spatial competition in retail markets: Movie theaters. RAND Journal of Economics, 37(4), 964-982. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00066.x

Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in competition. Economic Journal, 39(153), 41-57. https://doi.org/10.2307/2224214

Tirole, J. (1988). The theory of industrial organization. MIT Press.

The DBA-815 Topic 4 assignment instructions

Topic 4 in DBA-815 asks doctoral students to analyze local pricing power. Strong analyses define markets from where customers actually come from, map rivals into each market and sort locations by the kind of substitute they face rather than by distance alone. Students should measure pricing power with evidence such as responses to a past price change and customers' stated alternatives, interpret short-run measures with care, state what local pricing would require in practice and recommend a test before changing prices. Distance alone should not define a competitive setting, since a nearby rival selling a different product constrains price less than a close substitute.

Inside the DBA 815 Topic 4 example

Member addresses define the markets first: most members live within about 12 minutes of their club, figures illustrative, so each club competes inside its own radius. Mapping rivals into those radii yields three settings. Five clubs share their radius with the regional rival's clubs, a close substitute. Three sit near the $15 entrant, a different product drawing price-sensitive joiners. Six face neither. Pricing power is then measured, not labeled. After the chain's last increase, from $45 to $49, the rival-overlap clubs lost about 9 percent of members within a quarter, the entrant clubs 5 percent and the uncontested clubs 3 percent. Join surveys point the same way: 46, 22 and 11 percent of new members named a rival they had considered. One price across all three settings, the analysis argues, cannot be right in all of them.

DBA 815 Topic 4 rubric: what Excellent looks like

Faculty reward pricing power measured, not labeled. An Excellent paper defines each club's market from member addresses, in the tradition of Hotelling and Davis's work on local retail competition. Credit goes to a table of member losses, implied elasticities and joiners naming rivals by setting. The rubric values reading short-run quit responses with caution and linking pricing power to markups, following Tirole. Strong papers explain why substitutability matters more than distance. Top marks go to the operational demands of local prices.

DBA 815 Topic 4 help before you submit

Naming the chain's market structure and stopping is the characteristic weak answer, since a category explains nothing about what any one club can charge. Papers that define the market as the whole metropolitan region treat a club twenty-five minutes from a member's home as a live alternative, which the address data contradict. Counting the $15 entrant as the closest rival confuses a low price with close substitution, when the survey shows most of the chain's joiners never considered it. Attrition evidence used without addressing the January season invites the reply that timing, not price, drove the losses, and the between-group comparison is the answer. Analyses that find three settings and then recommend one price have measured pricing power without using it. The opposite overreach converts survey shares directly into elasticities they cannot supply.

Get a DBA-815 Topic 4 example written to your instructions

Send the DBA-815 Topic 4 instructions, your section's rubric and the firm, industry or market the assignment sets. The custom example follows those requirements and arrives in 24 to 48 hours, with markets bounded from evidence, rivals sorted by closeness of substitution, pricing power measured two ways and the season objection answered. The first one is free.

More DBA 815 papers and DBA samples

DBA 815 Topic 4 questions, answered

How is a local market defined for pricing?

By where buyers can realistically go instead. The example uses member addresses to draw each club's travel radius, then asks a question borrowed from merger review: if every club inside the radius raised its price slightly and lastingly, would enough members leave the area to make the rise unprofitable? If not, the radius is a market. If so, it is drawn too tightly and must be widened.

Why isn't the low-price entrant the closest rival?

Because closeness depends on whether members see the two as substitutes, not on the size of the price gap. The entrant offers no classes, childcare or pool, and join surveys show that few of the chain's new members considered it. It competes for a price-sensitive segment the chain serves only partly. The regional rival, with a similar product at a similar price, is the club that actually disciplines the chain's dues.

Can attrition after a past price rise measure pricing power?

Only comparatively. The last increase took effect in January, and cancellations run high in the months that follow regardless, so the level of losses mixes price with season. Because all fourteen clubs raised prices at the same moment, though, differences between groups of clubs cannot come from the season. The example uses those differences as evidence of relative pricing power and leaves the size of each group's elasticity to a designed test.

Where can I find a free DBA 815 Topic 4 sample paper?

The pricing power analysis is printed here in full: defining markets, three settings, measuring power, reading the evidence, implications, why distance is not enough, what local pricing requires, limits and the recommendation. Send your club or store locations with customer addresses and a market analysis follows at no charge.

Why do entrant-nearby clubs lose fewer members in DBA 815 Topic 4?

The entrant sells a different product that draws mainly price-sensitive joiners, so fewer existing members see it as a close substitute.