A finished DBA-815 Topic 4 local pricing power analysis example, defining each club's market from member travel and switching evidence, and showing pricing power differs by competitive setting within one firm. Searches like "dba 815 topic 4 assignment example", "dba815 topic 4 sample" and "dba-815 topic 4 example" land here.
What a finished DBA-815 Topic 4 local pricing power analysis looks like
Member addresses define the markets first: most members live within about 12 minutes of their club, figures illustrative, so each club competes inside its own radius. Mapping rivals into those radii yields three settings. Five clubs share their radius with the regional rival's clubs, a close substitute. Three sit near the $15 entrant, a different product drawing price-sensitive joiners. Six face neither. Pricing power is then measured, not labeled. After the chain's last increase, from $45 to $49, the rival-overlap clubs lost about 9 percent of members within a quarter, the entrant clubs 5 percent and the uncontested clubs 3 percent. Join surveys point the same way: 46, 22 and 11 percent of new members named a rival they had considered. One price across all three settings, the analysis argues, cannot be right in all of them.
How a DBA-815 Topic 4 example is structured
The analysis opens by rejecting a single market definition for the chain, since a label such as monopolistic competition describes no club in particular. Market boundaries come next, drawn from member addresses and travel times and tested with a question borrowed from merger analysis: would a small, lasting price rise by every club inside a radius pay, or would members leave the radius to escape it? Rivals are then placed within each club's boundary and sorted by how close a substitute they offer. Two measures of pricing power follow, attrition after the last increase and the rivals new members say they considered, with a note that the season inflated attrition everywhere but cannot explain the gap between groups. The objection that members also train near work is tested, and two radii are redrawn. The close hands a club-by-club pricing question to the elasticity test.
No single market for the chain
A label such as monopolistic competition fits the chain as a whole and no club in particular, so the analysis defines markets club by club.
Radii drawn from member addresses
Most members live within about 12 minutes of their club, and a hypothetical price rise across each radius tests whether that boundary holds.
Three competitive settings, not one
Five clubs overlap the regional rival, three sit near the $15 entrant, and six face no close substitute within their members' travel radius.
Attrition after the last increase
The move from $45 to $49 cost the rival-overlap clubs about 9 percent of members within a quarter, against 3 percent where no rival stood.
What new members say they considered
Join surveys found 46 percent of new members at overlap clubs had weighed a rival, against 11 percent at uncontested clubs, figures illustrative.
The season cannot explain the gap
January timing inflated attrition in every group after the last increase, but the same season fell on all fourteen clubs and cannot produce the difference.
Where marks go in DBA-815 Topic 4
Naming the chain's market structure and stopping is the characteristic weak answer, since a category explains nothing about what any one club can charge. Papers that define the market as the whole metropolitan region treat a club twenty-five minutes from a member's home as a live alternative, which the address data contradict. Counting the $15 entrant as the closest rival confuses a low price with close substitution, when the survey shows most of the chain's joiners never considered it. Attrition evidence used without addressing the January season invites the reply that timing, not price, drove the losses, and the between-group comparison is the answer. Analyses that find three settings and then recommend one price have measured pricing power without using it. The opposite overreach converts survey shares directly into elasticities they cannot supply.
Get a DBA-815 Topic 4 example written to your instructions
Send the DBA-815 Topic 4 instructions, your section's rubric and the firm, industry or market the assignment sets. The custom example follows those requirements and arrives in 24 to 48 hours, with markets bounded from evidence, rivals sorted by closeness of substitution, pricing power measured two ways and the season objection answered. The first one is free.
DBA-815 Topic 4 questions, answered
How is a local market defined for pricing?
By where buyers can realistically go instead. The example uses member addresses to draw each club's travel radius, then asks a question borrowed from merger review: if every club inside the radius raised its price slightly and lastingly, would enough members leave the area to make the rise unprofitable? If not, the radius is a market. If so, it is drawn too tightly and must be widened.
Why isn't the low-price entrant the closest rival?
Because closeness depends on whether members see the two as substitutes, not on the size of the price gap. The entrant offers no classes, childcare or pool, and join surveys show that few of the chain's new members considered it. It competes for a price-sensitive segment the chain serves only partly. The regional rival, with a similar product at a similar price, is the club that actually disciplines the chain's dues.
Can attrition after a past price rise measure pricing power?
Only comparatively. The last increase took effect in January, and cancellations run high in the months that follow regardless, so the level of losses mixes price with season. Because all fourteen clubs raised prices at the same moment, though, differences between groups of clubs cannot come from the season. The example uses those differences as evidence of relative pricing power and leaves the size of each group's elasticity to a designed test.