| Course | DBA 815 Economics for Business Decisions |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 6 |
| Paper type | Repeated pricing game analysis |
| Length | About 990 words, 2 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | DBA |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for DBA 815 Topic 6
A Cut That Wins One Round and Loses the Game: Reading the Fitness Chain's Price Choice Against a Regional Rival as a Repeated Game
[Author Name]
College of Doctoral Studies, Grand Canyon University
DBA-815: Economics for Business Decisions
Topic 6 Repeated Pricing Game Analysis
[Instructor Name]
[Date]
The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.
A Cut That Wins One Round and Loses the Game: Reading the Fitness Chain's Price Choice Against a Regional Rival as a Repeated Game
The Payoff Matrix
At its five clubs that overlap with the regional rival, the composite fitness chain is weighing a permanent price cut from 49 to 44 dollars a month. The matrix below shows the chain's monthly contribution per overlap club under each combination of its own price and the rival's, with figures illustrative. With both at 49 dollars, a club of about 2,700 members earns about 37 dollars each above variable cost, roughly 99,900 dollars a month. If the chain cuts to 44 while the rival holds at 49, the chain's new-member test at overlap clubs suggested an own-price elasticity near minus 2.5 under those conditions, so membership would rise by about a quarter and contribution would reach about 108,000 dollars despite the lower margin. If the rival cuts while the chain holds, the chain loses about a quarter of its members to the rival and earns about 74,900 dollars. If both cut, membership barely moves, the margin falls to 32 dollars and contribution is about 89,900 dollars.
Table 1
Chain Contribution Under Four Price Combinations, Illustrative
| Chain's price, rival's price | Chain's monthly contribution per overlap club |
|---|---|
| 49, 49 | About 99,900 dollars |
| 44, 49 | About 108,000 dollars |
| 49, 44 | About 74,900 dollars |
| 44, 44 | About 89,900 dollars |
Read as One Round
Read as a single decision, cutting dominates. Whatever the rival does, the chain earns more by cutting: 108,000 against 99,900 if the rival holds, and 89,900 against 74,900 if the rival cuts. The rival, facing a symmetric matrix, reaches the same conclusion. Both cut and finish at 89,900 dollars, a result each likes less than the 99,900 both would earn by holding. This is the structure of the prisoner's dilemma, which Tirole (1988) shows arises naturally in price competition between a few sellers of close substitutes.
Which Elasticity a Permanent Cut Would Meet
The one-round reading depends on the 108,000 dollar cell, and that cell depends on the rival not responding. The elasticity of minus 2.5 came from an eight-week test in which some new members at two overlap clubs were offered a lower price. That test was too brief and too narrow to provoke a reply: the rival had little reason to react to a small, temporary offer it may not even have noticed. A permanent, advertised cut across five clubs would be different. The rival's history suggests how it would respond. Two years ago, when the chain waived its joining fee, the rival matched the waiver within three weeks. A permanent cut would therefore meet not the elasticity measured in the test, where the rival stood still, but the elasticity along the rival's reaction, where both prices fall together. Along that reaction, the chain moves from 99,900 to about 89,900 dollars, losing about a tenth of its contribution at these clubs, roughly 50,000 dollars a month across all five.
Why Restraint Can Persist
In a repeated game, firms that meet each other month after month can sustain the higher price without any agreement, because each understands that a cut will be matched and that the gain from cutting lasts only until the rival responds. Friedman (1971) showed that such cooperative outcomes can be equilibria when firms value future payoffs enough, and Axelrod (1984) found that strategies which cooperate but respond promptly to defection do well in repeated play. The rival's three-week matching of the fee waiver is exactly such a prompt response. Green and Porter (1984) added that restraint is harder to sustain when firms cannot see each other's prices clearly; here gym prices are posted publicly, which makes restraint easier to maintain and cuts easier to detect.
A Necessary Caution
The analysis describes independent decisions by each firm, each reasoning about the other's likely response. It does not suggest communicating with the rival about prices, which would be illegal. The chain should set its prices on its own analysis, as this paper does, and should document that analysis, including the public evidence, such as posted prices and past responses, on which it relied.
Recommendation
The chain should not make the permanent cut at its overlap clubs. The gain that made cutting attractive exists only if the rival does not respond, and the rival's record shows it will. If the chain wants to win members at those clubs, it should compete on features the rival cannot match within three weeks, such as class schedules or renovated facilities, where a response takes months rather than days.
What Would Change the Analysis
Three developments would change the conclusion. If the rival's financial position weakened so that it could not afford to match, the chain's cut would meet a higher elasticity and might pay; the rival's recent club closures or reduced advertising would be signs to watch. If the rival cut first, the chain would face the 74,900 dollar cell and would likely need to respond, since holding would lose a quarter of its members at overlap clubs. And if the 15 dollar entrant began drawing members from both chains' overlap clubs, both might have reason to reconsider their prices, though the entrant's different product makes that less likely in the near term. The chain should review the rival's posted prices weekly at overlap clubs so that any of these changes is seen early.
Conclusion
Read as one round, cutting the price at overlap clubs dominates, and both firms would end worse off than if both held. Read as the repeated game it actually is, the cut's apparent gain depends on an elasticity measured when the rival had no reason to respond. The rival's three-week match of the fee waiver shows how it would meet a permanent cut, along a reaction that leaves the chain about a tenth worse off. Restraint, competition on features that take months to copy and close watching of the rival's prices serve the chain better.
References
Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books.
Friedman, J. W. (1971). A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Review of Economic Studies, 38(1), 1-12. https://doi.org/10.2307/2296617
Green, E. J., & Porter, R. H. (1984). Noncooperative collusion under imperfect price information. Econometrica, 52(1), 87-100. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911462
Tirole, J. (1988). The theory of industrial organization. MIT Press.
The DBA-815 Topic 6 assignment instructions
The Topic 6 assignment in DBA-815 asks doctoral students to analyze a pricing decision as a game. Strong analyses build the payoff matrix from stated figures, read it as a single round and identify the dominant strategy and its outcome. Students should then ask which elasticity a permanent move would actually meet, use the rival's past behavior to infer its response, explain why restraint can persist in repeated play and state what developments would change the conclusion, while making clear that prices are set independently.
Inside the DBA 815 Topic 6 example
The matrix comes first, per overlap club and per month, figures illustrative. With both at $49, the chain's club earns about $99,900 in contribution. Cutting alone to $44 lifts that to about $108,000, because the new-member test's overlap pairs suggested an own elasticity near -2.5 while the rival's price stood still. Being undercut drops it to about $74,900, and a matched cut leaves $89,900. Read as one round, cutting dominates, and both firms finish in a cell each likes less than mutual restraint. The analysis then asks which elasticity a permanent cut would meet. The test was too brief and too narrow to provoke a reply; a standing cut would draw one, since the rival matched the chain's joining-fee waiver two years ago within three weeks. Along that reaction the cut costs about a tenth of contribution.
DBA 815 Topic 6 rubric: what Excellent looks like
Faculty reward a matrix read twice, once as one round and once as repeated play. An Excellent paper tables four price combinations and identifies the prisoner's dilemma, following Tirole. Credit goes to recognizing that the test elasticity assumed no rival response and using the matched fee waiver as evidence. The rubric values Friedman on cooperative equilibria, Axelrod on prompt response and Green and Porter on visible prices. Strong papers state that prices are set independently. Top marks go to naming what would change the conclusion.
DBA 815 Topic 6 help: mistakes that cost marks
Most of the marks lost here trace to a payoff matrix read as a single round, which recommends exactly the cut the repeated game punishes. Papers that feed the test's -2.5 straight into a permanent price change misread elasticity in a quieter way: that figure held the rival's price fixed, and a lasting cut removes the condition. Asserting that the rival will match, with no record of how it behaved before, swaps evidence for a guess about temperament. The switching-cost objection is often raised and left unanswered, or answered by assuming new members arrive at once when they arrive over months. Some analyses propose signaling restraint through public statements aimed at the rival or direct contact with it, which moves from strategy into antitrust exposure. Stopping at the first match leaves the rival's second move unpriced.
Get a DBA-815 Topic 6 example written to your instructions
Send the DBA-815 Topic 6 instructions, the rubric from your classroom and the rivals, prices or scenario the assignment gives. A custom example is written to them in 24 to 48 hours, with the game's players and timing set, payoffs built from the firm's own numbers, the rival's past behavior used as evidence and a second round costed. The first one is free.
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DBA 815 Topic 6 questions, answered
Why does the one-shot matrix give the wrong answer?
Because the chain and the rival do not meet once. They set dues every month in the same five markets, so a cut today changes what the rival charges next month. In a single round, cutting beats holding whatever the other side does. Across repeated rounds, a rival that answers cuts makes restraint worth more than the brief gain from moving first, and that comparison is the one the example prices.
What did Axelrod's tournaments show?
Robert Axelrod invited strategies for a repeated prisoner's dilemma and ran them against each other in computer tournaments. Tit-for-tat, which cooperates in the first round and then copies whatever the other player did last, earned the highest total score despite its simplicity. The example uses the finding to read the rival's three-week match as a coherent strategy, not as an overreaction the chain can wait out.
Is the -2.5 elasticity still useful?
Yes, for the question it answers. It describes how new joiners at the overlap clubs respond to the chain's price while the rival's price stays put, which suits a small, temporary or targeted move the rival will not bother to answer. It is the wrong figure for a standing cut at five clubs. The example also flags that it was measured on a price rise and applied to a cut, an assumption of symmetry.
Where can I find a free DBA 815 Topic 6 sample paper?
The game analysis is printed here in full: the payoff matrix, one round, the elasticity a permanent cut would meet, why restraint persists, a caution, the recommendation, what would change it and the conclusion. Describe your firm's pricing contest and an analysis follows at no cost.
Why does the test elasticity overstate the gain in DBA 815 Topic 6?
The brief, narrow test gave the rival no reason to respond. A permanent cut would be matched, as the fee waiver was, so both prices would fall together.