| Course | DBA 820 Emerging Issues in Financial Management |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 7 |
| Paper type | Buyback position paper |
| Length | About 1,020 words, 2 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | DBA |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for DBA 820 Topic 7
Surplus Cash, Not Stolen Investment: A Position on Share Repurchases, With the Firm-Level Exception a Composite Manufacturer Shows
[Author Name]
College of Doctoral Studies, Grand Canyon University
DBA-820: Emerging Issues in Financial Management
Topic 7 Position Paper
[Instructor Name]
[Date]
The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.
Surplus Cash, Not Stolen Investment: A Position on Share Repurchases, With the Firm-Level Exception a Composite Manufacturer Shows
The Position
Across the economy, share repurchases mostly return cash that companies lack good uses for, and the claim that they starve the economy of investment does not survive a count of where the cash goes. At particular firms, however, repurchases can displace investment that managers should have made, and the conditions under which that happens can be named and governed. The aggregate question and the firm-level question rest on different evidence, and this paper answers them separately.
The Crowding-Out Case at Full Strength
Lazonick (2014) makes the case against repurchases in its strongest form. Large companies, in that account, spent most of their earnings over a decade on buybacks and dividends, leaving too little for innovation, capacity and wages. The cause is placed in executive pay: when much of a chief executive's compensation comes from stock and options, buybacks that lift earnings per share and the share price in the short run serve the executive directly. Lazonick (2014) adds that open-market repurchases are timed by managers who know more than the sellers, and that a company buying its own stock at high prices destroys value for the holders who remain.
The argument draws strength from cases anyone can name, firms that announced large buyback programs in the same years they closed plants or cut research budgets. It also fits a plausible mechanism. Managers rewarded on earnings per share can raise that figure by reducing the share count, which is faster and more certain than raising earnings through investments that pay off years later.
The Reply: Free Cash Flow and Net Payout
Jensen (1986) supplies the first reply. Cash beyond what a firm can invest at returns above its cost of capital is free cash flow, and managers tend to retain and spend it on growth that serves their own interests, larger empires, prestige acquisitions, more than the shareholders'. Paying it out, by dividend or repurchase, limits the waste. On that view, a firm with few good projects that buys back stock is doing what it should.
Table 1
The Two Cases and Where Each Holds
| Claim | Strongest support | Strongest reply |
|---|---|---|
| Buybacks crowd out investment across the economy | Lazonick (2014): payouts absorb most earnings | Fried and Wang (2018): net payouts are far smaller; cash is reinvested |
| Payout disciplines managers | Jensen (1986): free cash flow is wasted if retained | Holds only for firms without good projects |
| Buybacks can displace investment at some firms | Almeida et al. (2016): firms near forecasts cut investment | Effect is concentrated, not general |
Fried and Wang (2018) supply the second reply, which bears directly on the aggregate claim. Gross repurchase totals overstate the cash leaving public companies, because the same companies issue large amounts of stock, much of it to employees as compensation. Net of issuance, shareholder payouts were a much smaller share of earnings than the gross figures suggest. And the cash returned does not disappear: shareholders reinvest it, often in younger firms with better opportunities than the mature companies paying it out. A buyback by a firm with surplus cash moves capital toward investment elsewhere rather than away from it.
The Manufacturer
The composite manufacturer makes industrial pumps in four plants and has repurchased about 400 million dollars of stock over three years. Three facts about it matter. Its repurchases cluster in the last weeks of fiscal quarters in which earnings per share would otherwise have fallen short of analysts' forecasts, by a cent or two. Its largest plant needs an upgrade, costed at about 150 million, that engineering reviews have recommended for four years and that has been deferred each year. And its executives' annual bonuses are tied to earnings per share targets.
None of these facts alone would condemn the program. A firm can repurchase stock in the last weeks of a quarter for ordinary reasons, such as a blackout period ending, and a deferred upgrade may reflect honest doubt about demand. Together they form a pattern that is hard to read innocently. The 400 million spent on repurchases would have funded the upgrade more than twice over, the firm's cash and credit lines were ample throughout, and no document presented to the board compared the return on the upgrade with the return to holders from buying back shares at the prices paid. The upgrade's own business case, prepared by the operations group, projected a return well above the company's cost of capital.
A Governance Problem, Not Proof of the Aggregate Claim
The pattern at the manufacturer matches what Almeida et al. (2016) found across many firms: companies that would have narrowly missed earnings forecasts were more likely to repurchase shares, and those repurchases were followed by lower investment and employment. That evidence supports the firm-level exception. It does not support the aggregate claim, because the effect is concentrated among firms at the forecast threshold, and the same study does not show repurchases reducing investment across the economy.
The remedy is therefore at the firm. The manufacturer's board should require any repurchase to be justified by the absence of better uses for the cash, documented alongside the capital plan, and should not approve repurchases in a quarter while a recommended investment of the size of the plant upgrade remains unfunded. Removing earnings per share from bonus targets, or measuring it before the effect of repurchases, would take away the incentive the pattern suggests. These are governance measures, and they do not require restricting buybacks generally.
What Would Change This Position
The position would be overturned by evidence that firms with strong investment opportunities, measured by high returns on past projects or high market-to-book ratios, routinely cut investment to fund repurchases, and that the cut is widespread rather than concentrated at the forecast threshold. It would also be weakened if the cash returned to shareholders were shown to leave productive use, held idle rather than reinvested. Neither finding is in the evidence reviewed here. Until one appears, the case for restricting buybacks across the economy rests on examples, and the case for governing them firm by firm rests on evidence.
References
Almeida, H., Fos, V., & Kronlund, M. (2016). The real effects of share repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics, 119(1), 168-185. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.08.008
Fried, J. M., & Wang, C. C. Y. (2018). Are buybacks really shortchanging investment? Harvard Business Review, 96(2), 88-95.
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-329.
Lazonick, W. (2014). Profits without prosperity. Harvard Business Review, 92(9), 46-55.
Reading the GCU DBA 820 Topic 7 instructions
The Topic 7 assignment in DBA-820 asks doctoral students to argue one side of a contested corporate finance practice. Strong papers state the position in the first paragraph and separate the economy-wide question from the firm-level one, since different evidence answers each. Students should present the opposing case at full strength, answer it with research rather than assertion and examine a firm where the exception may apply. The paper should propose remedies at the level where the problem sits, such as board approval rules and incentive design, and close by naming the evidence that would overturn the position.
Inside the DBA 820 Topic 7 example
The finished paper states its position in the first paragraph: across the economy, repurchases mostly return cash that firms lack good uses for, but at particular firms they can displace investment managers should have made. Both sides are then given room. Lazonick's argument is stated as he makes it, that large repurchase programs divert corporate resources from innovation and wages toward short-run share prices. Jensen's free cash flow argument supplies the reply that paying out surplus cash limits managers' ability to waste it. Fried and Wang's point that net payouts look much smaller once share issuance is counted, and that returned cash is reinvested elsewhere, completes the case against a general crowding-out claim. The composite manufacturer is then examined for the firm-level exception, and the paper names the evidence that would overturn its position.
Reading the DBA 820 Topic 7 rubric
Faculty reward a position that keeps the aggregate and the firm apart. An Excellent paper states Lazonick's crowding-out argument in its own terms before answering with Jensen on free cash flow and Fried and Wang on net payouts. Credit goes to a table pairing each claim with its strongest support and reply. The rubric values reading the manufacturer's forecast-timed buybacks and deferred upgrade through Almeida, Fos and Kronlund. Strong papers propose board rules and bonus redesign. Top marks go to stating which findings would overturn the position.
Common DBA 820 Topic 7 mistakes, and how to avoid them
Marks fall away fastest when the paper picks a side and never lets the other one speak. Asserting that buybacks destroy investment by citing large repurchase totals ignores both the free cash flow argument and the difference between gross and net payouts. Defending repurchases as efficient in every case, on the other hand, skips the firm-level evidence of programs timed to meet earnings targets. Papers that treat one company's deferred upgrade as proof of an economy-wide pattern overgeneralize from a case built to show an exception. Sources assigned findings they did not report cost more at this level than a missing source, so Lazonick and Jensen are cited for their central arguments only. Repurchase volumes or tax treatment stated as current figures date the paper, since both change from year to year.
Get a DBA-820 Topic 7 example written to your instructions
Send the DBA-820 Topic 7 instructions and the rubric from your classroom, with any firm or readings your section assigned. We write a custom example to them, with a stated position, the crowding-out case and its reply both at full strength, aggregate and firm levels separated and the reversing evidence named, in 24 to 48 hours. The first one is free.
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DBA 820 Topic 7 questions, answered
Do share repurchases reduce corporate investment?
The evidence does not support a general yes. Much repurchased cash is returned by firms without better uses for it, and once equity issuance is netted out the flow leaving public companies is smaller than headline totals suggest. At particular firms, especially where repurchases are timed to hit earnings targets, displacement of investment is more plausible. The example argues the two levels separately.
What is Jensen's free cash flow argument?
Jensen argued that managers of firms generating cash beyond their profitable investment opportunities are tempted to spend it on growth that serves their own interests rather than shareholders'. Paying cash out, or committing it to debt service, reduces that temptation. In the buyback debate the argument supplies the strongest reply to crowding-out claims, so the example states it before reaching a position.
Can the paper's position guide a real board?
No. The manufacturer, its capital budget and its pay plan are composites designed to show a firm-level exception, and an actual repurchase decision turns on the company's investment opportunities, financing, governance and current tax and securities rules. Those belong with the board's advisers. The paper is DBA-820 coursework and carries no investment, legal or governance advice for any reader.
Where can I find a free DBA 820 Topic 7 sample paper?
Every part of the position paper appears here: the stated view, the crowding-out case, the reply on free cash flow and net payout, the manufacturer, the governance problem and what would change the position. Send your assigned practice and a position paper follows free.
Why are gross buyback totals misleading in DBA 820 Topic 7?
The same companies issue large amounts of stock, much of it to employees, so net payouts are far smaller than gross repurchases. And shareholders reinvest the cash returned, often in younger firms with better opportunities.