DBA 820 Topic 8 behavioral finance argument paper example

Emerging Issues in Financial Management Grand Canyon University Free custom sample in 24 to 48h

This DBA 820 Topic 8 sample paper argues that a manager may weigh perceived overvaluation when timing an equity issue only if the belief rests on firm-specific information. It was prepared for GCU DBA 820, Emerging Issues in Financial Management, catalog code DBA-820, the closing finance paper of Grand Canyon University's DBA course. A composite device maker's finance chief would raise 300 million dollars a year early at 42 times earnings. Fama's efficiency and joint-hypothesis problem are weighed against Shiller's excess volatility, Baker and Wurgler's market timing and Loughran and Ritter's weak post-issue returns. The officer cites only public multiples, so the case falls short, and Myers and Majluf's signaling objection narrows any gain.

CourseDBA 820 Emerging Issues in Financial Management
TopicTopic 8
Paper typeBehavioral finance argument paper
LengthAbout 1,010 words, 2 pages
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolGrand Canyon University (GCU)
ProgramDBA
UpdatedOctober 2026

Free sample paper for DBA 820 Topic 8

1

Timing an Equity Issue on a Belief the Price Is High: Defensible When the Belief Rests on What the Firm Knows, Not on a View of the Market

[Author Name]

College of Doctoral Studies, Grand Canyon University

DBA-820: Emerging Issues in Financial Management

Topic 8 Argument Paper

[Instructor Name]

[Date]

The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.

What this page is doingThe title states the position and the condition on which it depends. The company and its figures are a composite, labeled illustrative; the studies cited are real.
2

Timing an Equity Issue on a Belief the Price Is High: Defensible When the Belief Rests on What the Firm Knows, Not on a View of the Market

The Proposal and the Position

The chief financial officer of a composite medical device maker proposes raising about 300 million dollars in new equity now, rather than next year when the money will be spent, because the company's shares trade at 42 times earnings and the officer believes they are overvalued. This paper argues that a manager may reasonably weigh perceived overvaluation in choosing when to issue, provided the belief rests on information about the firm the market lacks or has misread, and not on a general view that the market is wrong. On that test, the officer's case needs more support than it currently has.

The Efficient-Markets Case

Fama (1970) set out the position that prices fully reflect available information, and distinguished three forms of the claim by the information set involved: past prices, all public information, and all information including what insiders know. Most of the evidence Fama (1970) reviewed supported the first two forms; the strong form, which would rule out gains from inside information, was not supported. For the officer, the semi-strong form is the relevant one. If the share price already reflects everything public about the company, a belief that the price is too high, drawn from public data, is a belief that the officer has read those data better than the market has.

The same review identified the joint-hypothesis problem. Any test of efficiency requires a model of what returns should be, so an apparent mispricing may show that the market is inefficient or that the model of expected returns is wrong, and the test cannot say which. Every anomaly the behavioral literature offers can be contested on these grounds.

The Behavioral Case

Shiller (1981) offered evidence that is hard to explain away by the choice of model. If a stock's price is the present value of its expected future dividends, the price should vary less than the dividends that later arrive, since an expectation is smoother than the outcome it forecasts. Shiller (1981) found that stock prices moved several times more than later dividends could justify. Prices, on that evidence, contain swings that information about future cash does not explain.

Managers appear to act on such swings. Baker and Wurgler (2002) found that firms tended to raise equity when their market-to-book ratios were high, and that the effect on capital structure persisted for years, as if firms timed the market and left the result in place rather than reverting to a target mix of debt and equity.

The Post-Issue Evidence and Its Dispute

Loughran and Ritter (1995) documented that firms issuing equity, both in initial and in seasoned offerings, earned markedly lower returns over the following five years than comparable nonissuing firms. If issuers chose moments when their shares were overvalued, that is the pattern one would expect. The dispute is the joint-hypothesis problem again: issuers may differ in risk in ways standard models measure poorly, so lower later returns could reflect lower risk after issuance rather than earlier overpricing. The evidence is consistent with managers timing issues successfully, but it does not settle the matter.

Table 1

What Each Literature Implies for the Proposed Issue

LiteratureCore findingImplication for the officer
Efficient markets (Fama, 1970)Prices reflect public information; anomalies are contestableA public-data belief in overvaluation is weak grounds
Excess volatility (Shiller, 1981)Prices move more than later dividends justifyMispricing may exist; when is unknown
Market timing (Baker & Wurgler, 2002)Firms issue when valuations run highManagers do act on perceived overvaluation
New issues (Loughran & Ritter, 1995)Issuers earn low later returnsTiming may succeed, or issuers differ in risk

The Distinction the Position Depends On

Two kinds of belief that shares are overvalued must be kept apart. The first rests on information the manager has and the market lacks or has not yet weighed: a clinical result due next quarter that internal data suggest will disappoint, a slowing order book the market cannot see, or a competitor's product that the sales team has encountered before analysts. The second rests on a general view that the market, or the sector, has become too optimistic. The first is the kind of knowledge the strong form of efficiency does not rule out, and acting on it within disclosure rules is part of a manager's job. The second asks the manager to beat the market at its own task with the same information, which the efficient-markets evidence suggests few can do.

The officer's case, as presented, is of the second kind. The memo cites the company's earnings multiple against the sector average and against the company's own history, both public figures. It offers no internal evidence that next year's results will fall below what the price implies.

The Strongest Objection

The strongest objection to timing an issue at all is that investors anticipate it. Myers and Majluf (1984) showed that when managers know more than investors, an equity issue signals that managers think the shares are overvalued, and the price falls on the announcement. A firm that issues to exploit overvaluation will therefore capture less of it than the price before the announcement suggests. The objection is sound, and it narrows the gain without removing it: if the decline on announcement is smaller than the overvaluation, issuing still benefits existing holders. It also strengthens the case for an issue that has a stated, credible use for the cash, because that reduces the signal.

What Would Overturn the Conclusion

The conclusion would fail if the long-run underperformance of issuers were shown to be fully explained by differences in risk, leaving no evidence that issuers time overvaluation successfully. It would also fail if announcement declines were shown to absorb all of the apparent gain. For the device maker, the practical recommendation is narrower: issue now if management can point to firm-specific reasons the price is too high and can disclose a use for the cash; otherwise, raise the capital when it is needed, on its merits.

References

Baker, M., & Wurgler, J. (2002). Market timing and capital structure. Journal of Finance, 57(1), 1-32. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00414

Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. Journal of Finance, 25(2), 383-417. https://doi.org/10.2307/2325486

Loughran, T., & Ritter, J. R. (1995). The new issues puzzle. Journal of Finance, 50(1), 23-51. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05166.x

Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2), 187-221. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(84)90023-0

Shiller, R. J. (1981). Do stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent changes in dividends? American Economic Review, 71(3), 421-436.

The DBA-820 Topic 8 assignment instructions

Topic 8 in DBA-820 asks doctoral students to defend a position where the efficient-markets and behavioral literatures disagree. Strong papers state the efficient-markets case fairly, including the joint-hypothesis problem, before presenting the behavioral evidence. Students should explain what each literature predicts for the specific decision, distinguish firm-specific knowledge a manager may hold from a general belief that the market is wrong, and answer the strongest objection rather than a weak one. The paper should apply its test to the case's actual evidence, reach a practical recommendation and name the findings that would overturn the conclusion.

How this DBA 820 Topic 8 example is built

The finished paper argues that a manager may reasonably weigh perceived overvaluation when choosing when to issue equity, provided the belief rests on information about the firm rather than a general view of the market. The efficient-markets side is stated first and fairly. Fama's position is that prices reflect available information, and his joint-hypothesis point means any apparent mispricing is also a test of the model used to measure it. The behavioral side follows. Shiller's evidence that stock prices move far more than later dividends would justify challenges the efficient view directly. Baker and Wurgler found that firms tend to issue equity when market valuations are high, and Loughran and Ritter documented weak long-run returns after equity offerings. The paper then asks what each literature would predict for this CFO's decision.

Where the marks sit in the DBA 820 Topic 8 rubric

Faculty reward a position resting on a clear distinction. An Excellent paper states Fama's three forms and the joint-hypothesis problem before turning to Shiller's excess volatility. Credit goes to a table setting out what each literature implies for the issue, with Baker and Wurgler on market timing and Loughran and Ritter on post-issue returns. The rubric values separating firm-specific knowledge from a general market view and answering Myers and Majluf on announcement declines. Strong papers apply the test to the officer's evidence. Top marks go to naming what would overturn the conclusion.

DBA 820 Topic 8 help before you submit

Where this paper usually slips is in treating either literature as the winner. A paper arguing that the CFO should issue because behavioral finance has disproved efficient markets overstates evidence that remains disputed, and one dismissing her view because markets are efficient ignores findings the efficient side itself has had to explain. The joint-hypothesis problem is often missing, though it is the reason the question stays open. Post-issue return evidence cited as proof of mispricing, with no mention that risk-based explanations predict similar patterns, argues one side. Papers that never separate firm-specific knowledge from market-wide sentiment leave the position without a boundary. Citations stretched beyond a scholar's central finding are costly in doctoral work, and a conclusion with no stated condition for reversal reads as preference rather than argument.

Get a DBA-820 Topic 8 example written to your instructions

Send the DBA-820 Topic 8 instructions and the rubric your classroom posts, with the company case or readings your section provides. We write a custom example to them, with the efficient-markets and behavioral cases both stated fairly, the joint-hypothesis problem addressed, the position bounded and its reversing evidence named, in 24 to 48 hours. The first one is free.

More DBA 820 papers and DBA samples

DBA 820 Topic 8 questions, answered

What is the joint-hypothesis problem?

Fama's observation that market efficiency cannot be tested alone. To say a price is wrong, a researcher must specify what the right expected return was, which requires a model of risk. If a test finds abnormal returns, either the market is inefficient or the model is wrong, and the data cannot say which. That is why anomalies remain contested long after they are first documented.

Does behavioral finance show that markets are inefficient?

It shows patterns that are hard to reconcile with simple efficient-markets models, such as prices that swing more than later dividends justify and weak returns after share issues. Whether those patterns reflect investor error or risk the models miss is still argued. The example treats the question as open and builds a position that holds under either reading, within stated limits.

Where can I find a free DBA 820 Topic 8 sample paper?

The argument paper is printed here in full: the proposal and position, the efficient-markets case, the behavioral case, post-issue evidence, the distinction the position depends on, the strongest objection and what would overturn it. Share your case's decision and an argument paper follows at no cost.

Why does the officer's case fall short in DBA 820 Topic 8?

It rests on the company's earnings multiple against the sector and its own history, both public figures. Without internal evidence that results will disappoint, the belief is a general market view, which the efficiency evidence suggests few managers can exploit.

Should a company time its share issues on this reasoning?

The paper cannot advise any real company. The device maker, its finance chief and the proposal are composites built to show an argument defended on incomplete evidence, and financing choices at an actual firm turn on its circumstances, securities law and professional advice.