FIN 655 Topic 1 mandate design memo example

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This FIN 655 Topic 1 sample paper advises a composite pension plan's investment committee, in memo form, on whether to hire an active large-cap manager for a 150-million-dollar sleeve. It was written for GCU FIN 655, Investments, catalog code FIN-655, in the Grand Canyon University MS in Finance. The proposed fee of 0.55 percent against 0.03 for an index fund costs about 780,000 a year. With tracking error near 1.4 and active share near 30 percent, the effective fee on the part that differs from the index is about 1.76 percent. The memo sets terms that make the bet visible, measures them, and names the index-plus-concentrated alternative.

CourseFIN 655 Investments
TopicTopic 1
Paper typeManager mandate memo
LengthAbout 880 words, 2 pages
FormatMemo with APA 7 references
SchoolGrand Canyon University (GCU)
ProgramMS in Finance
UpdatedOctober 2026

Free sample paper for FIN 655 Topic 1

1

Memorandum

To: Investment Committee, Rockwell Manufacturing Pension Plan

From: Plan Investment Staff

Date: [Date]

Re: Proposed active large-cap equity mandate: fee, active share and terms

 

The Duty Comes First

The committee is considering hiring an active U.S. large-cap equity manager for a 150-million-dollar sleeve of the defined benefit plan. Before any term is set, this memo starts with the committee's duty. Fiduciaries of a private pension plan must act solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries and with the care and diligence of a prudent expert, and must defray only reasonable expenses of administering the plan (Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 2018). Every fee the committee agrees to must therefore be defensible as buying something participants need. All figures below are illustrative.

What the Fee Buys

Table 1

What the Proposed Fee Buys, Illustrative

MeasureValue
Proposed fee0.55% on $150 million
Index fund fee0.03%
Annual fee differenceAbout $780,000
Tracking errorAbout 1.4%
Active shareAbout 30%
Effective fee on the active 30%About 1.76%

The manager proposes a fee of 0.55 percent a year, against 0.03 percent for an index fund tracking the same benchmark. On 150 million dollars, that difference is about 780,000 dollars a year. The question is what the extra fee pays for.

Two statistics from the manager's composite answer it. Tracking error, the volatility of the manager's return relative to the benchmark, has been about 1.4 percent a year, which is low. Active share, the proportion of the portfolio's holdings that differ from the benchmark's, is about 30 percent (Cremers & Petajisto, 2009). In other words, about 70 percent of the portfolio is effectively the index, and only 30 percent represents the manager's active decisions.

That changes the economics of the fee. If the index-like 70 percent is credited at the index fee of 0.03 percent, the rest of the 0.55 percent fee falls on the 30 percent that differs. The effective fee on the active portion is (0.55 minus 0.7 times 0.03) divided by 0.30, about 1.76 percent a year. The plan would be paying an index fee for most of the portfolio and nearly 1.8 percent for the part that actually reflects the manager's skill.

What this page is doingCharging the whole fee against the active portion shows what the plan really pays for the manager's decisions.
2

Why the Effective Fee Matters

Sharpe (1991) showed that before costs the average actively managed dollar must earn the market return, because active investors together hold the market, which leaves the typical active dollar behind the index once fees and trading costs are paid. A manager whose active portion carries an effective fee of 1.76 percent must outperform the benchmark on that portion by more than 1.76 percent a year just to match the index fund after fees. With only 30 percent of the portfolio active and tracking error of 1.4 percent, the manager's whole-portfolio outperformance would need to exceed about 0.52 percent a year, a demanding target given the low risk the manager takes relative to the benchmark. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) found that funds with low active share, sometimes called closet indexers, have tended to underperform after fees, while funds with high active share have done better on average.

Terms That Make the Bet Visible

The memo recommends hiring the manager only on terms that align the fee with the active portion. First, either a minimum active share of 60 percent, with tracking error between 3 and 6 percent, so the plan is paying for a genuine active portfolio, or a fee reduced to reflect the current active share. Second, a performance-based component: a base fee of 0.20 percent plus a share of outperformance above the benchmark, measured over rolling three-year periods with a high-water mark, so the manager earns more only when the plan does. Third, quarterly reporting of active share, tracking error and sector deviations, so the committee can confirm the portfolio remains as active as promised. Fourth, a review at three years against the benchmark and the effective fee, with termination available without penalty.

The Alternative

If the manager will not accept these terms, the committee should consider a combination it can build itself: an index fund for most of the sleeve at 0.03 percent, and a smaller allocation to a high active share manager whose fee is paid on a genuinely active portfolio. That structure gives the plan the same overall exposure and a clearer price for active management, and it lets the committee size the active bet deliberately.

How the Committee Will Measure It

The committee should agree the yardstick before the first dollar moves. The benchmark is the index the manager already uses, and results will be judged net of all fees over rolling three-year periods, not quarter by quarter. Staff will report the information ratio, the outperformance divided by tracking error, so a manager who adds return by taking more relative risk is not mistaken for one who adds it with skill. Staff will also recompute the effective fee each quarter from the reported active share, so the committee can see at a glance whether the price of the active portion has drifted upward.

Recommendation

The committee should not hire the manager at 0.55 percent on its current portfolio. It should offer the terms above and, failing agreement, use the index-plus-concentrated-active alternative. Either path ensures the plan pays for active management only where it receives it, which is what the duty of prudence requires the committee to be able to show.

References

Cremers, K. J. M., & Petajisto, A. (2009). How active is your fund manager? A new measure that predicts performance. Review of Financial Studies, 22(9), 3329-3365. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp057

Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. ยง 1001 et seq. (2018).

Sharpe, W. F. (1991). The arithmetic of active management. Financial Analysts Journal, 47(1), 7-9. https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v47.n1.7

FIN 655 Topic 1 instructions, in plain terms

Topic 1 in FIN-655 asks students to advise a fiduciary on delegating money to an active manager. Strong submissions open with the duty the committee owes participants, then examine what the proposed fee buys using measures such as active share and tracking error. Students should compute what the plan effectively pays for the active portion, connect that figure to the evidence on active management after costs, and propose mandate terms covering activity, fees, reporting and review. The memo should set out how results will be measured, weigh an alternative structure, and end with a clear recommendation the committee can adopt or reject.

Inside the FIN 655 Topic 1 example

The finished memo opens with the duty rather than the portfolio: the committee invests for plan participants, and every term it signs must be defensible to them. An illustrative fee of 0.55 percent against 0.03 for an index sleeve costs about 780,000 a year on 150 million. The manager's composite shows tracking error near 1.4 percent and an active share around 30 percent, so roughly 70 percent of the portfolio is the index. Charging 0.55 on the whole means paying about 1.76 percent on the 30 percent that differs, once the index portion is credited at 0.03. William Sharpe's arithmetic of active management frames the stakes: before costs, active dollars in aggregate earn the market return, so after costs they must trail it. The memo sets terms that make the active bet visible and priced.

Reading the FIN 655 Topic 1 rubric

Faculty reward a memo that prices delegation rather than describing it. An Excellent memo grounds the analysis in the committee's fiduciary duty and computes the effective fee on the active share with the arithmetic shown. Credit goes to linking that figure to the outperformance the manager must deliver after fees. The rubric values mandate terms that align pay with genuine activity, such as an active share floor or a performance-based fee with a high-water mark. Strong memos define the yardstick in advance and report the information ratio. Top marks go to an alternative structure and a decision the committee can act on.

FIN 655 Topic 1 help: mistakes that cost marks

Memos that set the manager's record beside the index and recommend the hire take the heaviest loss, because the question here is what changes once the committee answers to someone else. Papers that quote the fee without relating it to how much of the portfolio is active miss that a near-index manager is expensive in the way participants cannot see. Mandates with a tracking error ceiling and no floor permit the closet indexing the fee should rule out. Leaving the review horizon unstated invites the committee to fire on one bad year and hire on one good one. Citing Sharpe's arithmetic as proof that no active manager can add value overstates it, because the argument concerns the average dollar. A memo that never names which decisions the committee keeps has delegated its own duty along with the portfolio.

Get a FIN-655 Topic 1 example written to your instructions

Send the FIN-655 Topic 1 instructions and the rubric from your classroom, with the plan or mandate case your section assigns. We write a custom example to them, with the committee's duty stated, the fee priced against the portfolio's active share, tracking error bounded from both sides and review rules fixed before the hire, in 24 to 48 hours. The first one is free.

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FIN 655 Topic 1 questions, answered

What is active share, and why does the memo use it?

Active share measures how much of a portfolio's holdings differ from its benchmark's, from zero for an index fund to 100 percent for a portfolio sharing nothing with it. The measure is associated with Martijn Cremers and Antti Petajisto. The memo uses it to show what the fee buys: a manager whose holdings mostly match the index is charging an active price for a largely passive portfolio.

What did Sharpe's arithmetic of active management show?

That before costs, the return on the average actively managed dollar must equal the return on the average passively managed dollar, because together they hold the market. After costs, the average active dollar must therefore earn less. The argument says nothing about any single manager, only about active managers as a group, which is why the memo uses it to set the burden of proof rather than to settle the hire.

Could the memo serve as a real plan's manager mandate?

No. The plan, the sleeve, the fee, the manager's statistics and the tracking error range were set for a FIN-655 exercise so that the cost of delegation shows clearly. A real mandate depends on the plan's governing documents, the law that applies to it, counsel's review and terms negotiated with an actual manager. It shows how FIN-655 expects delegation argued, and it advises no real committee.

Where can I find a free FIN 655 Topic 1 sample paper?

Every part of the mandate memo is shown below: the duty, what the fee buys, why the effective fee matters, the proposed terms, how results will be measured, the alternative and the recommendation. Send your plan's manager figures and we can redraft the memo around them free.

How is the 1.76 percent effective fee found in FIN 655 Topic 1?

Credit the 70 percent of the portfolio that mirrors the index at the index fee of 0.03 percent, then charge the rest of the 0.55 percent fee to the 30 percent that differs: 0.55 minus 0.021, divided by 0.30, is about 1.76 percent.