| Course | FIN 660 Advanced Financial Strategies |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 4 |
| Paper type | Distress stage assessment |
| Length | About 980 words, 3 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | MS in Finance |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for FIN 660 Topic 4
Acting While Every Option Is Open: A Distress Stage Assessment of an Auto Parts Supplier at 4.1 Times Against a 4.5 Covenant
[Author Name]
Colangelo College of Business, Grand Canyon University
FIN-660: Advanced Financial Strategies
Topic 4 Distress Assessment
[Instructor Name]
[Date]
The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.
Acting While Every Option Is Open: A Distress Stage Assessment of an Auto Parts Supplier at 4.1 Times Against a 4.5 Covenant
The Position
A composite auto parts supplier has net debt of 820 million dollars against EBITDA of 200 million, 4.1 times, under a maintenance covenant of 4.5 times. A 400 million term loan matures in twenty months. The company is not in default and has not missed a payment. This assessment asks how close it is to losing control of its options and what it should do now. All figures are in millions and illustrative.
A Screen Read as a Warning
The Z-score combines five ratios into one figure, weighted as the original study of public manufacturers estimated them (Altman, 1968): working capital to total assets, retained earnings to total assets, operating profit to total assets, equity at market value relative to total liabilities, and sales to total assets. The supplier's figures are shown in Table 1. The score is about 1.90, just above the 1.81 line at which the original model's distress zone begins.
Table 1
Altman Z-Score, Illustrative
| Ratio | Value | Weight | Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|
| Working capital to total assets (75 / 1,500) | 0.05 | 1.2 | 0.06 |
| Retained earnings to total assets (150 / 1,500) | 0.10 | 1.4 | 0.14 |
| Operating profit to total assets (120 / 1,500) | 0.08 | 3.3 | 0.26 |
| Market value of equity to total liabilities (440 / 1,100) | 0.40 | 0.6 | 0.24 |
| Sales to total assets (1,800 / 1,500) | 1.20 | 1.0 | 1.20 |
| Z-score | | | About 1.90 |
Three Measures That Matter More
The screen points to three direct measures. The first is covenant headroom. At 4.1 times against a 4.5 limit, EBITDA can fall only about 9 percent, to roughly 182, before the covenant breaks. In the last two auto downturns the supplier's EBITDA fell by more than that, so a breach in the next one is likely rather than possible.
The second is maturity. The 400 term loan is due in twenty months, and the case states that lenders are now refinancing companies like this one only below 4.0 times. At 4.1, the supplier cannot refinance on current terms.
The third is liquidity: cash of 60 plus 90 of undrawn revolver, 150 in all. That covers a bad year's operating needs, but the revolver is subject to the same covenant, so a breach could close it just when it is needed.
Four Stages and the Options at Each
Distress moves through stages, and the options narrow at each one. Table 2 lists them.
Table 2
Stages of Decline and the Options That Survive
| Stage | Situation | Options still available |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Headroom intact, maturity more than a year away | Amend and extend, sell assets, raise equity, cut spending, refinance |
| 2 | Covenant breached | Waiver or amendment on lenders' terms, asset sales with lender consent |
| 3 | Maturity within twelve months, no refinancing | Exchange offer, forced asset sales, sponsor or rescue capital |
| 4 | Court process | Reorganization plan under court supervision, sale of the business |
Why Equity Disappears as an Option
Raising new equity is open in stage one but closes quickly. Myers (1977) showed that when a firm's debt is large relative to its value, much of the benefit of any new investment goes to creditors, who are made safer, rather than to shareholders who fund it. Shareholders then decline to fund even projects worth doing, which is the underinvestment problem known as debt overhang. As the supplier's position weakens, new equity becomes harder to raise for this reason, even if the business is sound.
The Recommendation: Act Now
The assessment recommends two actions now, while the company is in stage one. The first is to sell a non-core aftermarket unit that the case values at 100, about 6.7 times its EBITDA of 15. The proceeds reduce net debt to 720 against EBITDA of 185, about 3.89 times, which brings the company below the 4.0 at which lenders will refinance. The second is to negotiate an amend-and-extend with the term lenders, pushing the maturity out three years and resetting the covenant with headroom of at least 25 percent.
Gilson et al. (1990) found that firms that restructured out of court were more likely to succeed when more of their debt was owed to banks and when they acted before conditions deteriorated. The supplier's debt is concentrated in a bank term loan and a revolver, which makes a negotiated amendment practical now and harder after a breach, when lenders set the terms.
What the Lenders Will Ask For
An amend-and-extend is a negotiation, and the supplier should expect to pay for it. Lenders will likely ask for a higher interest margin, an amendment fee, tighter limits on dividends and acquisitions, and a requirement that part of any future asset sale proceeds repay the loan. Those costs are real but bounded, and they are far smaller than the terms lenders would set after a breach, when they could also demand security over more assets or a say in operating decisions. Arriving with the unit sale already agreed strengthens the supplier's hand, because it shows the lenders a lower debt multiple before the talks begin rather than a promise of one.
Against Waiting for the Cycle
The alternative is to wait for the auto cycle to recover and refinance from a stronger position. That would save the discount on the unit sale and the fees on the amendment. But it bets every option on a recovery the company does not control. If the cycle turns down instead, the company moves to stage two with twenty months or less to maturity, and the same steps would then be taken on lenders' terms. A buyer for the unit would also know the company was under pressure, which lowers the price, since sellers who must sell commonly accept less than the same assets would fetch from strength.
The cost of acting now is modest and known. The cost of waiting in a downturn is large and uncertain. The assessment therefore recommends acting now.
References
Altman, E. I. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. Journal of Finance, 23(4), 589-609. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00843.x
Gilson, S. C., John, K., & Lang, L. H. P. (1990). Troubled debt restructurings: An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default. Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 315-353. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(90)90059-9
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5(2), 147-175. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(77)90015-0
Reading the GCU FIN 660 Topic 4 instructions
In Topic 4, FIN-660 asks students to assess a company approaching financial distress and recommend a course of action. Strong assessments screen with a distress model, showing each ratio and the model's limits, and then measure covenant headroom, time to maturity and liquidity directly. Students should lay out the stages of decline and the options that remain at each, explain why new equity becomes hard to raise as debt overhang grows, and recommend specific actions with their effect on debt ratios, defended against the alternative of waiting for conditions to improve. The assessment should also anticipate what lenders will ask in return for any amendment.
How this FIN 660 Topic 4 example is built
The finished assessment reads the supplier's position three ways, all in illustrative millions. Covenant headroom comes first: net debt of 820 over EBITDA of 200 gives 4.1 times, so a 9 percent fall in EBITDA, to 182, would breach the 4.5 limit. Maturity comes second: the 400 term loan is due in twenty months, and the case says lenders now refinance only below 4.0 times. Edward Altman's Z-score, computed from five ratios covering liquidity, accumulated profit, operating return, market cushion and asset turnover, comes to about 1.90, just above the 1.81 line where the original model's distress zone begins. The assessment then lays out four stages of decline and the options that survive into each, and shows how quickly the list shortens once a covenant is broken.
FIN 660 Topic 4 rubric: what Excellent looks like
Instructors grading the assessment reward acting while options remain. An Excellent paper computes the Z-score with every ratio shown and treats it as a warning, not a verdict. Credit goes to headroom, maturity and liquidity measured side by side. The rubric values a stage table showing the options that survive into each stage. Strong papers apply Myers's debt overhang argument and cite Gilson, John and Lang on out-of-court restructuring. Top marks go to a unit sale and amend-and-extend that bring debt below the refinancing line, defended against waiting for the cycle.
Common FIN 660 Topic 4 mistakes, and how to avoid them
Assessments that recognize distress only when a covenant has already broken score lowest, because by then the options this topic asks about belong to the lenders. Papers that report the Z-score as a verdict, without noting the population the model was built on, give a screening tool more authority than it has. Headroom stated as a ratio, with no translation into how far EBITDA can fall, hides how thin the margin is. Ignoring the maturity date treats a refinancing that markets may refuse as routine. An equity raise proposed after the breach overlooks debt overhang, which makes holders unwilling to fund a recovery creditors would largely capture. Recommending patience without pricing what each quarter of waiting removes from the list leaves the board choosing delay by default.
Get a FIN-660 Topic 4 example written to your instructions
Send the FIN-660 Topic 4 instructions and the rubric listed in your classroom, with the company's figures your section supplies. We write a custom example to them, with a distress screen, headroom translated into an EBITDA decline, maturity and liquidity measured, the options mapped stage by stage and a course of action defended against waiting, in 24 to 48 hours. The first one is free.
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FIN 660 Topic 4 questions, answered
What is the Altman Z-score?
A weighted combination of five financial ratios that Edward Altman developed to separate manufacturers that went bankrupt from those that did not: working capital, retained earnings and operating profit each scaled by total assets, market value of equity over total liabilities, and sales over total assets. Low scores signal elevated risk. Later versions adapt the weights for private and non-manufacturing firms, so the version must match the company.
What is debt overhang?
A problem Stewart Myers identified: when a firm's debt is large relative to its value, much of the gain from any new investment goes to creditors, whose claims become safer, rather than to the shareholders who would fund it. Holders may therefore refuse to put in new equity even for a sound project. That is why the assessment treats an equity raise as realistic only before a breach.
Does the assessment say whether an actual company is in distress?
No. The supplier, its ratios, the covenant and the refinancing threshold are composites, picked so that each measure and stage shows clearly. Judging a real company's position requires its audited statements, loan documents, lender relationships and advice from restructuring professionals, and nothing here should inform a decision about a real security. The assessment is FIN-660 coursework on reading distress early.
Where can I find a free FIN 660 Topic 4 sample paper?
Every section of the distress assessment is shown here: the position, the Z-score screen, three measures, the four stages, why equity disappears, the recommendation, what lenders will ask for and the case against waiting. Bring your company's figures and a free assessment can be worked.
How does the recommendation reach 3.89 times in FIN 660 Topic 4?
Selling a non-core unit for 100, about 6.7 times its EBITDA of 15, cuts net debt to 720 and EBITDA to 185. That ratio, about 3.89 times, sits below the 4.0 at which lenders will refinance.