| Course | HIM 415 Clinical Data Management |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 7 |
| Paper type | Failure traced process redesign |
| Length | About 980 words, 3 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | BS in Health Information Management |
| Updated | September 2026 |
Free sample paper for HIM 415 Topic 7
A Measure That Fell Without the Care Changing: Tracing Cholla's VTE Prophylaxis Drop to a Template Default and Redesigning the Process
[Author Name]
College of Nursing and Health Care Professions, Grand Canyon University
HIM-415: Clinical Data Management
Topic 7 Assignment
[Instructor Name]
[Date]
The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.
A Measure That Fell Without the Care Changing: Tracing Cholla's VTE Prophylaxis Drop to a Template Default and Redesigning the Process
The Failure and How It Was Found
Cholla Regional Medical Center tracks an internal measure, modeled on national definitions, of the share of eligible inpatients who received venous thromboembolism prophylaxis, or had a documented reason for none, by the day after admission. For two years it ran between 92% and 95%. In March it fell to 71%, and in April to 69%. The quality dashboard showed the drop, but no one acted on it, because the dashboard displayed thirty measures and the committee that reviewed them met quarterly. In May, the hospitalist group's director questioned the figure at a medical staff meeting: her physicians' prescribing had not changed, and she asked for the data to be checked. This paper traces the failure back through each step that produced the number and then redesigns the process so the next failure is caught sooner.
The Trace
Table 1
Tracing the Measure Back to Its Source
| Step, working backward | What was checked | Finding |
|---|---|---|
| Dashboard report | Calculation logic and denominator | Unchanged; correct |
| Data warehouse | Load of abstracted values | Loaded exactly what abstractors entered |
| Abstraction | Source the abstractors used for prophylaxis | The prophylaxis field in the admission order set template |
| Admission order set template | Changes in the period | February update set the prophylaxis field's default to "none ordered" |
| Medication orders and administration record | Actual prophylaxis for a sample of 50 March patients | 44 received pharmacologic prophylaxis ordered separately from the template |
What Happened
In February, the EHR team updated the admission order set to add a new risk assessment tool. In doing so, it set the prophylaxis field's default to "none ordered," where it had previously been blank. Many physicians ordered enoxaparin or heparin through the medication order screen rather than through the order set, as they always had, and left the order set field untouched, so it kept its default. Abstractors, who had been trained to read the order set field because it was usually accurate, recorded no prophylaxis. The medication administration record showed that 44 of 50 sampled patients had in fact received it.
The care did not change. The documentation template did, and the abstraction step accepted the template's default as though it were a clinical entry. Kahn et al. (2016) describe plausibility checks that test whether a value makes sense against other data, and no such check existed here: nothing compared the order set field with the medication orders. Weiskopf and Weng (2013) identified concordance, agreement between elements that should agree, as a dimension of data quality, and it was exactly concordance that failed.
Why No One Noticed for Two Months
Three features of the process delayed detection. The dashboard showed the drop, but no one was assigned to act on a sudden change between quarterly meetings. The template change passed through the EHR change control process, which reviewed clinical safety but not effects on measures that depend on the field. And the abstractors' training had made the template field a trusted shortcut, so no one was checking it against the source it was meant to summarize. Benneyan et al. (2003) showed how control charts separate the routine month-to-month wobble of a process from a special cause worth chasing, and a measure that fell more than twenty points in a month, far outside its control limits, was a special cause no chart was watching.
The Redesign
The redesign addresses each feature rather than the individuals involved. First, the abstraction source changes: prophylaxis is now abstracted from medication orders and the administration record, with the order set field used only as a pointer. Second, the order set field has no default; it must be answered or left blank, and a blank does not count as an answer. Third, a monthly concordance check compares the order set field with medication orders for all measure patients and reports mismatches. Fourth, EHR change control now asks, for any change to a field used in a quality measure or registry, whether the change affects the data, with the health information management data steward as a required reviewer. Fifth, the ten measures the board follows most closely are plotted on control charts, and a point outside the limits triggers a data review within five working days, before the committee meets.
The March and April figures were recalculated from the medication record, at 93% and 94%, and the correction was reported to the medical staff with an account of the cause. The hospitalist director's question was the process's only effective check, and the redesign exists so that it is no longer the only one.
What the Redesign Costs and What It Assumes
The redesign has costs, and they were stated to the quality committee. Abstracting from medication orders and the administration record takes longer than reading one template field, about four extra minutes per case, or roughly 20 hours a month for the measure's volume. The monthly concordance check takes an analyst about two hours to run and review once built. The added change control review lengthens template changes by a few days. Against these, the failure cost two months of wrong data reported to the board, a medical staff meeting spent on a false problem and the credibility of every measure on the dashboard, which several physicians now question.
The redesign also rests on an assumption the committee should watch: that the medication administration record is itself accurate. It is the better source, since it records each dose scanned at the bedside, but it can be wrong when doses are given during downtime or documented late. The concordance check will surface disagreements in both directions, and a pattern of prophylaxis on the order set with no matching dose in the administration record would indicate a different problem, missed doses, which would be a care failure rather than a data failure and would go to nursing and pharmacy.
References
Benneyan, J. C., Lloyd, R. C., & Plsek, P. E. (2003). Statistical process control as a tool for research and healthcare improvement. Quality and Safety in Health Care, 12(6), 458-464. https://doi.org/10.1136/qhc.12.6.458
Kahn, M. G., Callahan, T. J., Barnard, J., Bauck, A. E., Brown, J., Davidson, B. N., Estiri, H., Goerg, C., Holve, E., Johnson, S. G., Liaw, S.-T., Hamilton-Lopez, M., Meeker, D., Ong, T. C., Ryan, P., Shang, N., Weiskopf, N. G., Weng, C., Zozus, M. N., & Schilling, L. (2016). A harmonized data quality assessment terminology and framework for the secondary use of electronic health record data. eGEMs, 4(1), Article 1244. https://doi.org/10.13063/2327-9214.1244
Weiskopf, N. G., & Weng, C. (2013). Methods and dimensions of electronic health record data quality assessment: Enabling reuse for clinical research. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 20(1), 144-151. https://doi.org/10.1136/amiajnl-2011-000681
The HIM-415 Topic 7 assignment instructions
The Topic 7 instructions in HIM-415 ask students to trace a data failure to its cause and redesign the process that allowed it. Weak papers blame individuals or propose retraining. The assignment rewards traces that work backward from the faulty report through each step that produced it, checking each step's source until the cause is found, then explain why the failure went unnoticed. Students should redesign the process at each point that failed, drawing on data quality and process control literature, state what the redesign costs and assumes, and correct the reported figures.
How the HIM-415 Topic 7 example is put together
The finished redesign begins with the failure and the timeline of how it was found. A composite hospital's venous thromboembolism prophylaxis measure dropped sharply, and nobody noticed until a physician group questioned the figure. The trace follows the data back from the report through the warehouse, the abstraction step and the documentation template, finding that a template update had set the prophylaxis field to a default value that abstractors accepted as documented. The redesign then targets what permitted the incident, not the incident alone: template changes now require review by the data management function before release, the abstraction guideline requires source confirmation for that element, and a monitoring check flags sudden shifts in any measure's inputs. Each change is linked to the point in the trace it closes, and the old and new process maps sit side by side.
Where the marks sit in the HIM 415 Topic 7 rubric
GCU's rubric for the failure trace rewards following data to its source. Excellent papers show that downstream steps worked as designed and locate the failure in a specific upstream change, such as a template default. Credit goes to explaining detection delay as a process feature, including missing change review and unmonitored measures. The rubric values redesigns that change sources, remove defaults, add concordance checks and use control charts. The highest level states the redesign's costs and the assumptions it depends on, and corrects the record openly.
Common HIM 415 Topic 7 mistakes, and how to avoid them
Redesigns assembled from general best practice, with the failure mentioned only in an introduction, lose the most here. The redesign is meant to rebuild the process around what actually broke, and a generic improvement plan would read the same had the incident never happened. Stopping at the triggering event, the template update, fixes one template and leaves the condition that will let the next one through. Traces that run forward from documentation to report tend to confirm what the writer already suspected, while a backward trace tests each step in turn. Some drafts propose retraining abstractors as the whole answer, although the abstractors followed the guideline they were given. A redesign whose changes cannot each be linked to a step in the trace has probably added controls for show, and graders usually ask why each one exists.
Get an HIM-415 Topic 7 example written to your instructions
Send the HIM-415 Topic 7 instructions, the rubric posted in your classroom and the failure, incident or case your assignment describes. We write a custom example to those criteria, with the failure traced backward, the trigger separated from the permitting condition, each change tied to the trace and owners named for every control, in 24 to 48 hours. The first one is free.
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HIM 415 Topic 7 questions, answered
Why trace backward instead of forward?
Because the failure is known at the report and the cause is not. Starting from the wrong number and asking, at each step, how it arrived there tests every stage in turn. A forward trace from documentation tends to start where the writer already suspects the problem lies and confirm it. The backward approach is slower and more likely to find a second contributing step nobody expected.
What is the difference between a trigger and a condition?
The trigger is the event that caused this failure, here a template update. The condition is the feature of the process that allowed any similar event to cause a failure, here the absence of data review before template changes. Fixing the trigger repairs one incident; removing the condition prevents the next. Root cause methods such as the five whys push past the trigger for that reason.
Can the failure come from my own workplace?
Many sections allow it, and a real failure makes a stronger redesign than a textbook case. Describe it as a process event, remove anything that identifies patients, staff or the organization, and check your instructions on whether internal incidents may be used. Where that is not possible, a composite failure built from a common pattern, like the defaulted field in this example, serves the same purpose.
Where can I find a free HIM 415 Topic 7 sample paper?
The complete redesign is on this page, with the failure and how it was found, the trace, what happened, why no one noticed, the redesign and its costs. Send your failure for a free worked redesign.
What caused the drop in HIM 415 Topic 7?
A February template update set the prophylaxis field's default to none ordered. Physicians ordered anticoagulants through the medication screen, the field kept its default and abstractors recorded no prophylaxis.