| Course | MGT 470 Strategic and Global Human Resource Management |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 7 |
| Paper type | Incentive redesign |
| Length | About 970 words, 4 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | BS in Business Management |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for MGT 470 Topic 7
One Incentive Plan, Two Countries' Rules: Redesigning a Profit-Weighted Bonus for a Mexican Plant With Statutory Profit Sharing and a German Office With a Works Council
[Author Name]
Colangelo College of Business, Grand Canyon University
MGT-470: Strategic and Global Human Resource Management
Topic 7 Assignment
[Instructor Name]
[Date]
The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.
One Incentive Plan, Two Countries' Rules: Redesigning a Profit-Weighted Bonus for a Mexican Plant With Statutory Profit Sharing and a German Office With a Works Council
The Group Plan
Keystone Grip Systems' compensation team in Pittsburgh has drafted a single annual incentive plan for all employees below director level at every site. Seventy percent of the payout depends on group operating profit and thirty percent on the employee's individual performance rating. The target payout is a percentage of base salary that varies by grade. The plan works reasonably well in Pittsburgh, where it replaced a discretionary bonus. This redesign asks whether it should be applied as drafted in Mexico and Germany, where Topic 2 classified the incentive as a framed practice: a shared principle with local rules. All figures are illustrative.
Mexico: A Link the Law Already Provides
Mexican employers must share a portion of their taxable profit with employees each year under the federal labor law's profit sharing rules, generally 10 percent of taxable profit, distributed according to days worked and salary (Dowling et al., 2017). Keystone's Querétaro employees therefore already receive a payment tied to profit. A group incentive weighted 70 percent on profit would duplicate a link the law already creates, and it would tie most of the payout to group results that Querétaro assemblers and technicians cannot influence from their plant.
An incentive pays best when employees can see how their efforts affect the measures it rewards (Lawler, 2000). For a plant workforce, those measures are things the plant controls. The Mexican version therefore pays on three plant measures: on-time delivery to automaker customers, first-pass yield on assembled grippers and recordable injuries. The target payout is 6 percent of base salary, paid in two installments a year so that employees see the link between results and pay more often than once a year.
The plant version also changes who sees the result. Monthly plant results are posted on the floor, so assemblers and technicians can see how delivery, yield and safety are trending well before the payout. That visibility is part of what makes an incentive work, and it is impossible with a measure like group operating profit that is reported quarterly to the board.
Germany: A Plan That Must Be Agreed
In Germany, the Stuttgart works council must agree to the principles by which pay is structured, including how a bonus is distributed among employees. The company decides how much money to spend on the incentive, but it cannot impose the rules for distributing that money without the works council's agreement (Dowling et al., 2017). The incentive therefore becomes a works agreement.
The redesign proposes that Keystone fix the budget, a pool equal to a target percentage of the office's salaries adjusted for group results, and that the works council and management agree how the pool is distributed. Based on early conversations, the works council is likely to favor team measures over individual ratings, since engineering work at the office is done in project teams and individual ratings have been a source of complaint. The proposed German version weights team measures, such as on-time delivery of engineering milestones and customer acceptance of designs, at 80 percent and individual contribution at 20 percent.
Negotiating the works agreement will take time, and the first German payout may be delayed while it is concluded. Keystone should open talks early in the plan year and, if no agreement is reached in time, continue the existing arrangement until one is, rather than imposing the group plan unilaterally.
What Stays Common
Local versions do not mean three unrelated plans. Both redesigned versions share one set of measure definitions with the group plan: on-time delivery means the same thing in Querétaro, Stuttgart and Pittsburgh, and first-pass yield is calculated the same way at every site. All versions run on the same plan year, so results can be compared across sites and rolled up for the board. And all versions keep the group plan's principle that the incentive rewards results the business needs, rather than seniority or attendance.
Keeping definitions common also protects the group's ability to manage across sites. If on-time delivery meant something different in Querétaro than in Pittsburgh, a customer complaint about late deliveries could not be traced to the site responsible, and the board could not compare plant performance fairly.
Risks in the Redesign
Plant-level measures carry their own risks. A bonus on on-time delivery could tempt the Querétaro plant to ship grippers that have not been fully tested, which is why first-pass yield is weighted alongside it. A bonus on recordable injuries could discourage reporting; the plan therefore counts near-miss reports positively and reviews any sudden drop in recorded injuries before paying out. Measures chosen without considering how people will respond to them can reward the opposite of what the organization wants (Kerr, 1975).
Summary of the Three Versions
Table 1
Group Plan and Local Versions
| Feature | Group plan (Pittsburgh) | Mexico version | Germany version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Main measure | Group operating profit, 70% | Plant measures: delivery, yield, injuries | Team measures, 80% |
| Individual element | Rating, 30% | None | Individual contribution, 20% |
| Target | Varies by grade | 6% of base | Pool set by company |
| How rules are set | By headquarters | By headquarters with local HR | By works agreement |
| Relation to statutory pay | None | Sits beside statutory profit sharing | Within co-determination |
| Shared elements | Measure definitions, plan year, purpose | Same | Same |
Table 1 sets the group plan beside the two local versions.
Recommendation
Keystone should adopt the plant-measure version in Querétaro and open negotiations with the Stuttgart works council on a works agreement, while keeping common measure definitions and a common plan year across all sites. The group plan remains appropriate in Pittsburgh. This keeps the incentive a framed practice, as Topic 2 classified it: a shared purpose and shared definitions, with local rules where law and local conditions require them.
References
Dowling, P. J., Festing, M., & Engle, A. D., Sr. (2017). International human resource management (7th ed.). Cengage Learning.
Kerr, S. (1975). On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B. Academy of Management Journal, 18(4), 769-783. https://doi.org/10.2307/255378
Lawler, E. E., III. (2000). Rewarding excellence: Pay strategies for the new economy. Jossey-Bass.
MGT 470 Topic 7 instructions, in plain terms
MGT-470 Topic 7 asks students to adapt a compensation practice for different countries. Applying the headquarters plan everywhere, or writing unrelated local plans, misses the balance the topic asks for. The prompt rewards a redesign that starts from the group plan, identifies the national rules and conditions that make it unsuitable in each country and adjusts the measures and process accordingly. Students should explain what remains common across versions, anticipate how new measures could be gamed and pair them with checks, and summarize the versions side by side so readers can see what differs and what is shared.
How this MGT 470 Topic 7 example is built
The redesign opens with the group plan and its classification as a framed practice. The Mexico section explains statutory profit sharing, why a profit-weighted bonus duplicates it and why plant measures employees can influence work better, with a twice-yearly payout. The Germany section explains works council co-determination and proposes a company-set pool distributed under a works agreement with team measures at 80 percent. A section lists what stays common. A risk section pairs each new measure with a check. Table 1 compares the three versions, and the recommendation applies them. Each version's payout timing is explained, including twice-yearly payments in Mexico.
Where the marks sit in the MGT 470 Topic 7 rubric
Faculty grading the incentive redesign reward national rules identified accurately and used to justify each change. Strong papers explain why the group plan's measures do not fit each country and choose measures employees can influence, supported by reward research. Credit goes to keeping measure definitions and the plan year common so results remain comparable. The rubric values anticipating how measures might be gamed and adding checks. The highest band presents the versions side by side and ties the result back to the practice's classification. Redesigns that change measures without explaining the national rule behind each change usually lose points. Explaining how the timing of payouts affects employees' line of sight adds strength.
Common MGT 470 Topic 7 mistakes, and how to avoid them
The weakest redesigns hand both countries the same plan with different numbers. A paper that lowers the Mexican target and raises the German one has adjusted levels without asking what each law already requires. Ignoring statutory profit sharing produces a Mexican plan that pays twice for profit and not at all for the measures a plant team controls. Papers treating the German works council as a group to be informed, rather than a body whose agreement the plan needs, misstate co-determination and invite a plan that cannot be implemented. Redesigns that change measure definitions by country lose the comparability that justified a group plan at all. Omitting the losses on each side presents the redesign as costless, which no reader believes. Legal points here are coursework analysis, never advice.
Get an MGT-470 Topic 7 example written to your instructions
Send the MGT-470 Topic 7 instructions, your section's rubric and the practice, countries or plan details the assignment names. A custom example is written to those criteria, with the current plan and its intent stated, global elements identified, each country version built on its legal requirements and the losses of each version set out, returned in 24 to 48 hours. The first one is free.
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MGT 470 Topic 7 questions, answered
What is statutory profit sharing in Mexico?
Mexican labor law requires most employers to distribute a share of taxable profit to employees each year, set at 10 percent, subject to rules on eligibility and on how individual amounts are calculated and capped. Because it already ties employee pay to company profit, a bonus plan adding a second profit link duplicates it. The example treats this as coursework, not tax or legal advice.
Does a German works council decide the bonus amount?
Generally not the overall budget for a voluntary bonus, which management sets. Co-determination covers principles of remuneration, meaning how the budget is distributed and by what method, so the plan's structure and measures must be agreed. Collective agreements covering the plant may add further terms. The example shows management and the council each holding a defined part of the decision.
Why keep measure definitions identical?
Because comparison across plants is part of what the group plan is for. If on-time delivery is calculated one way in Queretaro and another way in Germany, a better result at one plant may reflect nothing but the formula. Holding definitions constant while letting weights and mechanisms vary keeps the plans comparable, which is the global element the example protects.
Where can I find a free MGT 470 Topic 7 sample paper?
The two-country redesign is above, covering the group plan, the Mexico and Germany versions, what stays common, the risks and the comparison table. Send the plan you need to adapt and the countries involved, and a free redesign can be prepared.
Why drop profit in Mexico in MGT 470 Topic 7?
Mexican employers must already share part of their taxable profit with employees by law, so a profit-weighted bonus would duplicate that link. Plant measures give employees something they can influence.