| Course | MKT 433 Sales Management |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 4 |
| Paper type | Compensation plan behavior audit |
| Length | About 1,000 words, 2 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | BS in Marketing |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for MKT 433 Topic 4
What the Pay Plan Taught the Sellers to Do: Tracing Each Element of a Cleaning Company's Commission Plan to the Behavior It Rewards
[Author Name]
Colangelo College of Business, Grand Canyon University
MKT-433: Sales Management
Topic 4 Compensation Audit
[Instructor Name]
[Date]
The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.
What the Pay Plan Taught the Sellers to Do: Tracing Each Element of a Cleaning Company's Commission Plan to the Behavior It Rewards
The Plan and the Question
A composite commercial-cleaning company pays its sellers a modest base salary of 42,000 dollars, a commission of 8 percent on the first year's contract value of every new account, and a quarterly bonus of 2,500 dollars to any seller above target for the quarter. The owners say they want profitable, long-lasting accounts. This audit asks a different question: what has the plan actually taught the sellers to do? Kerr (1975) warned that organizations frequently pay for one kind of conduct while expecting a different kind, and that people follow the pay. Each element of the plan is traced to the behavior it rewards, and the evidence in the company's contract records is checked against each. Fairness is considered last. All figures are illustrative.
Commission on Revenue Rewards Discounting
Commission is paid on contract revenue, with no regard to margin. A seller earns the same commission on a contract priced at the company's standard rate as on one discounted by 20 percent, as long as the discounted contract is larger or closes faster. The plan therefore rewards discounting to win business. The contract records bear this out: the average new contract over the past year was priced about 14 percent below the company's standard rate, and large contracts were discounted more than small ones. Several of the largest accounts are barely profitable after labor and supplies.
Paying on the First Year Rewards Signing, Not Keeping
Commission covers only the first year of each contract, and nothing is paid on renewal. A seller's interest in an account ends when it is signed. The records show the result: only about 48 percent of contracts signed two years ago renewed at twelve months, against an owner target of 75 percent. Thinly priced contracts are especially likely to lapse, because customers who were sold on a low price often leave when it rises at renewal, and the company has little margin to offer a better deal. No one on the sales team is paid to prevent that.
A Quarterly Threshold Rewards Timing
The quarterly bonus is paid in full to anyone above target, and not at all to anyone below it. That rewards moving deals across the quarter line. About 41 percent of the past year's new contracts were signed in the last week of a quarter, many with extra discounts offered to close them in time. Sellers already above target in the middle of a quarter have reason to delay deals into the next one. Oyer (1998) found that sales across many industries rise at fiscal year ends, consistent with salespeople timing deals to meet thresholds in their pay. Steenburgh (2008) studied a firm's lump-sum bonuses and found that they mainly increased effort rather than only shifting the timing of orders, which suggests thresholds can motivate, but the clustering here, with discounts attached, shows a real cost in this case.
Table 1
Each Plan Element and the Behavior It Rewards
| Plan element | Behavior it rewards | Evidence in the records |
|---|---|---|
| 8% commission on first-year revenue | Discounting to win and to close larger deals | New contracts priced about 14% below standard |
| No payment after year one | Signing rather than keeping accounts | About 48% renewal against a 75% target |
| Quarterly bonus above target | Timing deals to cross the threshold | About 41% of contracts signed in the last week of a quarter |
A Redesign
The audit proposes three changes. First, commission is paid on the first year's gross margin rather than revenue, at about 20 percent of margin. At the company's standard margin this pays roughly what the current plan pays at full price, but a discounted contract now pays the seller less, so discounting costs the seller as well as the company. On a 100,000-dollar contract at the standard 40 percent margin, both plans pay 8,000 dollars. Discount the same work by 20 percent and the contract brings 80,000 dollars of revenue but only 20,000 of margin: the current plan pays 6,400 dollars, the redesign 4,000. Second, a renewal payment of 3 percent of the second year's revenue is paid when a contract renews, so the seller who signed the account has a reason to make sure it is set up and served well. Third, the quarterly bonus is replaced by an annual bonus with a gradual scale above target, which reduces the reward for moving deals across a quarter line.
The Behavior the Redesign Would Invite
No plan is free of unintended effects, and the redesign would invite one of its own. Small accounts are costly to serve relative to their revenue, so their margins are thin. Paying on margin would make them less attractive to sellers, who might stop pursuing them. The company depends on small accounts for steady, low-risk revenue and for referrals. The audit recommends two safeguards: a minimum commission per new account, so even small accounts pay something meaningful, and a quarterly review of the mix of new accounts by size, so management can see early if small accounts are being neglected.
Fairness
Only after tracing the behavior does the audit consider fairness. The redesign changes sellers' pay, and some will earn less in the first year, especially those who relied on large discounted deals. The company should model each seller's pay under both plans using last year's contracts, share the results, and phase in the change over two quarters. A plan that sellers believe is fair is more likely to produce the behavior it rewards rather than efforts to work around it.
Conclusion
The current plan pays sellers for revenue in the first year and for crossing a quarterly line, and the contract records show what it has taught them: discount, sign and move on. Paying on margin, rewarding renewal and smoothing the bonus would align pay with the profitable, lasting accounts the owners want, at the cost of a new risk to small accounts that the safeguards are designed to contain.
References
Kerr, S. (1975). On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B. Academy of Management Journal, 18(4), 769-783. https://doi.org/10.2307/255378
Oyer, P. (1998). Fiscal year ends and nonlinear incentive contracts: The effect on business seasonality. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(1), 149-185. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555559
Steenburgh, T. J. (2008). Effort or timing: The effect of lump-sum bonuses. Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 6(3), 235-256. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11129-008-9039-7
What the MKT 433 Topic 4 instructions ask for
In Topic 4, MKT-433 asks students to evaluate a sales compensation plan. Strong audits take the plan apart element by element, ask what behavior each element rewards, and check that against evidence in the company's records, drawing on research about incentives, thresholds and the timing of deals. Students should propose a redesign with worked figures, name the new behavior the redesign would invite and how to guard against it, and only then consider fairness, including how sellers' pay would change and how to introduce the plan.
How this MKT 433 Topic 4 example is built
Element by element, the audit takes the plan apart. Base salary is modest, commission is paid on the first year's contract value and a quarterly bonus goes to anyone above target. The audit then asks what each piece rewards. Commission on revenue with no regard to margin rewards discounting, and the illustrative contract records bear that out: the average new contract is priced well below the company's standard rate. Paying on the first year alone rewards signing and ignores renewal, which explains why many contracts lapse after twelve months. The quarterly threshold rewards timing, and deals cluster in the last week of each quarter. A proposed redesign pays on gross margin and adds a renewal payment. The audit then names the new behavior that redesign would invite, sellers avoiding small accounts that are costly to serve.
Reading the MKT 433 Topic 4 rubric
Faculty reward an audit that judges pay by the conduct it produces. An Excellent audit cites Kerr on rewarding A while hoping for B and traces commission, the first-year limit and the quarterly bonus to discounting, lapses and timing. Credit goes to a table pairing each element with evidence in the records. The rubric values Oyer and Steenburgh on deal timing. Strong audits show a worked contract under both plans. Top marks go to naming the risk to small accounts the redesign creates and phasing the change in fairly.
MKT 433 Topic 4 help: mistakes that cost marks
Audits that judge the plan on whether it feels fair to sellers give away the most, because a plan's real output is behavior and fairness says little about which behavior it produces. Describing the plan's elements accurately and never linking any of them to evidence from sales records is almost as costly. Drafts often propose a redesign and treat it as free of side effects, when every pay plan rewards something the company would rather not see. Quarter-end clustering is frequently missed, although short measurement periods are among the plainest causes of timing games. Recommending margin-based pay without noting that sellers rarely control delivery costs weakens the redesign in a way markers tend to catch. Missing measures leave no way to learn whether the new plan changed anything at all.
Get an MKT-433 Topic 4 example written to your instructions
Send the MKT-433 Topic 4 instructions and the rubric your classroom posts, with the compensation plan or case your section assigned. We write a custom example to those criteria, with each element traced to the behavior it rewards, evidence drawn from sales records, a redesign proposed and its own unintended behavior named, in 24 to 48 hours. The first one is free.
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MKT 433 Topic 4 questions, answered
Why judge a compensation plan by behavior rather than fairness?
Because sellers respond to what a plan pays for, and that response is the plan's actual effect on the business. A plan everyone considers fair can still reward discounting or neglect of renewals. Fairness matters for retention and morale, and the example discusses it, but only after establishing what the plan is teaching sellers to do.
How do revenue and margin commission differ?
Revenue commission pays a percentage of the sale price, so a seller earns nearly as much on a discounted deal as on a full-price one. Margin commission pays on what remains after the cost of delivering the service, so discounts cut the seller's pay directly. Margin plans align seller and company more closely, but they depend on cost data sellers trust.
Why do deals cluster at the end of a quarter?
Often because the pay plan measures performance by quarter. A seller just short of a bonus threshold has reason to pull deals forward, sometimes with discounts, and a seller already past it has reason to push deals into the next period. Either way, the timing reflects the plan more than customers. Longer measurement periods reduce the effect, though they weaken short-term motivation.
Where can I find a free MKT 433 Topic 4 sample paper?
The compensation audit is shown here in full: the plan and the question, commission on revenue, the first-year limit, the quarterly threshold, a redesign, the behavior it would invite, fairness and the conclusion. Bring your pay plan and we will audit it at no cost.
How does the redesign change pay on a discounted contract in MKT 433 Topic 4?
On a 100,000-dollar contract at 40 percent margin both plans pay 8,000. Discounted 20 percent, the current plan pays 6,400 and the margin-based plan 4,000, so discounting costs the seller too.