MKT 832 Topic 7 platform incentive separation analysis example

Digital Technology and Consumer Behavior Grand Canyon University Free custom sample in 24 to 48h

This MKT 832 Topic 7 sample paper tests a composite food-delivery platform's reading of longer menu browsing, up from about 4.1 to 6.3 minutes, as growing enjoyment of discovery. It is part of GCU MKT 832, Digital Technology and Consumer Behavior, catalog code MKT-832, a seminar in Grand Canyon University's DBA. Separating the platform's earnings from customers' goals shows sponsored listings per session rising from three to eight and abandoned sessions from 18 to 24 percent, with the increase concentrated in searches for a specific restaurant. Browsing grew where interests part. The paper recommends putting searched restaurants first and reporting browsing by session type.

CourseMKT 832 Digital Technology and Consumer Behavior
TopicTopic 7
Paper typePlatform incentive separation analysis
LengthAbout 990 words, 2 pages
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolGrand Canyon University (GCU)
ProgramDBA
UpdatedOctober 2026

Free sample paper for MKT 832 Topic 7

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Enjoyment of Discovery or the Cost of Ads? Separating a Delivery Platform's Earnings From Its Customers' Goals in Longer Menu Browsing

[Author Name]

College of Doctoral Studies, Grand Canyon University

MKT-832: Digital Technology and Consumer Behavior

Topic 7 Analysis

[Instructor Name]

[Date]

The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.

What this page is doingThe title states the analysis's two readings of one trend. The delivery platform and its figures are a composite; the sources are real.
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Enjoyment of Discovery or the Cost of Ads? Separating a Delivery Platform's Earnings From Its Customers' Goals in Longer Menu Browsing

The Trend and the Reading

A composite food-delivery platform reports that its customers now browse restaurant menus longer before ordering: the median time from opening the app to placing an order rose from about 4.1 minutes to about 6.3 minutes over two years. The platform's annual review reads the trend as growing enjoyment of discovery, customers exploring more restaurants because they like doing so. This analysis tests that reading by separating what the platform earns from each customer action from what the customer is evidently trying to do, and asks where the longer browsing sits. Figures are illustrative.

What the Platform Earns

The platform is a two-sided market, earning from both customers and restaurants. Rochet and Tirole (2003) showed that such platforms set prices and design rules to balance participation on both sides, and that their interests do not simply follow either side's. This platform earns in three ways: a commission on each order from the restaurant, delivery and service fees from the customer, and sponsored placements, for which restaurants pay each time their listing is shown or tapped. The first two depend on orders. The third depends on attention: every additional screen a customer scrolls shows more sponsored listings and earns the platform more, whether or not an order follows.

What Customers Are Trying to Do

The platform's own research describes most sessions as goal-directed: customers open the app hungry, often with a restaurant or type of food already in mind, and want a good meal quickly. Search logs support this: about 60 percent of sessions begin with a search for a specific restaurant or dish. A minority of sessions, mostly on weekend evenings, are exploratory, with customers browsing without a destination.

Where the Longer Browsing Sits

Three changes in the records place the longer browsing. First, sponsored listings per session rose from about three to about eight over the same two years, as the platform added sponsored slots between search results and in the home feed. Second, the share of sessions that end without an order rose from about 18 percent to about 24 percent. Third, the increase in browsing time is concentrated in goal-directed sessions that begin with a search, where customers now scroll past more sponsored listings before reaching the restaurant they searched for, and not in exploratory weekend sessions, where browsing time barely changed.

Table 1

Where the Longer Browsing Occurs, Illustrative

MeasureTwo years agoNow
Median minutes from opening to orderAbout 4.1About 6.3
Sponsored listings per sessionAbout 3About 8
Sessions ending without an orderAbout 18%About 24%
Change in browsing time, goal-directed sessions| Most of the increase
Change in browsing time, exploratory sessions| Little change

Reading the Pattern

If longer browsing reflected enjoyment of discovery, it would appear mainly in exploratory sessions and would come with more orders, not fewer. Instead it appears where customers know what they want and are shown more sponsored listings on the way to it. The longer browsing sits exactly where the platform's interest in attention and the customer's interest in a quick meal part. Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990) explained that consumers limit the options they consider because evaluating each one has a cost; here the platform is adding options to a decision the customer had largely made, raising that cost without adding value to the customer.

Evidence on Ranking and Search

Ursu (2018) showed with randomized ranking on a travel site that position strongly shapes which options consumers search. The same mechanism operates here in reverse: sponsored listings placed above a customer's searched-for restaurant push it down and force more scrolling. The platform earns from each sponsored impression whether or not the customer orders from it, so a design that lengthens the path to the intended order raises one revenue stream while the customer bears the time and some customers give up.

An Objection Considered

The platform's product team could object that sponsored listings help customers too, by showing them restaurants and deals they would not otherwise find, so longer browsing past them is discovery after all. The records allow a check. In goal-directed sessions, only about 9 percent of orders go to a sponsored restaurant the customer had not searched for; the rest go to the restaurant or dish the customer searched for at the start. In exploratory sessions, the share is about 31 percent. Sponsored listings do produce discovery, but mostly where customers are already exploring. In goal-directed sessions they mostly add distance between the customer and the order they came to place.

Why the Distinction Matters

Reading the trend as enjoyment would lead the platform to add more browsing features and more sponsored slots, in the belief that customers want them. Reading it as friction leads the opposite way. The distinction also matters for the platform's long-run interest. Rochet and Tirole (2003) emphasized that a two-sided platform must keep both sides participating; if customers abandon more sessions and order less often, restaurants will see fewer orders and pay less for placements, and the attention revenue will shrink with them.

Recommendations

The analysis recommends three changes. Show a searched-for restaurant first when a customer searches by name, with sponsored listings below it rather than above. Limit sponsored slots in goal-directed searches while keeping them in exploratory feeds, where customers are browsing anyway. And report browsing time separately for goal-directed and exploratory sessions, alongside abandoned sessions, so the annual review cannot mistake friction for enjoyment again.

Conclusion

Longer menu browsing on the platform is concentrated in sessions where customers know what they want and are shown more sponsored listings before reaching it, and it coincides with more abandoned sessions. Separating the platform's earnings from customers' goals shows that the trend reflects a divergence of interests rather than growing enjoyment of discovery, and that the platform's own long-run interest lies in closing it.

References

Hauser, J. R., & Wernerfelt, B. (1990). An evaluation cost model of consideration sets. Journal of Consumer Research, 16(4), 393-408. https://doi.org/10.1086/209225

Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2003). Platform competition in two-sided markets. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(4), 990-1029. https://doi.org/10.1162/154247603322493212

Ursu, R. M. (2018). The power of rankings: Quantifying the effect of rankings on online consumer search and purchase decisions. Marketing Science, 37(4), 530-552. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2017.1072

What the MKT 832 Topic 7 instructions ask for

Topic 7 in MKT-832 asks doctoral students to separate a platform's interests from its customers' goals. Strong analyses identify how the platform earns from each customer action, establish what customers are evidently trying to do, and locate a trend in the data by session type to see where the two interests diverge. Students should test an objection with the platform's own records, draw on research on two-sided markets and search, and recommend design and reporting changes. Recommendations should address both design and how the platform reports the trend internally.

How this MKT 832 Topic 7 example is built

An incentive map is the centerpiece of the finished analysis. Each customer action on the composite platform appears in a row with two entries: the revenue it brings the platform and the goal the customer appears to be pursuing. Most rows align, since both parties want an order placed. Three diverge. Promoted restaurants ranked above better-rated ones earn advertising fees while lengthening the search. Minutes spent scrolling carry sponsored placements the platform sells. A delivery subscription is offered at the moment a fee appears. Rochet and Tirole's account of two-sided markets explains why a platform balances charges across its sides rather than serving any one of them. The analysis then reads the browsing trend against the map, with illustrative session data, and finds longer time to order tracking a ranking change more closely than any change in appetite.

MKT 832 Topic 7 rubric: what Excellent looks like

Faculty reward an analysis that locates a trend where incentives diverge. An Excellent paper sets the platform's commissions, fees and sponsored placements against customers' goal-directed sessions. Credit goes to showing the extra browsing concentrated in name searches as sponsored listings rose, with Ursu on ranking and Hauser and Wernerfelt on evaluation costs. The rubric values Rochet and Tirole on two-sided participation. Strong papers test the discovery objection. Top marks go to putting searched restaurants first and reporting browsing by session type. Papers that accept the platform's reading at face value miss the analysis the topic asks for.

Common MKT 832 Topic 7 mistakes, and how to avoid them

Analyses lose the most by treating platform data as a neutral record of what customers do, when the record was designed around what the platform sells. Close behind is the paper that describes a platform's incentives in general terms, as profit-seeking, without mapping them onto specific customer actions. Many drafts assume the platform's interests and the customer's are always opposed, which ignores the rows where both want the same order placed. Behavioral trends are often explained by consumer psychology before the interface changes that coincide with them are checked. Some papers mention two-sided markets without saying which side bears which charge. Leaving the exit objection unanswered weakens the argument, since competition is the standard reason offered for why platform and user interests should converge over time.

Get an MKT-832 Topic 7 example written to your instructions

Send the MKT-832 Topic 7 instructions and the rubric provided in your classroom, with the platform or case your section named. A custom example is written to those criteria, with each customer action mapped against platform revenue, divergences tied to design features, trends tested against interface changes and the exit objection answered, and it arrives within 24 to 48 hours. The first one is free.

More MKT 832 papers and DBA samples

MKT 832 Topic 7 questions, answered

What is a two-sided market?

A market in which a platform serves two or more groups that value each other's presence, such as diners and restaurants, and sets charges for each side with the other in mind. Rochet and Tirole's work showed that how a platform divides its charges between sides can matter as much as their total. The example uses the idea to explain why a delivery platform can profit from actions that serve advertisers rather than diners.

Why does a platform's incentive matter to consumer research?

Because the platform decides what gets recorded, how options are ranked and which actions are easy, and each of those decisions follows its revenue. Behavior observed on the platform therefore reflects its design as well as its users. A researcher who reads a trend in platform data as a change in consumers, without checking the design changes that coincided with it, may be reporting the platform's strategy back to itself.

Are platform and user interests always opposed?

No, and the example is careful on this point. Both want the customer to find a meal and place an order, and most of the incentive map shows alignment. The divergences are specific: placements sold to advertisers, time spent scrolling past paid slots and offers timed to a moment of friction. Naming those rows precisely is more persuasive than a general claim that the platform exploits its users.

Where can I find a free MKT 832 Topic 7 sample paper?

The analysis appears here in full: the trend and the reading, what the platform earns, what customers want, where the browsing sits, reading the pattern, ranking evidence, an objection, why it matters, recommendations and the conclusion. Name the marketplace your course asks about and we will separate its incentives at no cost.

Is the longer browsing discovery in MKT 832 Topic 7?

Mostly not. Only about 9 percent of orders in goal-directed sessions go to a sponsored restaurant not searched for, against about 31 percent in exploratory sessions, so the extra time is mostly friction.