MKT 834 Topic 7 program counterfactual evaluation example

Data-Driven Marketing Management Grand Canyon University Free custom sample in 24 to 48h

This MKT 834 Topic 7 sample paper rejects a composite grocery chain's claim that its loyalty program caused the 27-dollar gap between members' and others' spend per visit. It is part of GCU MKT 834, Data-Driven Marketing Management, catalog code MKT-834, a DBA seminar on measuring marketing's effects. Frequent shoppers joined first, and the rising member share is mechanical. Using a staggered rollout across 60 stores in a difference-in-differences design, total store sales rose about 1.5 percent, about 13.5 million dollars, against the report's 140 million. Stores near a competitor show the largest effect, which supports the estimate. Store openings are dated before any comparison.

CourseMKT 834 Data-Driven Marketing Management
TopicTopic 7
Paper typeProgram counterfactual evaluation
LengthAbout 960 words, 2 pages
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolGrand Canyon University (GCU)
ProgramDBA
UpdatedOctober 2026

Free sample paper for MKT 834 Topic 7

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Not the Gap Between Members and Others: Estimating a Grocery Loyalty Program's Effect From Store-Level Sales Instead

[Author Name]

College of Doctoral Studies, Grand Canyon University

MKT-834: Data-Driven Marketing Management

Topic 7 Program Evaluation

[Instructor Name]

[Date]

The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.

What this page is doingThe title states what the evaluation rejects and what it uses instead. The grocery chain and every figure are a composite; the sources are real.
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Not the Gap Between Members and Others: Estimating a Grocery Loyalty Program's Effect From Store-Level Sales Instead

The Report's Claim

Members of a composite regional grocery chain's loyalty program spend about 68 dollars per visit, against about 41 dollars for other shoppers. The program's annual report calls that 27-dollar gap the program's effect and multiplies it by member visits to credit the program with about 140 million dollars in added sales. It also notes that members' share of sales has risen from about 35 percent to about 70 percent since launch. This evaluation sets both claims aside and estimates the program's effect from store-level sales instead. Figures are illustrative.

Why the Gap Is Not the Effect

The members who joined first were the chain's most frequent, highest-spending shoppers. They had the most to gain from discounts and points, and the cashiers offered cards to customers they saw often. Those shoppers spent more per visit before the program existed. The gap between members and non-members therefore mixes any effect of the program with who chose to join. Leenheer et al. (2007) studied this problem directly and found that once self-selection into loyalty programs was accounted for, the programs' effect on behavioral loyalty was much smaller than simple member and non-member comparisons suggested.

Why the Rising Member Share Proves Nothing

The rising member share is close to mechanical. As more shoppers carry cards and cashiers prompt for them, more of the same purchases are recorded as member purchases. A store's sales could be entirely unchanged while its member share doubled, simply because more transactions are scanned with a card. The share measures how widely the card is used, not what it changes.

The Store-Level Approach

Store-level sales avoid both problems, because they count all purchases in a store regardless of who carried a card. The program was introduced across the chain's 60 stores in stages over 18 months, for reasons of staff training and system installation rather than store performance. That staggered rollout allows a difference-in-differences comparison: the change in each store's total sales after its launch is set against the change across those same weeks in stores that had not yet launched (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). The comparison controls for chain-wide trends such as inflation and seasonality, and for each store's own level of sales.

The design's key assumption is that stores launching later would have followed the same sales trends as stores launching earlier, had the program not arrived. The evaluation checks this by comparing the stores' sales trends in the year before any launches; early and late stores moved closely together.

The Estimate

Total store sales rose by about 1.5 percent on average after a store's launch, relative to stores that had not yet launched, with a 95 percent interval of roughly 0.3 to 2.7 percent. Across the chain's annual sales of about 900 million dollars, that is roughly 13.5 million dollars a year, about a tenth of the report's figure. Against the program's annual cost in discounts, points and systems, about 11 million dollars, the program appears to roughly pay for itself, with considerable uncertainty.

Table 1

Two Estimates of the Program's Effect

MeasureReport's approachStore-level approach
BasisMember versus non-member spend per visitStore sales before and after launch, against stores not yet launched
Effect on salesAbout 140 million dollars a yearAbout 13.5 million dollars a year (interval about 3 to 24 million)
Handles self-selection?NoYes
Handles mechanical member share?NoYes

A Further Check

A second check supports the store-level estimate. If the program changed shopping behavior, stores near a competitor, where shoppers have an easy alternative, should show a larger effect than stores without nearby competition, because the program gives shoppers a reason to choose the chain over the rival. That is what the data show: the post-launch rise was about 2.3 percent in stores within a mile of a competing supermarket and about 0.8 percent in stores without one. The pattern fits a real effect of the program rather than a statistical artifact, and it points to where the program earns its cost.

What the Chain Should Change

The chain should stop reporting the member gap as the program's effect and replace it with the store-level estimate and its interval. It should consider concentrating the program's richest offers in stores facing competition, where the effect appears largest. And for future changes to the program, such as new point rules, it should introduce them in stages across stores, as it did the original launch, so their effect can be measured the same way.

What the Estimate Leaves Out

The store-level estimate measures the effect on total sales in the program's first year in each store. It does not capture effects that build over longer periods or that the program might have on shoppers who visit several of the chain's stores. Liu (2007) found that loyalty programs affected heavy and light buyers differently over time, with light buyers increasing their purchases more, which suggests effects may evolve. The estimate also does not measure the value of the customer data the program produces, which the chain uses for targeted offers and could be evaluated separately.

Conclusion

The 27-dollar gap between members and non-members is mostly a measure of who joined, and the rising member share mostly measures how widely the card is used. Store-level sales, compared across a staggered rollout, suggest the program raises total sales by about 1.5 percent, roughly enough to cover its cost, and about a tenth of what the annual report claims. The chain should report the store-level estimate and its uncertainty in place of the member gap. A smaller, honest number gives the board something it can plan around; a large number built on who joined first gives it only a reason to keep spending without knowing why.

References

Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2009). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist's companion. Princeton University Press.

Leenheer, J., van Heerde, H. J., Bijmolt, T. H. A., & Smidts, A. (2007). Do loyalty programs really enhance behavioral loyalty? An empirical analysis accounting for self-selecting members. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 24(1), 31-47. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijresmar.2006.10.005

Liu, Y. (2007). The long-term impact of loyalty programs on consumer purchase behavior and loyalty. Journal of Marketing, 71(4), 19-35. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkg.71.4.019

MKT 834 Topic 7 instructions, in plain terms

The Topic 7 brief in MKT-834 asks doctoral students to estimate a marketing program's effect against a credible counterfactual. Strong evaluations explain why simple member and non-member comparisons and rising participation shares mislead, choose a design that avoids self-selection, check its key assumption, and report the estimate with its uncertainty. Students should test the estimate with a further prediction, compare it with the program's cost, state what it leaves out and recommend changes to how the organization reports the program. The evaluation should end with how the program should be reported in future.

How the MKT-834 Topic 7 example is put together

Two figures from the program's annual report open the finished evaluation, each followed by the reason it cannot answer the question. Comparing member and non-member spending sets people who chose to join against people who did not, and the rising member share of sales measures card adoption, since a sale counts as a member's only once a card is scanned. The design exploits a staggered launch across three store regions. Total store sales, covering every shopper, are compared with regions not yet launched, and a synthetic control of the kind Abadie and colleagues developed weights untreated stores into a comparison for the first region. The estimated lift, illustrative, is a small fraction of the reported gap. Net of discounts, the verdict is plain: a modest gain, with much coupon spending going to purchases members would have made anyway.

MKT 834 Topic 7 rubric: what Excellent looks like

Faculty reward an evaluation that replaces a gap with a counterfactual. An Excellent paper explains self-selection with Leenheer and colleagues and shows the member share rising mechanically. Credit goes to a staggered-rollout difference-in-differences with pre-launch trends checked, following Angrist and Pischke. The rubric values an estimate near 1.5 percent with its interval, set against an 11-million-dollar cost. Strong papers confirm it with a larger effect near competitors and note Liu's evidence on light buyers. Top marks go to reporting the smaller honest number. Evaluations that report the member gap as the effect miss the point of the topic.

Common MKT 834 Topic 7 mistakes, and how to avoid them

The heaviest loss on this evaluation goes to papers that accept the member spending gap as the program's effect, a comparison that self-selection alone could produce. Close behind is the rising member share of sales, which many drafts cite as growth without noticing that the program's own card defines who counts as a member. Evaluations that estimate a lift but never net discount costs against it report revenue rather than value. Synthetic control and difference-in-differences are sometimes named without showing that the comparison tracked the launched region before launch, the evidence either design needs. Many papers treat customer data as a benefit that settles the question, instead of pricing it. A doctoral reader also expects the recommendation to include a way of continuing to measure, since a program judged once on evidence reverts to its dashboard the following year.

Get an MKT-834 Topic 7 example written to your instructions

Send the MKT-834 Topic 7 instructions and the rubric your classroom posts, with the program or data your section provided. A custom example is written to those instructions, with reported figures examined for how they arose, a counterfactual built at the right level, costs netted against the estimated gain and the data-value objection priced, in 24 to 48 hours. The first one is free.

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MKT 834 Topic 7 questions, answered

Why is the member versus non-member comparison misleading?

Because membership is chosen, and the people who choose to join a grocery loyalty program are disproportionately those who already shop at the chain often. Their higher spending existed before they joined. Comparing them with non-members therefore measures the difference between two kinds of shoppers. The example avoids the problem by measuring total store sales, where every shopper counts regardless of membership.

What is a synthetic control?

A method developed by Abadie and colleagues for evaluating an intervention in one unit, such as a region, when no single untreated unit is a good match. It builds a weighted combination of untreated units whose past outcomes closely track the treated unit's before the intervention, then uses that combination to estimate what would have happened afterward. The example applies it to the program's first region.

Is a loyalty program worth keeping if its sales lift is small?

Possibly, if its other benefits justify the cost, but those benefits have to be priced rather than assumed. The program's data may improve assortment or pricing decisions, and the example estimates that value separately. It also finds that redesigning coupons to target items members did not already buy could raise the lift. The recommendation keeps the program on those conditions and keeps a store holdout to verify it.

Where can I find a free MKT 834 Topic 7 sample paper?

The evaluation is printed here in full: the report's claim, why the gap is not the effect, why the member share proves nothing, the store-level approach, the estimate, a further check, what to change, what the estimate leaves out and the conclusion. Bring your program data and we will evaluate it free.

Why use store-level sales in MKT 834 Topic 7?

They count every purchase regardless of who carried a card, so they avoid both the self-selection of frequent shoppers into the program and the mechanical rise in member share.