| Course | NSG 444 Transition to Practice |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 6 |
| Paper type | Medication error analysis |
| Length | About 1,030 words, 3 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | BSN |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for NSG 444 Topic 6
A Dose Given After the Order Stopped: Reporting, Team Disclosure and a Just Culture Review of a New Nurse's Medication Error
[Author Name]
College of Nursing and Health Care Professions, Grand Canyon University
NSG-444: Transition to Practice
Topic 6 Assignment
[Instructor Name]
September 6, 2027
The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.
A Dose Given After the Order Stopped: Reporting, Team Disclosure and a Just Culture Review of a New Nurse's Medication Error
The Error
At 0800, the hospitalist discontinued intravenous furosemide 40 milligrams, scheduled at 0900, for Mr. W., 71, because his morning creatinine had risen from 1.2 to 1.6. The medication administration record on the workstation-on-wheels that the nurse, Ms. R., five months licensed, was using had been opened at 0745 and had not refreshed. At 0900 she scanned Mr. W.'s wristband and the furosemide, which the scanner accepted because the screen was still showing the old record, and gave the dose without a second look at the active orders. At 0930, when she opened his chart at the desk to document, she saw the discontinuation. The system condition was a record that did not refresh; the individual act was not rechecking active orders for a patient whose labs had just resulted.
Who Was Told, and in What Order
0932: Ms. R. assessed Mr. W.: blood pressure 124/72, heart rate 84, alert, no dizziness. 0935: she told the charge nurse. 0938: she called the hospitalist: "Mr. W. in 208 received furosemide 40 IV at 0900 after it was discontinued at 0800. I didn't see the discontinuation because the MAR I was using hadn't refreshed. He's stable, BP 124/72, HR 84, no symptoms. What would you like me to do?" The hospitalist ordered a basic metabolic panel at 1300, strict intake and output, orthostatic vital signs every four hours and increased oral fluids. 1000: she completed a safety event report.
What went where. The chart recorded the facts: the dose given, the time, the assessment, the notification and the new orders, with no judgment and no mention of the event report. The safety event report, which is confidential and used for improvement, recorded the sequence, the workstation that had not refreshed and Ms. R.'s account of why she had not rechecked. The chart is a clinical record; the event report is where the analysis of causes belongs.
Disclosure as a Team Conversation
The hospital's policy is that errors reaching the patient are disclosed to the patient by the team, usually led by the attending physician, with the nurse involved encouraged to be present. At 1100 the hospitalist, the charge nurse and Ms. R. went to Mr. W.'s room. The hospitalist said: "Mr. W., I want to tell you about something that happened this morning. We stopped your water pill at 8 because your kidney numbers went up a little, but you received a dose at 9 anyway. That was a mistake on our part. You're doing well, and we don't expect any harm, but we're checking your blood this afternoon and watching your fluids closely to be sure. We're also looking at how it happened so it doesn't happen again." Ms. R. added: "I gave you that dose, and I'm sorry." Mr. W. said he appreciated being told. Disclosure was not a solo confession by the new nurse but a conversation the team owned, which protected both the patient's right to know and the nurse from carrying it alone. His 1300 creatinine was 1.7, and by the next morning it was back to 1.4.
A Just Culture Classification
Marx (2001) asks reviewers to sort an act into one of three categories before deciding how to respond. A slip that the person did not intend, such as picking up the wrong vial from two that look alike, is human error, and the right response is support for the person plus a redesign of whatever made the slip easy. A habit or shortcut whose danger the person has stopped seeing, often because everyone around them does the same, is at-risk behavior, and the response is coaching. Knowingly ignoring a serious danger is reckless, and only that category calls for discipline.
Ms. R.'s act was at-risk behavior, not simple human error. The workstation not refreshing was a system failure she did not cause. But she had a habit, common on her unit, of opening the medication record at the start of the pass and working from it for an hour without refreshing, and she did not recheck active orders for a patient whose morning labs she knew had resulted. That was a choice whose risk she did not recognize. It was not reckless, because she did not knowingly disregard a risk. The appropriate response was coaching: a conversation with her manager about refreshing the record before each patient and checking active orders when labs have resulted, not discipline. Classifying her act as mere human error would have been more flattering but less useful, because it would have left the habit in place.
What the Error Did to the Nurse
Wu (2000) described clinicians involved in errors as second victims, who can experience guilt, anxiety and loss of confidence. Ms. R. said afterward that she replayed the moment many times that night, did not sleep, and on her next shift checked every order three times and fell behind. Scott et al. (2009) described a recovery trajectory in which clinicians move through chaos, intrusive reflections, restoring personal integrity and enduring the inquisition before either dropping out, surviving or thriving. Ms. R. was in the early stages. Her charge nurse checked on her at the end of the shift, and her manager referred her to the hospital's peer support program, where a nurse trained in second victim support met with her within the week. She said the most helpful thing was hearing that experienced nurses had made errors like hers and learned from them.
The System Change
The review found that the workstations did not refresh the medication record automatically and that other nurses had given discontinued doses the same way. The unit changed three things. The workstations now refresh the medication record automatically every five minutes and display a banner when an order changes after the record was opened. The scanner now checks against the live order list rather than the displayed one. And nurses are coached to refresh before each patient. A resolution by Ms. R. to be more careful would have protected no one; the changes to the system protect every patient on the unit.
References
Marx, D. (2001). Patient safety and the "just culture": A primer for health care executives. Columbia University.
Scott, S. D., Hirschinger, L. E., Cox, K. R., McCoig, M., Brandt, J., & Hall, L. W. (2009). The natural history of recovery for the healthcare provider "second victim" after adverse patient events. Quality and Safety in Health Care, 18(5), 325-330. https://doi.org/10.1136/qshc.2009.032870
Wu, A. W. (2000). Medical error: The second victim. BMJ, 320(7237), 726-727. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.320.7237.726
Reading the GCU NSG 444 Topic 6 instructions
Topic 6 in NSG-444 asks students to analyze a medication error and the response to it. Strong papers describe the error precisely, trace who was told and in what order and explain how disclosure to the patient works as a team conversation, usually led by the physician. Students should classify the act with a just culture framework before deciding the response, describe the effect on the nurse involved, including second victim experiences, and identify the system condition that made the error possible. The error should be a composite or one the student is comfortable writing about, and the paper should end with a system change and how it will be checked.
Inside the NSG 444 Topic 6 example
The error itself takes one paragraph and is stated plainly: the order was discontinued at 0800, the medication record had not refreshed on the screen the nurse used, and the dose was given at 0900 without a second look at the active orders. No harm followed beyond extra monitoring. Most of the paper concerns the aftermath. It records who the nurse told and in what order, the charge nurse and the provider within minutes, and what went into the safety event report as opposed to the chart. The disclosure to the patient is described as a team conversation under the hospital's policy, with the nurse present and the words quoted. A just culture section classifies the act, and a final section examines what the error did to the nurse, using the second victim literature.
Reading the NSG 444 Topic 6 rubric
Faculty reward an error traced to its system cause. An Excellent paper describes furosemide given at 0900 after a 0800 discontinuation for rising creatinine. Credit goes to the reporting sequence from 0932 and disclosure led by the attending with the nurse present. The rubric values classifying the act as human error under Marx's just culture. Strong papers describe Ms. R.'s distress as a second victim, after Wu and Scott and colleagues. Top marks go to fixing workstations that did not refresh the medication record, since other nurses had made the same error.
Common NSG 444 Topic 6 mistakes, and how to avoid them
Stopping at the incident report is the most frequent way this paper falls short. The error is reported, the nurse resolves to be more careful, and the patient never learns what happened, which leaves disclosure, the center of the topic, unaddressed. Papers that describe disclosure as the new nurse's solo confession misread how it usually works, since many hospitals run it as a team conversation. A just culture model named and not applied earns little, and so does a classification chosen to flatter the writer. Faculty deduct when the account of the error is entered in the chart as blame, or when the system condition is left out. Silence about the nurse's own response is a further gap. The most convincing papers end on a system change, because a resolution to be careful protects the next patient from nothing.
Get an NSG-444 Topic 6 example written to your instructions
Send the NSG-444 Topic 6 instructions and the rubric posted in your classroom, with the error scenario your section supplies. We write a custom example to those criteria, with the error stated plainly, the report and chart kept apart, disclosure described as a team conversation and a just culture reading defended, in 24 to 48 hours. The first is free.
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NSG 444 Topic 6 questions, answered
Should the paper be about an error I actually made?
Only if your instructions ask for it, and even then the details should be changed so no patient, colleague or unit can be recognized. A composite or a supplied scenario is usually acceptable, which lets you analyze honestly without putting a real event in writing. Whichever you use, the analysis is what earns marks, not the confession.
What is just culture?
An approach to safety events associated with David Marx that separates three kinds of behavior: human error, an inadvertent slip, which calls for consoling the person and fixing the system; at-risk behavior, a drift into a shortcut whose risk was not recognized, which calls for coaching; and reckless behavior, a conscious disregard of substantial risk, which can warrant discipline. Papers earn marks by classifying the specific act.
Does a new nurse lead the disclosure to the patient?
Usually not alone. Hospital policies typically assign disclosure to the attending provider or a designated team, with the nurse involved and sometimes present, and they set out what is said and when. A strong paper places the new nurse accurately inside that process, describing what the nurse contributes and how the conversation is prepared, rather than inventing a solo apology at the bedside.
Where can I find a free NSG 444 Topic 6 sample paper?
The error analysis for NSG 444 Topic 6 covers the error, who was told and in what order, disclosure as a team conversation, a just culture classification, what the error did to the nurse and the system change. Paste in your NSG 444 Topic 6 prompt and a free paper follows.
Does a new nurse lead disclosure to the patient in NSG 444 Topic 6?
Usually not. Policy typically has the attending physician lead disclosure with the nurse present, so the patient hears one clear account.