| Course | FIN 650 Managerial Finance |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 1 |
| Paper type | Firm objective and agency analysis |
| Length | About 1,030 words, 2 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | MBA |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for FIN 650 Topic 1
More Profit, Less Value: The Firm's Objective, the Agency Problem Inside a Specialty Food Company and the Mechanisms Meant to Close It
[Author Name]
Colangelo College of Business, Grand Canyon University
FIN-650: Managerial Finance
Topic 1 Firm Objective and Agency Analysis
[Instructor Name]
[Date]
The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.
More Profit, Less Value: The Firm's Objective, the Agency Problem Inside a Specialty Food Company and the Mechanisms Meant to Close It
The Objective
Managerial finance takes the objective of a company to be maximizing the current value of the owners' stake, the market value of its shares. That is different from maximizing profit, from maximizing sales or market share, and from maximizing the size of the firm, all of which are sometimes offered as the goal. This analysis explains why value and profit diverge, using a decision at a composite publicly traded specialty food company with a packaged snack division and a newer plant-based protein division. It then sets out why the people running the company may not pursue the owners' objective, evaluates the mechanisms meant to align them and states where the objective should bend for other stakeholders.
Why Value Differs From Profit
Profit ignores two things value includes: when cash arrives and how risky it is. The company's snack division must choose between two uses of the same budget. A packaging upgrade would add 10 million dollars of profit in each of the next three years, with little uncertainty. A new product line would earn nothing for two years and then a single 36 million, but with the uncertainty of a new category. By total profit, the product line wins, 36 million against 30. Discounted at 9 percent for the upgrade's low risk, the upgrade is worth about 25.3 million today. Discounted at 14 percent for the product line's higher risk, the line is worth about 24.3 million. A manager maximizing reported profit would choose the line; a manager maximizing value would choose the upgrade. Timing and risk are exactly what profit leaves out.
Table 1
Profit and Value Ranking the Same Options Differently, Millions of Dollars
| Option | Year 1 | Year 2 | Year 3 | Total profit | Discount rate | Present value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Packaging upgrade | 10 | 10 | 10 | 30 | 9% | 25.3 |
| New product line | 0 | 0 | 36 | 36 | 14% | 24.3 |
The Agency Relationship
The owners of a public company hire managers to run it, and that delegation creates an agency relationship: the managers act as agents for the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The conflict that follows is structural, not a matter of dishonesty. Managers know far more about the company's prospects than dispersed shareholders can. Managers bear costs that owners do not, such as the personal effort of a restructuring or the career risk of a failed project, and they enjoy benefits owners pay for, such as a larger organization to run. Owners, who can diversify across many companies, are less troubled by a single company's risk than managers whose income and reputation are tied to it. People behaving reasonably under these conditions will make some choices owners would not.
Where Interests Diverge, and the Cost
Three divergences are visible at the company. First, managers paid on annual earnings have reason to protect the reported figure. Graham et al. (2005) found that most of the financial executives they surveyed would give up economic value to meet an earnings target, for instance by delaying a positive value project. At the company, cutting the plant-based division's product development to hit this year's earnings would raise profit while lowering value. Second, managers who are not diversified may avoid risky projects that owners would want, rejecting value-creating bets to protect their own position. Third, surplus cash beyond what good projects require invites managers to buy companies that enlarge their domain rather than the owners' wealth (Jensen, 1986). The snack division produces steady cash, and that cash is the resource most exposed to this temptation.
Do the Alignment Mechanisms Work
Each mechanism should be judged on its effect, not its intent. Compensation tied to shares aligns managers with owners in principle, but Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that executives often influence their own pay, producing packages that reward luck and weaken the link to performance; options can also encourage short-term moves that lift the price near vesting dates. Board oversight helps when directors are independent and informed, but directors rely largely on information managers provide. Debt disciplines managers by committing cash to interest payments that would otherwise be available to spend, which directly addresses the free cash flow problem, though it adds financial risk. The market for corporate control, the threat that an underperforming company will be acquired and its managers replaced, is powerful but slow and expensive, acting only after value has been lost. No single mechanism closes the gap; together they narrow it, and several create distortions of their own.
Recommendations for the Company
The board should base a larger share of executive pay on multiyear measures of value, such as total shareholder return relative to peers over three years, rather than annual earnings, so that cutting development spending to meet a target is no longer rewarded. It should require the snack division's surplus cash to be returned to shareholders unless a project clears the hurdle rate, which limits empire building. And it should protect the plant-based division's development budget from annual earnings pressure by approving it as a multiyear program.
Where the Objective Should Bend
Maximizing shareholder value is a defensible objective because shareholders are paid last, after employees, suppliers and lenders, so value created for them generally reflects value created overall. It is not a license to ignore other stakeholders. The company sells food, and cutting product safety spending to raise value would shift risk to customers who cannot see it. The analysis takes the position that value maximization should operate within firm constraints on safety and honest disclosure, and that where a decision transfers serious harm to people who cannot protect themselves through contracts or prices, the objective should yield. Within those limits, value remains the best single guide for financial decisions, because it accounts for timing and risk where profit does not.
Conclusion
The company's own options show profit and value pointing in different directions once timing and risk are counted. The managers who choose between them face incentives that are reasonable for them and costly for owners, and the mechanisms meant to align the two work only partly. Pay tied to multiyear value, cash returned when projects fall short and firm limits on safety give the objective its best chance of guiding decisions.
References
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. (2003). Executive compensation as an agency problem. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(3), 71-92. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533003769204362
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40(1-3), 3-73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-329.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
The FIN-650 Topic 1 assignment instructions
Topic 1 in FIN-650 asks MBA students to analyze the firm's objective and the agency problem. Strong analyses distinguish value maximization from profit maximization with an example where timing and risk separate them, and describe the agency relationship as structural rather than dishonest. Students should name specific divergences and their costs, evaluate alignment mechanisms on their effects and defend a position on other stakeholders. Students should also recommend specific changes to pay, cash policy or governance that follow from the analysis. A table showing profit and value ranking the same options differently makes the opening argument concrete. Each mechanism should be judged on evidence about its effects, including the new distortions some of them create.
How the FIN-650 Topic 1 example is put together
The finished example is precise about an objective people state loosely. Maximizing shareholder wealth is distinguished from maximizing profit, since the first accounts for timing and risk and the second does not, and a manager can raise reported profit while destroying value. The agency problem then follows as a structural consequence rather than as a moral failing: managers hold information owners lack, bear career risk owners do not, and are paid on measures that may not track value. Specific divergences are named, empire building, short horizons, excessive caution with the firm's capital. Mechanisms are then evaluated on whether they actually align interests or merely appear to. Nothing in the analysis rests on anybody behaving dishonestly.
FIN 650 Topic 1 rubric: what Excellent looks like
Faculty reward an objective defined and then tested against behavior. An Excellent paper tables two options ranked oppositely by profit and present value. Credit goes to the agency relationship from Jensen and Meckling and survey evidence from Graham and colleagues on sacrificing value to meet earnings. The rubric values free cash flow risk from Jensen and pay design critiqued by Bebchuk and Fried. Strong papers recommend multiyear pay. Top marks go to a defended limit on the objective. Papers that argue where the objective should bend, for example on product safety in a food company, and defend that position, avoid both the narrow and the unexamined versions of this topic.
FIN 650 Topic 1 help before you submit
Treating profit maximization and wealth maximization as the same objective is the conceptual error the topic opens with, since ignoring timing and risk is what lets a manager destroy value while improving the reported figure. A second failure is presenting agency conflict as dishonesty, when the interesting version is structural and arises between people all behaving reasonably. Papers lose marks for listing alignment mechanisms without evaluating any, since the question is whether they work and several demonstrably create new distortions of their own. Ignoring stakeholders entirely reads as narrow at graduate level, and treating the objective as obviously wrong without argument reads as unexamined. Both positions need defending rather than assuming.
Get a FIN-650 Topic 1 example written to your instructions
Send the FIN-650 Topic 1 instructions and the rubric posted in your classroom, with the firm or case your section assigned. We write a custom example to those criteria, with wealth distinguished from profit, agency framed structurally, divergences costed and alignment mechanisms judged on effect, in 24 to 48 hours. The first is free.
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FIN 650 Topic 1 questions, answered
Why is maximizing profit the wrong objective?
Because it ignores when the profit arrives and how risky it is. A manager can raise this year's profit by deferring maintenance, cutting development or taking on risk that has not yet materialized, and every one of those makes owners worse off. Wealth maximization accounts for timing through discounting and for risk through the required return, which is why finance uses it instead.
Is the agency problem about dishonest managers?
Rarely, and framing it that way makes the analysis shallow. The structural version is more interesting and more common: a manager whose career depends on the firm cannot diversify that exposure the way a shareholder can, so they will rationally prefer safer projects than owners would want. Nobody is behaving badly and the interests still diverge.
Do alignment mechanisms actually work?
Partially, and each introduces its own distortion. Equity based pay aligns wealth and can encourage risk taking or short horizon manipulation of the measure. Debt imposes discipline through required payments and raises distress risk. Boards vary enormously in independence. Evaluating each on its observed effects, rather than listing them as solutions, is what the topic is assessing.
Where can I find a free FIN 650 Topic 1 sample paper?
The objective and agency analysis is shown here complete: the objective, value and profit, the agency relationship, divergences and their cost, the alignment mechanisms, recommendations, where the objective should bend and the conclusion. Tell us about the company in your case and a version for it follows free.
Why can profit and value disagree in FIN 650 Topic 1?
Profit ignores when cash arrives and how risky it is. The product line earns more in total, but its single late and uncertain payment is worth less today than three steady earlier ones.