HCA 450 Topic 7 root cause analysis example

Quality in Health Care Grand Canyon University Free custom sample in 24 to 48h

This HCA 450 Topic 7 sample paper is a root cause analysis of one delayed heart attack transfer that took 118 minutes from arrival to departure at a 25-bed rural hospital. It belongs to GCU HCA 450, Quality in Health Care, catalog code HCA-450, in the Grand Canyon University BS in Health Care Administration. The paper starts from the reported quarterly median and reconstructs a de-identified composite case minute by minute in a table, from walk-in registration to helicopter departure. For each delay it asks what made the step possible, reaching conditions rather than people: registration before triage, equipment stored away from triage, shared night coverage, a three-call acceptance relay, late transport requests and no prompt for clot-dissolving treatment. It records what went right and proposes system changes.

CourseHCA 450 Quality in Health Care
TopicTopic 7
Paper typeRoot cause analysis
LengthAbout 980 words, 3 pages
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolGrand Canyon University (GCU)
ProgramBS in Health Care Administration
UpdatedSeptember 2026

Free sample paper for HCA 450 Topic 7

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118 Minutes From Door to Door: A Root Cause Analysis of One Delayed Heart Attack Transfer, Traced Past the Person to the Conditions

[Author Name]

College of Nursing and Health Care Professions, Grand Canyon University

HCA-450: Quality in Health Care

Topic 7 Assignment

[Instructor Name]

[Date]

The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.

What this page is doingThe title gives the reported number and promises to trace it past individual error, which is the discipline a root cause analysis needs. The case is a de-identified composite; the hospital is a composite; the sources are real.
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118 Minutes From Door to Door: A Root Cause Analysis of One Delayed Heart Attack Transfer, Traced Past the Person to the Conditions

The Number the Hospital Is Answering For

In the third quarter, Pinon County Hospital's median door-in to door-out time for patients transferred with a heart attack caused by a blocked artery was 71 minutes, against the hospital's goal of 30 minutes. National registry data show that most hospitals miss that goal, with a median of 68 minutes (Wang et al., 2011), but that is no comfort to a patient losing heart muscle. The longest case of the quarter took 118 minutes. This analysis reconstructs that case, a de-identified composite built from the quarter's transfers, to find out how a number like 118 is produced, and it keeps asking what made each step possible until it reaches conditions the hospital can change.

The Sequence, Reconstructed

A 61-year-old man drove himself to the emergency department with chest pressure on a Tuesday night. Table 1 reconstructs the sequence from the electronic record, the electrocardiograph timestamp, the transfer center log and the ambulance and flight records.

Table 1

Reconstructed Sequence for One Delayed Transfer

TimeEventMinutes since arrival
01:52Walks in; registration clerk begins intake0
02:04Triage by the only registered nurse on duty12
02:21Electrocardiogram performed29
02:24Emergency physician, called from the inpatient floor, reads it as a heart attack32
02:31Call to the cardiac center's transfer line39
02:33County advanced ambulance requested; on a call 40 minutes away41
02:49Accepting cardiologist confirmed after two call-backs57
02:52Helicopter requested60
03:30Helicopter arrives after weather check98
03:50Patient departs118
What this page is doingThe sequence is laid out with times and handoffs before any cause is named, so each delay can be located and questioned.
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Asking What Made Each Step Possible

The first delay was 29 minutes from arrival to electrocardiogram against a 10-minute goal. The easy answer is that the triage nurse should have done it sooner. The analysis asks why she did not. Hospital policy required walk-in patients to be registered before triage, so the clinical clock started 12 minutes late. The electrocardiograph was stored in the trauma room at the far end of the department, and the nurse was alone with a second patient. There was no standing order allowing any staff member to obtain an electrocardiogram for chest pain before registration or triage.

The second delay was the physician's arrival. Pinon County's night physician covers both the emergency department and the inpatient floor, and was admitting a patient when called. That is a staffing model, not an individual failure.

The third delay was 18 minutes to confirm acceptance. The transfer line connected the physician to a cardiology fellow, who called the interventional cardiologist, who called back to confirm a laboratory team. Three calls in series were built into the process.

The fourth and longest delay was transport. The county has one advanced ambulance at night, and it was on another call. The helicopter was requested only after acceptance, 60 minutes after arrival, and weather checks added time. No step triggered a transport request at the moment the diagnosis was made.

Finally, the total delay from first arrival to expected artery opening would exceed two hours, the point at which clot-dissolving treatment is generally considered for patients who cannot reach a catheterization laboratory in time. No one considered it, because nothing in the hospital's protocol prompted the question when transport was delayed.

What Went Right

A root cause analysis should also record what worked, because those parts of the process must survive the changes. Once the electrocardiogram was performed, the physician read it correctly within three minutes, and the transfer call was placed seven minutes later. The nurse started aspirin, established two intravenous lines and printed the record for the flight crew while waiting, so no time was lost after the helicopter landed; the patient left 20 minutes after its arrival, which is quick for a patient who needs to be moved from a bed to a flight stretcher with monitoring. The cardiac center opened the artery, and the patient went home five days later. The changes proposed below are meant to remove waiting, not to add steps to the parts of the sequence that already moved well.

Why the Inquiry Does Not Stop at Human Error

Human error appears in this chain, but stopping there would end the inquiry at the point where it becomes useful. Errors are shaped by the conditions people work in, and naming a person produces retraining while the conditions remain (Reason, 2000). Root cause analysis has been criticized for doing exactly that: producing weak recommendations focused on individuals, education and policy reminders rather than on system changes that would prevent recurrence (Peerally et al., 2017). The analysis therefore follows each step to a condition: registration before triage, equipment placed away from triage, one nurse and a shared physician at night, a transfer process built as a relay, transport requested late and no prompt for backup treatment.

Conditions the Hospital Can Change

The chain closes on five conditions, each with a proposed change. A standing order will let any trained staff member obtain an electrocardiogram within 10 minutes for adults with chest pain, before registration. An electrocardiograph will be kept at the triage desk. A single-call activation agreement will be negotiated with the cardiac center so that one call from the emergency physician accepts the patient and alerts the laboratory team. Transport will be requested at the moment of diagnosis, in parallel with the acceptance call, with the helicopter service placed on standby automatically. The protocol will add a prompt to consider clot-dissolving therapy when expected transport and procedure time exceeds two hours. The staffing model for nights is a larger question, and the analysis refers it to the executive team with the data from this case. Root cause analyses are only as effective as the actions they produce (Wu et al., 2008), so each change will be tracked in the quarterly door-out report.

References

Peerally, M. F., Carr, S., Waring, J., & Dixon-Woods, M. (2017). The problem with root cause analysis. BMJ Quality & Safety, 26(5), 417-422. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjqs-2016-005511

Reason, J. (2000). Human error: Models and management. BMJ, 320(7237), 768-770. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.320.7237.768

Wang, T. Y., Nallamothu, B. K., Krumholz, H. M., Li, S., Roe, M. T., Jollis, J. G., Jacobs, A. K., Holmes, D. R., Peterson, E. D., & Ting, H. H. (2011). Association of door-in to door-out time with reperfusion delays and outcomes among patients transferred for primary percutaneous coronary intervention. JAMA, 305(24), 2540-2547. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2011.862

Wu, A. W., Lipshutz, A. K. M., & Pronovost, P. J. (2008). Effectiveness and efficiency of root cause analysis in medicine. JAMA, 299(6), 685-687. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.299.6.685

What the HCA 450 Topic 7 instructions ask for

The Topic 7 instructions in HCA-450 ask students to conduct a root cause analysis of an adverse event or a quality problem. Students describe the event, reconstruct the sequence of actions and decisions, identify contributing factors and root causes, and recommend actions to prevent recurrence. The assignment expects students to look beyond individual error to the systems, processes and conditions that made the event possible, using tools such as timelines, cause and effect diagrams or the five whys. Recommendations should be strong enough to change the system and be measurable, and the analysis should draw on patient safety literature and protect confidentiality.

How the HCA-450 Topic 7 example is put together

The finished analysis reaches a condition rather than a person, and the difference shows in the last third. It opens from the reported number, which is what the organization is answering for, and then descends to a composite de-identified case illustrating how that number gets produced. The sequence is reconstructed in order, with times and handoffs, and each step is followed by the question of what made that step possible. Human error appears in the chain, but the analysis keeps asking past it, because the answer that somebody failed to check terminates the inquiry. The chain closes on something that existed before the case, such as a form design, a staffing pattern or an alert nobody could act on.

Reading the HCA 450 Topic 7 rubric

Marks on the root cause analysis follow depth. Excellent analyses reconstruct the event in order with times and handoffs and then question each step until they reach a condition the organization can change. The rubric rewards moving past human error without ignoring it, and it gives credit for identifying what went right so that effective practices survive the changes. Recommendations should be system-level, such as moving equipment or collapsing a sequence, rather than retraining alone. The highest level ties each recommendation to a measure and cites evidence about the strengths and weaknesses of root cause analysis itself.

Common HCA 450 Topic 7 mistakes, and how to avoid them

Marks are lost, and lost heavily, where the chain stops at a person. An analysis concluding that a nurse did not verify the order has found the last event rather than the cause, and every recommendation that follows reduces to more training and closer attention, which is why those two appear in so many versions. Chains that reach a condition and then propose an education session have abandoned their own finding. Cases written with identifying detail breach the constraint the topic works under and are avoidable by construction. Sequences described without times conceal the gaps the analysis exists to find. Proposals with no measure attached cannot be evaluated later. Versions that never connect back to the reported number leave an explanation and no answer.

Get an HCA-450 Topic 7 example written to your instructions

Send the HCA-450 Topic 7 instructions, your classroom rubric and the measure or scenario you were assigned. We write a custom example to those criteria, with a composite de-identified case, a sequence laid out in time, a chain carried past human error and a change tied to the measure it would move, in 24 to 48 hours. The first one costs nothing.

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HCA 450 Topic 7 questions, answered

Why is human error not a root cause?

Because it is the last event rather than the first, and stopping there produces the recommendations everybody recognizes: retrain, remind, be careful. Ask what made the error available. A form putting two similar options next to each other, or a handoff with no structured content, will produce the same error again with different people.

Can I write about a real event from my workplace?

Write a composite instead. Assemble the pattern from several situations, remove anything identifying a patient, a colleague or a facility, and say in the paper that the case is composite and de-identified. That protects everyone involved and costs the analysis nothing, since the causal chain is what is being examined.

How far back should the chain go?

Until you reach something in place before the case began that the organization could change. A staffing ratio, a screen layout or a policy nobody can follow at three in the morning are all reachable. Going further, into funding or national policy, produces conclusions true enough to be useless here.

Where can I find a free HCA 450 Topic 7 sample paper?

The complete root cause analysis is on this page, with the reported number, the minute-by-minute sequence, the questions asked at each delay, what went right and the conditions to change. A free model for your own event or problem is available on request.

Why is the triage nurse not the root cause in HCA 450 Topic 7?

Because policy required registration before triage, the electrocardiograph was stored at the far end of the department and she was alone with another patient. Blaming her would leave all three conditions in place for the next night.