MKT 832 Topic 8 mediated behavior research design example

Digital Technology and Consumer Behavior Grand Canyon University Free custom sample in 24 to 48h

This MKT 832 Topic 8 sample paper designs research on whether visible popularity changes purchases, using a composite social shopping platform that hid like counts in two countries first. It completes GCU MKT 832, Digital Technology and Consumer Behavior, catalog code MKT-832, the closing seminar of this DBA course. A difference-in-differences comparison checks parallel trends, but the rollout also changed feed ranking. Posts reached through direct links, profiles and recency search, where ranking did not change, isolate visibility, and feed position is controlled. Two treated countries call for wide intervals, and data stay aggregated inside the platform. The design states in advance what result would show visibility has no effect.

CourseMKT 832 Digital Technology and Consumer Behavior
TopicTopic 8
Paper typeMediated behavior research design
LengthAbout 960 words, 2 pages
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolGrand Canyon University (GCU)
ProgramDBA
UpdatedOctober 2026

Free sample paper for MKT 832 Topic 8

1

Does Visible Popularity Change What People Buy? A Research Design for a Platform's Hidden Like Counts, Built Around a Rollout That Also Changed Ranking

[Author Name]

College of Doctoral Studies, Grand Canyon University

MKT-832: Digital Technology and Consumer Behavior

Topic 8 Research Design

[Instructor Name]

[Date]

The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.

What this page is doingThe title states the research question and the design's main obstacle. The social shopping platform and its rollout are a composite; the sources are real.
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Does Visible Popularity Change What People Buy? A Research Design for a Platform's Hidden Like Counts, Built Around a Rollout That Also Changed Ranking

The Opportunity

A composite social shopping platform, where creators post photographs of products that viewers can buy with a tap, hid the like counts on product posts in two countries several months before doing so everywhere else. That staggered rollout created a chance to learn whether visible popularity changes what people buy, a question of interest well beyond this platform. Experimental evidence from other settings suggests it should: Muchnik et al. (2013) showed that a single randomly assigned early vote shifted later ratings substantially. This design is built for the platform's question using records the platform itself produced. It must also deal with a complication: the same rollout altered how posts were ranked in users' feeds.

The Question and the Outcome

The research question is whether hiding like counts changes which product posts viewers buy from, and in particular whether purchases shift away from posts that would have displayed high counts toward posts that would have displayed low ones. The outcome is purchases made through the tap-to-buy feature, measured per post and per viewer, which the platform records directly. Likes themselves are not the outcome, because the rollout changed how visible they were to viewers and may also have changed whether viewers bothered to like posts at all.

The Basic Design

The basic design compares the two treated countries with similar untreated countries before and after the rollout, a difference-in-differences design. If purchases from high-like posts fell in the treated countries relative to the untreated ones after counts were hidden, that difference estimates the effect of hiding counts. Angrist and Pischke (2009) explain that this design rests on the parallel trends assumption: without the rollout, the treated and untreated countries would have followed the same path. The design checks that assumption by comparing the countries' purchase trends over the twelve months before the rollout, and selects comparison countries whose trends tracked the treated countries closely.

The Complication: Ranking Changed Too

The rollout did not only hide counts. In the treated countries, the platform also stopped using like counts as a ranking signal in feeds, so posts that once rose because they were liked now appeared in different positions. Any change in purchases could therefore come from viewers no longer seeing counts, the effect of interest, or from posts being shown in different places, a ranking effect. The basic design cannot separate the two.

Separating Visibility From Ranking

The design separates them in two ways. First, it uses purchases from posts reached outside the ranked feed: through direct links shared in messages, through creators' own profile pages, and through search results sorted by recency. In those routes, ranking did not change, but like counts were hidden just the same. Comparing purchases from high-like and low-like posts reached by these routes, before and after, in treated and untreated countries, isolates the effect of visibility. Second, within the feed, the design controls for each post's position in the feed, using the platform's records of where each post appeared to each viewer, and compares purchase rates among posts shown in the same positions.

Table 1

Separating the Two Effects by Route

Route to the postRanking changed?Counts hidden?What comparison measures
Ranked feedYesYesVisibility and ranking together
Feed, controlling for positionHeld constantYesMainly visibility
Direct links, profiles, recency searchNoYesVisibility alone

Threats and Checks

Several threats remain. Creators in the treated countries may have changed what they posted once counts were hidden, which would change the set of posts rather than how viewers responded; the design restricts the main analysis to creators active before and after the rollout. Viewers who reach posts through direct links may differ from feed viewers, so the visibility estimate from those routes may not apply to all viewers; the design reports it as an effect for those routes. And with only two treated countries, statistical uncertainty is easy to understate. Bertrand et al. (2004) showed that standard errors in difference-in-differences studies are often far too small when outcomes are correlated over time within groups, and the design uses methods suited to few treated units and reports the result with appropriately wide intervals.

Data and Ethics

The design uses records the platform already holds: which posts each viewer saw, by which route and in which feed position, and which posts they bought from. Those records are personal data, so the analysis would run on aggregated tables prepared inside the platform, with no individual-level records leaving its systems and with the platform's privacy review approving the use. The study introduces no new treatment, since the rollout had already happened, but the platform should still describe the research in its privacy notice and publish the result whatever it shows, so that a finding unwelcome to the business is not quietly set aside.

What the Design Can and Cannot Conclude

If purchases from high-like posts reached through unranked routes fell relative to low-like posts after counts were hidden, the design can conclude that visible popularity steered purchases toward popular posts for those viewers. It cannot conclude what would happen if a different platform hid counts, or what the long-run effect would be once creators and viewers adapted. Those limits should be stated with the result.

Conclusion

The staggered rollout offers a natural experiment on whether visible popularity changes what people buy, but it changed ranking at the same time. Using routes to posts that ranking did not touch, controlling for feed position and taking care with uncertainty from only two treated countries, the design can separate the effect of seeing counts from the effect of being ranked by them, which is the question the platform and the field most need answered.

References

Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2009). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist's companion. Princeton University Press.

Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). How much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 249-275. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355304772839588

Muchnik, L., Aral, S., & Taylor, S. J. (2013). Social influence bias: A randomized experiment. Science, 341(6146), 647-651. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1240466

MKT 832 Topic 8 instructions, in plain terms

The closing MKT-832 topic, Topic 8, has doctoral students design a study of how digital mediation shapes what people do. Strong designs define the question and an outcome the change did not distort, choose a design suited to the data, such as a difference-in-differences comparison with checked trends, and identify any confound introduced alongside the change. Students should explain how the design separates the effect of interest from the confound, address threats including few treated units, handle data ethically and state what the design can and cannot conclude.

How this MKT 832 Topic 8 example is built

The finished design pairs a quasi-experiment with data the researcher collects directly. Its core is a difference-in-differences comparison of purchase behavior in the two countries where counts disappeared against comparable countries where they remained, over matched periods before and after the change. Salganik's account of digital trace data frames the threats: the logs are always on and nonreactive, yet drifting and algorithmically confounded, because the ranking system changed alongside the counts. The design responds with a consented panel of users who complete short surveys on what they considered and why, linked to their own activity records. Lazer and colleagues' analysis of Google Flu Trends is cited as a warning about platform systems that change underneath a model. Every threat to validity is listed with the specific check that addresses it, and the analysis plan is preregistered.

MKT 832 Topic 8 rubric: what Excellent looks like

Faculty reward a design built around its confound. An Excellent design uses Angrist and Pischke's difference-in-differences with pre-rollout trend checks. Credit goes to recognizing that hiding likes also changed ranking and to using unranked routes and feed position to separate the two. The rubric values Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan on overstated precision with few treated units. Strong designs restrict to creators active before and after and plan privacy-preserving analysis. Top marks go to stating what the result could and could not show. Designs that ignore the ranking change cannot answer the question they set.

Common MKT 832 Topic 8 mistakes, and how to avoid them

Treating platform data as though it were collected for the researcher's question is the first thing a committee marks down, since the platform chose what to record and when to change it. A rollout described as a natural experiment without asking why those countries went first costs heavily, since the choice itself may correlate with the outcome. Many drafts overlook the ranking change that accompanied the count removal, leaving two treatments tangled as one. Parallel trends are often assumed instead of checked. Designs relying only on logs cannot say why behavior changed, and those relying only on surveys cannot say whether it did. The ethics section is commonly reduced to a sentence, though linking survey answers to activity records demands consent and data-access terms a doctoral committee will read closely.

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Send the MKT-832 Topic 8 instructions and the rubric your classroom lists, with the research question or platform your section is working on. We write a custom example to them, with the counterfactual named, a natural experiment examined for how it arose, platform and consented data combined, threats paired with checks and hypotheses preregistered, in 24 to 48 hours. The first one is free.

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MKT 832 Topic 8 questions, answered

What is algorithmic confounding?

A term Matthew Salganik uses for the way a platform's own systems shape the behavior recorded in its data. If a recommendation engine or a ranking change pushes users toward certain actions, the logs show those actions, and a researcher may mistake the system's influence for a fact about people. The example treats the ranking change that accompanied hidden counts as exactly this problem and designs around it.

Why combine platform data with surveys?

Each covers the other's blind spot. Platform records show what people did, at scale and without the distortion of asking them, but not what they considered or why. Surveys capture reasons and alternatives but rely on memory and self-report. Linking the two, with consent, lets the design check whether a change in behavior matches a change in stated reasons, which neither source could establish alone.

What did the Google Flu Trends case teach researchers?

Lazer and colleagues showed that a model estimating flu prevalence from search queries drifted badly, partly because the search engine itself kept changing in ways that altered what people searched. Their warning against what they called big data hubris applies directly to consumer research on platforms, where the system producing the data is redesigned constantly. The example cites the case when planning its checks for drift.

Where can I find a free MKT 832 Topic 8 sample paper?

The research design is shown here complete: the opportunity, the question and outcome, the basic design, the ranking complication, separating visibility from ranking, threats, data and ethics, what it can conclude and the conclusion. Outline the behavior you want to study and a design built around it comes free.

How does the design separate visibility from ranking in MKT 832 Topic 8?

By studying purchases from posts reached through direct links, creator profiles and recency-sorted search, where ranking did not change but counts were still hidden, and by controlling for feed position.