| Course | BUS 676 Advanced Conscious Capitalism: Free Market Perspectives |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 2 |
| Paper type | Debate paper |
| Length | About 970 words, 4 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | MS in Leadership |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for BUS 676 Topic 2
Friedman, Freeman and Jensen at the Same Table: A Fair Statement of the Stakeholder Debate, How Much the Sides Share and the Two Questions Still Open
[Author Name]
Colangelo College of Business, Grand Canyon University
BUS-676: Advanced Conscious Capitalism: Free Market Perspectives
Topic 2 Assignment
[Instructor Name]
[Date]
Friedman, Freeman and Jensen at the Same Table: A Fair Statement of the Stakeholder Debate, How Much the Sides Share and the Two Questions Still Open
Introduction
Debates about the purpose of the corporation are often conducted against caricatures: shareholder primacy as greed, stakeholder theory as sentiment. Neither caricature helps a manager decide anything. This paper first states the strongest version of each side, then shows how much the positions share once stated carefully and finally isolates the two questions on which they genuinely disagree. Conscious capitalism, which claims to resolve the debate, is assessed against those two questions at the end.
Friedman's Case, as He Made It
Friedman's argument is narrower than its reputation. A corporate executive is an employee of the owners and has a direct responsibility to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which will generally be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom (Friedman, 1970). The constraint matters: Friedman did not argue that anything legal is permitted.
His central objection to corporate social responsibility concerns whose money is spent. When an executive spends company funds on a social goal that the owners did not choose, the executive is spending someone else's money: the shareholders' in lower returns, customers' in higher prices or employees' in lower wages. In effect, the executive imposes a tax and decides how to spend it, a function Friedman believed belonged to elected governments accountable to voters, not to managers accountable to no one for that choice. Owners who want to support social causes remain free to do so with their own money.
Freeman's Case
Freeman began from a different question: not whom the firm belongs to, but whom it depends on. In his framing, a stakeholder is anyone, person or group, whose actions bear on whether the firm reaches its goals or whose life is touched by the firm pursuing them (Freeman, 1984). Employees, customers, suppliers, communities and financiers all supply something the firm needs, and each can withdraw it. Managing those relationships is therefore the substance of strategic management, not a distraction from it.
Read this way, stakeholder theory is first a theory of how to manage well and only second a claim about obligations. A manager who ignores suppliers' interests may find them unwilling to invest in the relationship; one who ignores employees may lose the knowledge that makes the business work.
Jensen's Objection
The sharpest reply from the free-market side came from Jensen. A firm cannot maximize more than one thing at a time. Telling managers to serve all stakeholders, without a rule for trading their interests off against each other, gives them no criterion for judging decisions and leaves them unaccountable, since any choice can be defended as serving some stakeholder (Jensen, 2001). Jensen's alternative, enlightened value maximization, keeps a single objective, long-run firm value, but accepts that the firm cannot achieve it without attending to all its stakeholders. Stakeholder theory supplies the map of relationships; value maximization supplies the scorecard.
How Much the Positions Share
Stated carefully, the three positions overlap more than the debate suggests. All agree that a firm must treat employees, customers and suppliers well enough to keep them, because it cannot create value otherwise. Friedman's ethical custom and Freeman's stakeholder management both rule out exploiting stakeholders who cannot protect themselves. Jensen explicitly adopts Freeman's account of how firms create value and rejects only its lack of a single objective. In most ordinary decisions, such as investing in employee training that raises productivity or treating a key supplier fairly, all three would recommend the same action, and for compatible reasons.
What Remains Open
Two questions remain genuinely disputed.
The first is who decides when stakeholder interests truly conflict and no horizon reconciles them. If closing a plant raises long-run value but leaves its workers permanently worse off, Friedman and Jensen say the owners' objective decides, within law and ethical custom. Freeman's framework, in its strong normative form, says managers should weigh the workers' interests on their own terms. The disagreement is about authority: whether managers may trade owners' wealth for other groups' welfare without the owners' consent.
The second is what the owners actually want. Hart and Zingales (2017) argue that shareholders care about more than market value; many would accept lower returns to avoid harms they consider unacceptable, and a firm can often avoid those harms more cheaply than shareholders could offset them on their own. If so, maximizing shareholder welfare, rather than market value, could justify some stakeholder commitments within Friedman's own framework, provided the owners have actually expressed those preferences.
Where Conscious Capitalism Stands
Conscious capitalism answers the first question by denying it arises: over time, its advocates say, stakeholder interests align. That answer is weakest exactly where the question bites, in cases where they do not. On the second question it has more to offer. A firm whose owners adopt a stakeholder purpose openly, so that investors who disagree can sell and those who agree can buy, satisfies Friedman's concern about consent and fits the Hart and Zingales account of shareholder welfare. Understood this way, the doctrine is defensible as a choice owners make and disclose, and contestable as a general rule for all firms.
Conclusion
The stakeholder debate is less polarized than it appears. Friedman, Freeman and Jensen agree that firms must manage stakeholder relationships to create value and must not exploit those who cannot protect themselves. They disagree about who has authority when interests diverge and about whether owners' own preferences extend beyond wealth. Those two questions, not the caricatures, are where a manager or a board should focus, and the clearest practical answer is for owners to state their preferences in advance so managers are not left to guess.
References
Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Pitman.
Friedman, M. (1970, September 13). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. The New York Times Magazine, 32-33, 122-126.
Hart, O., & Zingales, L. (2017). Companies should maximize shareholder welfare not market value. Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting, 2(2), 247-274. https://doi.org/10.1561/108.00000022
Jensen, M. C. (2001). Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective function. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 14(3), 8-21. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2001.tb00434.x
What the BUS 676 Topic 2 instructions ask for
The Topic 2 instructions in BUS-676 ask students to examine the debate between shareholder and stakeholder views of the firm. Weak papers argue against caricatures. The assignment rewards papers that present each position in the strongest form its authors gave it, including the constraints they placed on their own arguments. Students should identify the common ground, isolate the questions that remain genuinely disputed and evaluate where conscious capitalism stands on each. Attention to newer work on shareholder welfare, which suggests owners care about more than market value, strengthens graduate analysis. The paper should end by saying what a board could actually do with the remaining disagreement, since the debate matters most when someone has to decide.
Inside the BUS 676 Topic 2 example
The paper opens by rejecting the caricatures. Friedman's argument is set out with its agency logic and its limit of law and ethical custom. Freeman's account of stakeholders as groups the firm depends on follows, then Jensen's objection and his enlightened value maximization. A section lists what the three positions share in ordinary decisions. The open questions section identifies authority in genuine conflicts and the content of owner preferences, drawing on Hart and Zingales. Conscious capitalism is placed against both questions, and the conclusion recommends that owners state their preferences in advance. Each position is cited from its own source.
Where the marks sit in the BUS 676 Topic 2 rubric
Instructors grading the debate paper reward fairness first. Strong papers quote or closely paraphrase each author's actual position and include the qualifications that critics usually omit. Credit goes to showing how much the views share, since that sharpens what remains in dispute. The rubric values reducing the debate to specific questions a board could answer, rather than leaving it as a contest of values. The highest band brings in recent research on shareholder welfare and judges conscious capitalism against each open question separately. Papers that take a side without stating the other fairly usually lose points. Sources should be primary where possible, with the original essay and article cited rather than a textbook summary.
BUS 676 Topic 2 help: mistakes that cost marks
Most deductions trace to a misrepresented Friedman. Papers presenting the 1970 essay as permission to ignore law, ethics or society lose credit because the essay says the reverse, and any reader of it notices at once. The mirror error costs as much: stakeholder theory reduced to a demand that firms behave as charities, which no serious stakeholder theorist argues. Papers that stop at the two positions, without asking where they agree, miss that much of the apparent dispute dissolves once both are stated carefully. Leaving out the trade-off problem lets stakeholder theory avoid its hardest question. Graduate sections also expect accurate attribution, with the single-objective argument credited to Jensen and Friedman's claims quoted or closely paraphrased rather than inferred from secondary summaries. A conclusion picking a winner without addressing the divergence case has argued past the topic.
Get a BUS-676 Topic 2 example written to your instructions
Send us the BUS-676 Topic 2 instructions, your classroom rubric and the readings assigned for the topic. The custom example is written to those criteria, with Friedman and Freeman each stated fairly, Jensen's trade-off argument included, the common ground mapped and the remaining disagreement isolated, within 24 to 48 hours. The first one is free.
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BUS 676 Topic 2 questions, answered
Did Friedman really say companies should only care about profit?
Not in the crude sense often attributed to him. His essay argued that executives, as agents of the owners, should pursue the owners' goals, which he took generally to be making as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of society, embodied in law and ethical custom. He accepted spending that served the firm's long-run interest and objected mainly to presenting it as social responsibility.
What is Jensen's enlightened value maximization?
It is Jensen's attempt to take stakeholders seriously without abandoning a single objective. He argued that a firm cannot sensibly maximize in several directions at once and needs one criterion, long-run firm value, for choosing between claims. Managers should attend to stakeholders because firm value depends on them, but when interests conflict, value breaks the tie. It narrows the debate rather than ending it.
Which side should the paper take?
Whichever the argument supports, and many strong papers take neither outright in this topic, since the assignment usually asks for the positions to be compared rather than resolved. The test is whether each is stated so its defenders would accept the summary and that the paper finds the precise point where they part. Later topics typically ask for a position, defended against the other side.
Where can I find a free BUS 676 Topic 2 sample paper?
The complete debate paper appears above, covering Friedman's case, Freeman's case, Jensen's objection, the common ground, the two open questions, conscious capitalism's position and the conclusion. Tell us which readings your section assigned, and we will draft a free version around them.
What do Friedman and Freeman agree on in BUS 676 Topic 2?
That firms must treat employees, customers and suppliers well enough to keep them and must not exploit groups that cannot protect themselves. In most ordinary decisions, such as training that raises productivity, they would recommend the same action.