| Course | HIM 370 Health Care Information Systems |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 3 |
| Paper type | Interface failure analysis |
| Length | About 1,000 words, 3 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | BS in Health Information Management |
| Updated | September 2026 |
Free sample paper for HIM 370 Topic 3
176 Pounds Filed as 176 Kilograms: An Interface Failure Analysis Traced Through Message, Engine and Receiving System
[Author Name]
College of Nursing and Health Care Professions, Grand Canyon University
HIM-370: Health Care Information Systems
Topic 3 Assignment
[Instructor Name]
[Date]
The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.
176 Pounds Filed as 176 Kilograms: An Interface Failure Analysis Traced Through Message, Engine and Receiving System
The Incident
Mr. W., 64, was admitted to Bajada Community Hospital through the emergency department with a deep vein thrombosis. The triage nurse recorded his weight as 176, selecting pounds on the emergency department screen. When the admission was registered, the EHR sent an admission message to the pharmacy system carrying the weight in an observation segment. The pharmacy system filed and displayed the weight as 176 kilograms. The admitting physician ordered weight-based enoxaparin, and the pharmacy system's dose check calculated a dose from 176 kilograms, more than twice the correct dose for a man weighing 80 kilograms. A pharmacist verifying the order noticed that a 176-kilogram patient was unusual, checked the emergency department record, found the pounds entry and corrected the dose before any was given. No harm reached Mr. W. This analysis traces the failure through the three layers it passed through, so that the fix addresses the cause rather than the pharmacist's catch.
Layer 1: The Message
The admission message followed HL7 version 2, in which each message is built from segments and each segment from fields. Observations such as weight travel in an observation segment, whose fields include the observation identifier, the value and the units (Health Level Seven International, 2007). In Mr. W.'s message, the value field held 176 and the units field was empty. The emergency department screen had stored the unit selection in a local field that was never mapped to the outgoing message, because the interface was built when the screen allowed only kilograms. A later screen change added a pounds option and no one updated the interface specification. The message was valid under the standard, since the units field was optional in the implementation, and so nothing at this layer flagged it.
Layer 2: The Interface Engine
The interface engine received the message, routed copies to the pharmacy, laboratory and dietary systems, and applied the translation rules configured for each feed. The pharmacy feed's rules translated the EHR's local observation code for weight into the pharmacy system's code, but contained no rule for units, because every weight had arrived in kilograms when the feed was built. The engine could have been configured to reject or hold an observation with an empty units field, or to require units for weight specifically; it was not. The engine did exactly what it was told, which was to pass the value on.
Layer 3: The Receiving System
The pharmacy system received a weight with no units and applied its own default, kilograms, silently. It displayed 176 kg on the patient banner and used it in dose calculations. A receiving system that defaults a missing unit, rather than refusing the value or displaying it as unverified, turns an incomplete message into a plausible-looking error. The dose-range check did fire, but it was one of many alerts pharmacists see each shift, and the verifying pharmacist's attention, not the alert, caught the problem.
The failure matches a pattern research has described. Ash et al. (2004) described errors that arise when information is entered, retrieved or passed between systems, where a value is technically transferred but its context is lost. Koppel et al. (2005) described how order entry systems can facilitate medication errors, including through displays that present information misleadingly. Here, a correctly entered weight became a dangerous one through three configuration decisions made years apart by different teams.
Why the Pharmacist's Catch Is Not the Fix
It would be easy to close this incident by commending the pharmacist and reminding staff to check weights. That response treats the last barrier as the system. The pharmacist noticed because 176 kilograms is unusual; a patient who weighed 90 pounds would have been filed as 90 kilograms, a weight too ordinary to question, and the resulting overdose would have passed every human check. The failure is therefore more dangerous for lighter patients, including older adults and children, whose pound values fall within the plausible kilogram range.
A search of the pharmacy system's weight history, run as part of this analysis, found 37 other admissions in the preceding four months where the emergency department recorded pounds and the pharmacy displayed the same number as kilograms. None led to a documented dosing error, partly because most weight-based orders are verified against the EHR's own display, which showed the correct unit. But the count shows that the condition was routine, not rare, and that the enoxaparin order was simply the first time the error met a calculation large enough to be noticed. Fixing the layers removes the condition itself rather than relying on the next person to notice it.
Fixes at Each Layer
Table 1
Fixes Assigned by Layer
| Layer | Fix | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| Message | Emergency department screen restricted to kilograms, with a pounds-to-kilograms converter that stores only the kilogram value; units field mapped and required in every outgoing weight observation | EHR team |
| Interface engine | Pharmacy, laboratory and dietary feeds hold any weight or height observation with an empty or unexpected units field and alert the interface team | Interface team |
| Receiving system | Pharmacy system configured to refuse a weight without units and flag the patient for weight verification | Pharmacy informatics |
| Process | Any change to a clinical entry screen that adds a unit or option requires an interface impact review | Change control board |
The first fix follows national medication safety guidance, which recommends that patient weights be measured and recorded in metric units only (Institute for Safe Medication Practices, 2024). Restricting entry to kilograms removes the ambiguity at its source; the other fixes ensure that if ambiguity returns, each later layer refuses it rather than resolving it silently. The process fix addresses the root cause, which was not any one layer but the absence of a review connecting a screen change to the interfaces that depended on it. Health information management sits on the change control board and will track whether the interface impact review is completed for every screen change in the next year.
References
Ash, J. S., Berg, M., & Coiera, E. (2004). Some unintended consequences of information technology in health care: The nature of patient care information system-related errors. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 11(2), 104-112. https://doi.org/10.1197/jamia.M1471
Health Level Seven International. (2007). HL7 messaging standard version 2.5.1. Health Level Seven International.
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2024). ISMP targeted medication safety best practices for hospitals: 2024-2025. Institute for Safe Medication Practices.
Koppel, R., Metlay, J. P., Cohen, A., Abaluck, B., Localio, A. R., Kimmel, S. E., & Strom, B. L. (2005). Role of computerized physician order entry systems in facilitating medication errors. JAMA, 293(10), 1197-1203. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.293.10.1197
HIM 370 Topic 3 instructions, in plain terms
HIM-370 Topic 3 asks students to analyze an interface failure between health information systems. Papers often blame a user or a single system. The assignment rewards analyses that trace an incident through each layer it passed: the message and its segments and fields, the interface engine's routing and translation rules and the receiving system's filing and display. Students should explain what each layer was configured to do, show where assumptions made at different times collided, describe why relying on the person who caught the error is not a solution and assign fixes to owners at each layer, including a process change that addresses the root cause.
Inside the HIM 370 Topic 3 example
The finished analysis reads as an incident traced through three layers. A composite adult is admitted, and the EHR sends an HL7 version 2 admission message whose observation segment carries a weight value. The interface engine receives it, routes a copy to the pharmacy system and applies the translation rules configured for that feed. The pharmacy system accepts the message, files the value and displays it as kilograms, although the sending side recorded pounds and left the units field empty. The analysis describes the message segment by segment in plain language, marks which fields the standard requires and which it leaves optional, and states that every system behaved as configured. A short passage then describes how the same fact travels as a FHIR Observation resource, where units are a structured part of the value.
HIM 370 Topic 3 rubric: what Excellent looks like
GCU's rubric for the interface failure analysis rewards layered reasoning. Excellent analyses describe the message structure accurately, including which field was empty and why the message was still valid. Credit goes to showing that the interface engine and receiving system behaved as configured, which locates the failure in the gaps between them. The rubric values evidence of how often the condition occurred and why lighter patients face greater risk. The highest level assigns fixes by layer with owners and addresses the missing review that allowed a screen change to break an interface.
HIM 370 Topic 3 help before you submit
Stopping at the name of the standard is where most drafts in this topic go wrong. An answer that says both systems use HL7, so the interface should work, has named the envelope and ignored what was written inside it. Papers that describe the interface engine as a pipe miss the translation and routing rules where many fixes actually belong. Blaming the pharmacy for trusting the value, or the registrar for entering pounds, turns a design gap into a training issue and leaves the next feed exposed. Some analyses offer FHIR as the answer, when a newer standard still depends on both sides populating and reading the same fields. An analysis that never assigns the fix to a layer, with a test to prove it, ends as a description of the failure rather than a response to it.
Get an HIM-370 Topic 3 example written to your instructions
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More HIM 370 papers and BS in Health Information Management samples
- HIM 370 Topic 1: System Type Inventory
- HIM 370 Topic 2: Data Element Trace
- HIM 370 Topic 4: Duplicate Record Impact Analysis
- HIM 370 Topic 5: System Limits Dq Post
- HIM 370 Topic 6: Weighted Requirements Matrix
- HIM 370 Topic 7: Data Migration Plan
- HIM 370 Topic 8: Installed System Evaluation
- HIM 355 Topic 3: Root Operation Selection Analysis
- HIM 350 Topic 3: Combination Code Analysis
- HIM 310 Topic 3: Procedural Logic Comparison
- HIM 200 Topic 3: Retention Schedule Analysis
HIM 370 Topic 3 questions, answered
Does the analysis need real HL7 message syntax?
Usually not at this level. Most sections want the structure explained, which segments carry the patient, the visit and the observation, and which fields matter to the failure, rather than raw pipe-delimited text. If your instructions include a sample message, the analysis works from it and describes each relevant field in plain words. Reproducing long message strings without explanation adds length and shows little understanding of what they carry.
Would FHIR have prevented this failure?
Not by itself. FHIR represents a measured value as a quantity with a units system, which makes a missing unit easier to detect and harder to ignore. The sending system still has to populate it and the receiving system still has to reject a value without one. A standard can make the right behavior easier, but agreement between the two sides on what each field must contain is what prevents the error.
Where do interface engines fit in a hospital?
Between systems that were never designed to talk to each other directly. Rather than building a separate connection from every system to every other, a hospital routes messages through an engine that receives them, sends copies where they are needed, reformats or remaps fields for each receiver and keeps a log. That central position is why many interface fixes are made in the engine rather than in either system at the ends.
Where can I find a free HIM 370 Topic 3 sample paper?
The interface analysis is reproduced in full, covering the incident, the message, the interface engine, the receiving system, why the pharmacist's catch is not the fix and fixes at each layer. Describe your incident for a free worked analysis.
Why is the error worse for lighter patients in HIM 370 Topic 3?
A 90-pound patient filed as 90 kilograms looks ordinary, so the overdose would pass every human check. The 176-kilogram value was caught only because it was unusual.