| Course | MGT 830 Management of Business Complexity |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 3 |
| Paper type | Intervention critique |
| Length | About 1,030 words, 5 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | DBA |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for MGT 830 Topic 3
Shorter Calls, Longer Waits: How a Handle-Time Target Backfired in a Regional Telecom's Contact Centers
[Author Name]
College of Doctoral Studies, Grand Canyon University
MGT-830: Management of Business Complexity
Topic 3 Assignment
[Instructor Name]
[Date]
The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.
Shorter Calls, Longer Waits: How a Handle-Time Target Backfired in a Regional Telecom's Contact Centers
The Intervention as Leadership Saw It
Lakeshore Connect, a composite regional telecom serving about 900,000 broadband and mobile customers, had a waiting problem. Customers calling its three contact centers waited an average of 4.1 minutes to reach an agent, and complaints about waits were rising. Leadership reasoned that if each call took less time, the same agents could answer more calls and waits would fall. It set a target for average handle time, the minutes an agent spends on a call including wrap-up, of 7.5 minutes against a current 9.4, and tied a quarterly bonus to it. The reasoning was simple and, on its face, sound.
What Happened
Table 1
Lakeshore's Contact Center Measures Before and After the Handle-Time Target, Illustrative
| Measure | Before the target | Twelve months later | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Average handle time | 9.4 minutes | 7.7 minutes | Down 18 percent |
| Customers contacting again within 7 days | 18 percent | 33 percent | Up 15 points |
| Total contacts per month | 310,000 | 397,000 | Up 28 percent |
| Average wait to reach an agent | 4.1 minutes | 6.3 minutes | Up 54 percent |
Table 1 shows the sequence over the following year, using composite figures.
The Mechanism
Handle time fell, as intended. Agents met the target by ending calls before problems were resolved, transferring difficult calls to other queues and promising callbacks. Customers whose problems were not resolved called again, often more than once. Contact volume grew faster than handle time fell, so total agent workload rose by about 5 percent, and because the centers were already running near full use of their agents, a small rise in workload produced a large rise in waits.
The causal path is a loop the target broke. Before the target, resolution on the first contact had been holding down future demand: a solved problem does not generate another call. When agents were rewarded for short calls instead of solved problems, unresolved contacts began generating later contacts, and those contacts added to the queue, lengthening waits, which leadership had set out to shorten. The gap between a rushed call and the customer's return call, typically two to five days, hid the connection. Managers watching daily reports saw handle time fall day by day and saw volume rise, but the two appeared unrelated because they were separated in time and recorded in different reports.
Two Theories Applied
Forrester (1971) argued that complex social systems often behave counterintuitively: policies chosen by intuition act on symptoms, and the system's feedback structure produces results opposite to those intended, often after a delay that conceals the cause. Lakeshore's target is an example. The intuitive lever, shorter calls, acted on the symptom of long waits and, through the repeat-contact loop, made waits longer.
Campbell (1979) observed that the more any quantitative social indicator is used for decision making, the more it becomes subject to corruption pressures and the more it distorts the process it is meant to monitor. Before the bonus, handle time described how long it took to serve a customer. Once agents were paid on it, handle time described how quickly agents could end calls, and it stopped measuring service. The indicator degraded because it was tied to consequences for the people being measured.
The Rival Explanation: A Badly Designed Reward
A compensation specialist would offer a simpler account. Kerr (1975) described organizations that pay for one behavior yet hope for a different one, and Lakeshore rewarded short calls while hoping for satisfied customers. On this view the episode is a reward-design error, not a systems effect, and a better bonus would have fixed it.
The critique grants most of this. Kerr explains why agents rushed: they did what the reward asked. But Kerr's account does not explain why total volume grew by more than the minutes saved, or why waits rose when handle time fell. That requires the repeat-contact loop and the queueing effect of running near capacity. The reward started the problem; the system's structure turned it into a reversal. The two explanations are complementary, and a fix based on Kerr alone, such as replacing handle time with a different single target, would risk rebuilding the same structure around a new indicator.
What Could Have Been Seen in Advance
Three facts were available before the target was set. First-contact resolution data showed that about 18 percent of customers already called back within a week, so repeat demand was a known share of volume. The centers were running at high agent occupancy, which meant waits would be very sensitive to any rise in workload. And the bonus tied pay to a measure agents could move without improving service. A manager who had asked how agents would meet the target, and what a customer whose call was cut short would do next, could have predicted the repeat-contact loop.
Implications for Single-Metric Targets
The episode suggests three lessons for any single-metric target in a system with feedback. Pair the target with a measure of the outcome it could damage, here repeat contacts within seven days. Look for the delay between the action and its consequence, and report the two together. And avoid tying individual pay to an indicator that people can move without improving what it was meant to measure. Lakeshore has since removed the handle-time bonus and begun reporting first-contact resolution beside waits.
Even the replacement carries a warning. If Lakeshore were to pay agents on first-contact resolution instead, Campbell's argument predicts new distortions: agents might mark calls resolved that were not, or keep customers on the line far longer than needed to avoid any chance of a return call, pushing handle time and waits up again. The point is not that no measure can be used. It is that a measure tied to consequences for the people being measured should be paired with others that would reveal gaming, and should be reviewed against the outcome customers experience, in this case total time from first call to a solved problem. That end-to-end measure is harder to collect, because it requires linking a customer's contacts across days and channels, but it is the one that the original goal, shorter waits for a working service, actually described. Lakeshore's analytics team estimates it can produce it monthly within two quarters.
References
Campbell, D. T. (1979). Assessing the impact of planned social change. Evaluation and Program Planning, 2(1), 67-90. https://doi.org/10.1016/0149-7189(79)90048-X
Forrester, J. W. (1971). Counterintuitive behavior of social systems. Theory and Decision, 2(2), 109-140. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00148991
Kerr, S. (1975). On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B. Academy of Management Journal, 18(4), 769-783. https://doi.org/10.5465/255378
What the MGT 830 Topic 3 instructions ask for
Topic 3 of MGT-830 asks doctoral learners to critique an intervention that produced the opposite of its purpose. A paper meets the prompt when it reconstructs what leadership intended, lays out what happened in figures, and identifies the mechanism that turned the intervention against its goal. Learners should name the feedback loop and the delay involved, apply Forrester's argument about counterintuitive behavior and Campbell's law about indicators tied to consequences, and give the simpler rival explanation a fair hearing. The critique should ask what a manager could have observed beforehand and draw implications for single-metric targets, without claiming that no measure can ever be used. Composite figures should be labeled as such.
How the MGT-830 Topic 3 example is put together
The critique takes an intervention the company counted as a success on its own metric and shows it producing the opposite of its purpose. Leadership wanted shorter waits and set a handle-time target with a bonus attached. Agents met it by ending calls before problems were resolved, transferring difficult ones and promising callbacks, so customers called again, often more than once. Contact volume grew faster than handle time fell, and waits lengthened. The critique rebuilds the sequence from reported figures, labeled as composite, and names the loop the target broke: resolution on first contact had been holding down future demand. Forrester's argument about the counterintuitive behavior of social systems frames the reversal, Campbell's law explains why the indicator itself degraded, and Kerr's critique of rewarding one behavior while hoping for another is weighed as the simpler rival account.
Where the marks sit in the MGT 830 Topic 3 rubric
Faculty marking the critique reward a mechanism, not a label. An Excellent paper presents the intervention in leadership's terms, shows the reversal in labeled figures and names the loop the target broke, along with the delay that kept managers from seeing it. Credit goes to Campbell's law applied to handle time ceasing to measure service once bonuses depended on it, without stretching it into a rejection of all metrics. The rubric values a partial concession to Kerr, showing what reward design explains and what it cannot, such as volume outgrowing the minutes saved. Strong papers identify what was observable in advance. Top marks go to implications that pair targets with the outcomes they could damage.
Common MGT 830 Topic 3 mistakes, and how to avoid them
Doctoral graders are hardest on a critique that reports the reversal, labels it an unintended consequence and never names its mechanism, which records a surprise without explaining it. Blaming the agents for gaming the target mistakes the symptom for the cause, since agents did what the reward asked. Some papers draw the right loop but omit the delay between a rushed call and the callback, and without it the managers' failure to notice becomes inexplicable. Campbell's law is occasionally stretched into a claim that no metric can ever be used, when the argument concerns indicators tied to consequences for the people measured. The Kerr objection is the one most often missing, although a compensation specialist would offer it first. Recommendations that swap handle time for a different single target rebuild the structure the critique has just shown failing.
Get an MGT-830 Topic 3 example written to your instructions
Send the MGT-830 Topic 3 instructions and the rubric posted in your classroom, with the intervention or case your section chose. We write the custom example to those criteria, reconstructing the reversal from figures, locating its mechanism and weighing the incentive explanation against the systems one, in 24 to 48 hours. The first is free.
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MGT 830 Topic 3 questions, answered
What is Campbell's law?
Donald Campbell argued that the more a quantitative social indicator is used for social decision making, the more it becomes subject to corruption pressures and the more it distorts the processes it was meant to monitor. The example applies that argument to handle time once agents were paid on it. It is often discussed alongside Goodhart's law, a similar observation from economics about targets and measures.
Is this really just an incentive problem?
Partly, and the example says so. Kerr's critique of rewarding one behavior while hoping for another explains why agents rushed calls. It does not explain why total volume rose by more than the time saved, which depends on unresolved contacts feeding later demand after a delay. The critique treats the incentive account as necessary and the systems account as what explains the size and direction of the reversal.
Can a real company case be used instead of a composite?
Many prompts ask for a published case or a documented organization, and your rubric will say which. The example uses a composite so its figures can be labeled as illustrative. If you work from a real organization, cite where each figure comes from and keep the claim about mechanism separate from the reported numbers, since the mechanism is an inference the evidence has to support.
Where can I find a free MGT 830 Topic 3 sample paper?
The handle-time backfire critique is shown in full: the intervention, the figures, the mechanism, Forrester and Campbell, the Kerr rival account, what could have been seen and the lessons for targets. Tell us the intervention your case describes and a free critique can be drafted.
Why did waits rise in MGT 830 Topic 3?
Rushed calls left problems unresolved, so customers called again. Contacts rose 28 percent while handle time fell 18 percent, raising total workload in centers already near capacity, which pushed waits from 4.1 to 6.3 minutes.