| Course | MKT 834 Data-Driven Marketing Management |
|---|---|
| Topic | Topic 6 |
| Paper type | Gaming-resistant metric design |
| Length | About 970 words, 2 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Grand Canyon University (GCU) |
| Program | DBA |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for MKT 834 Topic 6
People Push on Whatever They Are Paid For: Replacing a Payroll Software Company's Lead Count With a Measurement System That Resists Gaming
[Author Name]
College of Doctoral Studies, Grand Canyon University
MKT-834: Data-Driven Marketing Management
Topic 6 Metric Design
[Instructor Name]
[Date]
The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.
People Push on Whatever They Are Paid For: Replacing a Payroll Software Company's Lead Count With a Measurement System That Resists Gaming
The Problem
Marketing at a composite payroll-software company for small businesses is paid on marketing-qualified leads, prospects whose behavior, such as downloading a guide or attending a webinar, meets a scoring threshold. In two years, the count has roughly tripled, from about 1,200 a quarter to about 3,600. Over the same period, the share of those leads that the sales team accepts as worth pursuing has fallen from about 52 percent to about 14 percent, and the number of accepted leads has barely changed. The company is paying for a number that has grown while the thing it was meant to measure has not. This paper designs a replacement built on the assumption that people will push on whatever they are paid for, and prices what the new system costs. Figures are illustrative.
How the Count Was Gamed
No one cheated. The marketing team did what the incentive asked. It lowered the friction to download guides, ran broader webinars that attracted students and competitors, and adjusted the scoring rules so that more behaviors counted. Each change was defensible on its own and raised the count. Kerr (1975) described this pattern decades ago: organizations reward one behavior while hoping for another. Campbell (1979) stated the general principle that the more a quantitative indicator is used for decisions, the more it is subject to pressures that distort and corrupt it. The lead count was used to pay people, so it was distorted.
Why a Single Number Invites Gaming
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) showed that when people perform several tasks but are rewarded on a measure that captures only some of them, they shift effort toward what is measured and away from what is not. The lead count measured quantity and not quality, so effort moved to quantity. Any single number tied to pay will invite the same response; the solution is not a better single number but a small system of measures that are hard to raise together without doing the real work.
The Measurement System
The design replaces the single count with four measures, chosen so that gaming one tends to show up in another.
Sales-accepted pipeline value is the primary measure: the total value of opportunities that the sales team accepts and opens from marketing-sourced leads, measured each quarter. It counts quality, because sales accepts only leads it believes can buy, and value, because a large employer counts more than a sole trader.
Closed revenue from marketing-sourced leads, measured with a two-quarter lag, checks that accepted pipeline turns into sales and prevents marketing and sales from colluding to accept weak leads.
Acceptance rate is reported but not paid on, as a counterweight: if the lead count rises while acceptance falls, the report shows it immediately.
A quarterly audit of a random sample of 50 leads, scored by someone outside marketing and sales against a written definition of a qualified prospect, checks the scoring rules themselves and catches drift that the other measures might miss.
Table 1
The Replacement Measurement System
| Measure | Role | What gaming it would reveal |
|---|---|---|
| Sales-accepted pipeline value | Primary, paid on | Inflating leads does not raise it unless sales accepts them |
| Closed revenue, two-quarter lag | Check, partly paid on | Collusion to accept weak leads |
| Acceptance rate | Counterweight, reported | Rising volume with falling quality |
| Random audit of 50 leads | Check on scoring rules | Drift in what counts as qualified |
Pay
Marketing's variable pay will be based 70 percent on sales-accepted pipeline value against a quarterly target and 30 percent on closed revenue from marketing-sourced leads two quarters later. The lead count and acceptance rate are reported on the same dashboard but carry no pay. The sales team's acceptance decisions are reviewed through the audit, so marketing can challenge leads that sales rejects without reason.
What the System Will Invite
The new system will invite its own pushes. Marketing may focus on large prospects, whose pipeline value is high, and neglect small businesses, the company's core market. The design addresses this by setting the pipeline target separately for small and mid-sized prospects. Sales may slow acceptance to pressure marketing, which the audit and the acceptance-rate report make visible. No system is immune; the aim is a system in which gaming is harder and easier to see.
Introducing the Change
The change will be introduced over two quarters. In the first, the new measures run beside the old count, with pay still based on leads, so the marketing team can see how its work scores under the new system before anything depends on it. In the second, pay moves to the new measures. The marketing team will also help write the audit's definition of a qualified prospect, which makes the definition more accurate and gives the team a stake in a standard it might otherwise see as imposed by sales.
What the System Costs
The system costs more to run than a count. The audit needs about four days of an analyst's time each quarter, the two-quarter lag delays part of marketing's pay, and the CRM needs fields to track lead source through to closed revenue. Together these would take roughly 60,000 dollars of staff time and setup each year. Against that, the company currently pays bonuses on about 3,000 extra leads a quarter that sales rejects, and its sales team spends time screening them.
Conclusion
The lead count tripled because the company paid for it, and it stopped measuring what the company wanted. A small system of linked measures, with pay tied to what sales accepts and what closes, a counterweight that is reported but not paid on, and an independent audit, makes gaming harder and visible. It costs more to run than a single number, and it measures what the company actually wants marketing to produce.
References
Campbell, D. T. (1979). Assessing the impact of planned social change. Evaluation and Program Planning, 2(1), 67-90. https://doi.org/10.1016/0149-7189(79)90048-X
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7(Special issue), 24-52. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24
Kerr, S. (1975). On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B. Academy of Management Journal, 18(4), 769-783. https://doi.org/10.2307/255378
Reading the GCU MKT 834 Topic 6 instructions
Topic 6 in MKT-834 asks doctoral students to design marketing measures that resist gaming. Strong designs explain how the current metric was gamed without anyone cheating, draw on theory about indicators and multitask incentives, and replace a single number with a small system of linked measures in which gaming one shows up in another. Students should specify what is paid on and what is only reported, anticipate the behavior the new system invites, plan the transition and price what the system costs. The design should say what is paid on and what is merely reported.
How this MKT 834 Topic 6 example is built
The finished design starts from Goodhart's observation that a measure used as a target loses its value as a measure, and Campbell's parallel warning about indicators used for social decisions. It then diagnoses how the lead count was inflated, all figures illustrative: the scoring threshold was lowered twice, webinar sign-ups earned lead status and a gated checklist collected student email addresses. The replacement has four parts. Rewards move to a lagged outcome finance already records, first-year contract value from new accounts. Lead volume stays as a leading indicator but is paired with the sales-acceptance rate, which falls when volume is padded. A monthly random audit of fifty lead records checks for fit. Program credit comes from holdout comparisons rather than from sourced-pipeline reports. Each part is costed in analyst time.
Reading the MKT 834 Topic 6 rubric
Faculty reward a design that assumes people push on what they are paid for. An Excellent design uses Kerr and Campbell to explain the tripled lead count. Credit goes to Holmstrom and Milgrom on effort shifting to measured tasks. The rubric values a table of four linked measures, with pay on accepted pipeline and lagged revenue and acceptance reported only. Strong designs add a random audit of 50 leads and anticipate a drift toward large prospects. Top marks go to a phased introduction and a cost of about 60,000 dollars a year.
MKT 834 Topic 6 help before you submit
The most expensive mistake here is proposing a better single metric, since any number that carries rewards will attract the same pressure the lead count did. Nearly as costly is describing gaming as dishonesty to be punished, when the diagnosis shows ordinary people responding to what they were paid for. Many drafts cite Goodhart's law as a slogan and never turn it into a design principle with a component attached. Paired measures are frequently proposed without saying which manipulation each pair would reveal, which leaves the pairing decorative. Designs that move rewards to lagged outcomes rarely address the objection that managers need a number they can move this quarter, and doctoral readers expect that answer. Leaving out what the system costs to run makes a sound design look free, which no finance reader will believe.
Get an MKT-834 Topic 6 example written to your instructions
Send the MKT-834 Topic 6 instructions and the rubric attached in your classroom, with the metric or organization your section assigned. We write a custom example to those criteria, with the inflation diagnosed, gaming anticipated component by component, each manipulation mapped to the measure that exposes it and the speed objection answered, in 24 to 48 hours. The first one is free.
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MKT 834 Topic 6 questions, answered
What is Goodhart's law?
An observation attributed to the economist Charles Goodhart, often paraphrased as saying that when a measure becomes a target it ceases to be a good measure. Donald Campbell made a similar argument about quantitative indicators used in social decision making, warning that they become subject to corruption pressures. Both serve as the design's premise: every rewarded number will be pushed on, so the system must expect it.
What is a marketing-qualified lead?
A prospect that marketing judges ready for sales contact, usually because a scoring model assigned enough points for actions such as downloading content, attending a webinar or visiting pricing pages. The definition is set internally, which makes it easy to change. When marketing is rewarded on the count, the definition tends to loosen. The example keeps the measure for diagnosis and stops paying on it.
Why is a lagged outcome harder to game?
Because it is recorded by someone other than the team being measured and depends on a customer's decision to pay. First-year contract value appears in the finance system only when an account signs and is billed, so raising it requires producing customers rather than reclassifying activity. The cost is delay, and the example handles that by keeping faster indicators for steering while tying rewards to the slower one.
Where can I find a free MKT 834 Topic 6 sample paper?
The metric design is shown here complete: the problem, how the count was gamed, why a single number invites gaming, the measurement system, pay, what it will invite, the transition, cost and the conclusion. Describe your current metric and we will design a free replacement.
Why report acceptance rate but not pay on it in MKT 834 Topic 6?
As a counterweight. If lead volume rises while acceptance falls, the dashboard shows it at once, but paying on acceptance would invite pressure on sales to accept weak leads.